THE TRUTH ABOUT A LIE
A refutation of the claim that falsehood is included in Divine Power

Abu Hasan al-Ridawi
The picture on the cover is from a manuscript of Sharḥ Al-Dowwānī álā Āqidah al-Ađūdiyyah from the Diaber collection. The text appears on page 119 of the MS; it is signed 1094 AH and is translated thus:

I say: falsehood is a flaw, and a flaw for Allāh tāālā is muĥāl. It is not included in the mumkināt and neither is it included in Divine Power. And this, just as His Divine Power does not include anything that implies a flaw in Him – exalted is He – like ignorance [jahl] and powerlessness [ājz] or negation of the attribute of Speech or any other attribute of perfection.
# Table of Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preface</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. In These Difficult Times</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. The Issue</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. The Sunni View</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. A Primer on Kalām Terminology</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. Kalām Terminology: A Summary</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI. Is Muḥāl included in Divine Power?</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII. Allāh, Most High, is Transcendent from all flaws</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII. Definition of Kadhib</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IX. Statements of Scholars that Kadhib is Muḥāl</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X. The Principle of Explosion and the Deobandi Proposition</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XI. Khulf fīl Waŷīd</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XII. What Sharīf Al-Jurjānī Said</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XIII. Conclusion</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix A. Keller's Talk</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix B. A Clarification</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix C. Obscure Statements in Books of Kalām</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix D. Transliteration Table</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix E. Bibliography</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix F. Another Deception</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix G. Shaykh Buti’s Statement</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afterword</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Truth About A Lie

Praise be to Allāh táālā, the Lord of the worlds. Salutations and peace be upon our master Muĥammad, the prince of the worlds; and the leader of all prophets and messengers sent to guide the world. O Allāh! We ask thee to guide us to the truth and on the right path.

The most important thing a sensible and a wise person ought to do in these difficult times is to strive to save his own self from eternal hellfire. That is not possible, except by knowing the correct belief and true tawĥīd, as described and explained by leaders of the Ahlu’s Sunnah – scholars and pious gnostics among them.

These are times when people following the true creed and staunchly attesting to the right belief are at ebb; and the seas of ignorance swell. Falsehood is rampant and threatens to dominate; truth, the truthful and the righteous are under attack from every corner of the earth as waves of depravity gush with all force from all sides.

Alas! How adorned and bedecked are the false and the flawed, the blemished and the fraud!

Truly, fortunate is that person who recognizes the correct creed and immaculate faith and is thus enlightened; his innermost secret is radiant, illuminated by the light of truth. He, who has distanced himself completely from all deviant groups and their evil, until death takes him away, delivered and liberated from this wicked world.

Glory be to Allāh táālā who has inspired us and has given us a clear understanding of such points of belief that few know in our age; and fewer still are scholars who can explain these issues. Allāh táālā has by His Grace, guided us to the right and correct opinion in those matters in which, even those who are considered as knowledgeable and proficient have erred and made blunders; those, whom one does not expect or suspect to make such mistakes.

O Allāh! just as you have favored us with true knowledge, increase it for us and aid us in completing this work by Thy Grace. Grant us a beautiful end and make us join our beloved ones, in the world of peace; and do not take away from us, that which You have given us.

O, the seeker of truth! Look into this: read, understand and reflect; and when you recognize the truth, then thank Allāh táālā for bestowing this great fortune upon you; that which was not granted to a multitude of people, and they returned empty-handed with an enormous calamity upon them.

In the following pages are clear and unequivocal statements of masters of the discipline; ponder and reflect. Then, fear not to accept the truth and forsake the lie. Be not among those deceived by glib talkers and the falsifiers. Only Allāh táālā gives success.

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1 tawĥīd: belief in One God, Allāh; true and unflinching monotheism.
2 corrupt beliefs, bāťil
3 dār al-amān
4 This is a translation from the preface of Sharĥ al-Şughrā by Imām al-Sanūsī, starting from the first line until here.
I. IN THESE DIFFICULT TIMES

The Messenger of Allāh  صلى الله عليه وسلم foretold of a time when truth and falsehood would be so mixed up that it would be difficult to tell, which is which. And that we would hear of strange things our forebears had never heard of; that mischief and heresies would be widespread and Muslims will come to accept them as true faith, while in reality these would be ideas alien to Islam. In the ḥadīth5 of Muslim, narrated by Ḥudhayfah رضي الله عنه:

I have heard the Messenger of Allāh  صلى الله عليه وسلم say: ‘Heresies6 will be presented to [people’s] hearts slowly and repeatedly;7 and in that heart which accepts it, a dark mark is made; and in the heart which rejects it, a white mark. So much so that, hearts will be of two kinds: the white, like marble - no heresy or evil can harm it, as long as the heavens and earth abide. [The second kind] black: like the tipped over and dirty water jug8 - [which] neither recognizes the righteous, nor rejects the evil; except, that fancied by its own desire.

Qādī Ýād explaining9 the above says that, ‘presented’ means, mischief will stick to hearts and leave its trace, like the marks imprinted on the sides of a person who has lain upon a mat, and because of pressing close to the mat. This will occur repeatedly, until it takes firm hold [in hearts]. Or it means: like reeds that are woven one after the other in a mat; so also will heresies take root in hearts, one after the other. The white [heart] like marble, to which dirt does not stick; and a dark [heart] like the soiled water jug, tipped over and nothing remains in it [from goodness].10

In another ḥadīth11 narrated by Abu Hurayrah رضي الله عنه:

RasūlAllāh ﷺ said: ‘hasten in doing good deeds before heresies (and evil) descend, like the dark parts of the night. A man shall be a Muslim in the morning and becomes an infidel in the evening; a man shall be Muslim in the evening and becomes a kafir by the morning. He shall sell his religion for [success] in this [temporal] world.

Álī al-Qārī says that the ‘dark parts of the night’ is a metaphor to explain that heresies will be black, dark and not easily recognizable, such that it becomes difficult to identify and differentiate the right from the wrong.12

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5 Muslim 231/144; Mishkât al-Maşâbîĥ, no.5380.
6 fitan: pl. or fitnah : mischief or evil. In this context, heresies and innovation in belief. [Al-Qārî in Mirqâtu’l Maşâtî, Vol.10, Pg.405]
7 ādan ūdā; Imām Nawawi and Qādî Ýād say that there is a difference of opinion in the declension for this particular phrase; with dāl (sans dot) and with dhāl (with the dot); also, ǳûn with nāsb or with raḥf. The possible readings mentioned are:
   a. ādan ūdā: like the spinning of individual stalks one by one while making a straw mat.
   b. āwdan āwdâ : again and again.
   c. āwdhan āwdhā : seeking refuge
8 The ḥadīth says: mirbāddan ka’l kūz; muj-khiyyan; Álī al-Qārī says, like the tipped over water jug, soiled grayish-black and empty. Al-Qārî says mirbâd (with kasrah of mīm and shaddah of dāl); Qādî Ýād says murbâd (with dammah of mim) is also an accepted variant.
9 Ikmāl al-Mūlim, Vol.1, Pg.453
10 A metaphor for someone without knowledge or gnosis – neither ílm nor mārifah (Al-Qārî)
11 Muslim, 186-118; Abu Dâwûd 4259; Tirmîdhî 2195; Ibn Mâjah 3954; Musnad Imâm Āhmed 2:304.
We live in times when the truthful are reviled and liars promoted as defenders of truth. Just as it was foretold\textsuperscript{13} by the Messenger 
\textit{ṣallAllāhu ʿalayhi wa sallam}:

\textit{..when the truthful are labeled as liars; and liars considered as truthful.}

These are times in which people demand proof for even fundamental articles of belief and casually admit opposition, claiming that a difference of opinion exists in such matters. Common folk are misled because knowledge has depleted immensely and the knowledgeable are becoming scarce.

It is necessary for Muslims to be mindful of their religion and not be by wayward men of learning, nor follow them in their blunders. We seek Allāh's refuge and ask for His Aid, and to make the truth apparent to us and guide us in aiding it; and to help us identify falsehood and to reject it; and Allāh's aid is sufficient.

It is an obligation to investigate the correct \textit{áqīdah} and then to follow it. Concerning certain problematic questions, some scholars deliberately ignore them and avoid addressing them, either because they are themselves not aware, or because they are inclined towards a position that cannot be supported with evidence. They confuse common Muslims by vague statements and dismiss such things as unimportant issues.

In \textit{Idā'atu'l Dujnā}\textsuperscript{14} by Al-Maqirrī:\textsuperscript{15}

\begin{quote}
\textit{fa’l tárifi’l wājiba wa’l muhālā}
\textit{wa jāyizan fi ʿaqqiqi tāālā}
\textit{fa īlmuhā fardun ālaynā sharāā}
\textit{wa mithluhā fi ʿaqiqi rusulin turʿāā}
\end{quote}

Know what is necessary and [what is] impossible
And what is permissible [concerning Attributes] of Allāh tāālā
This knowledge is made obligatory upon us by the \textit{sharīāh}
And also, such knowledge about the Messengers

Imām Ábd al-Ghanī an-Nablūsī\textsuperscript{16} comments that it is made obligatory by the \textit{sharīāh} to learn these aspects of faith. And to know what is necessary, impossible and possible; on what is allowed or prohibited to say about Allāh tāālā concerning His Attributes.\textsuperscript{17}

It is necessary to know that certain attributes are impossible for Allāh tāālā. One cannot have a corrupt belief and use the lame excuse of not knowing it in the first place. Because, it is obligatory to learn these things and therefore, necessary for those who know, to disseminate the true \textit{áqīdah} and refute false beliefs.

\textsuperscript{13} From Ibn Mardawīh, in \textit{Ashrāţ as-Sāāh} by Muḥammad ibn Ábd ar-Rasul al-Barzanjī; Pg.169; another narration is by Al-Muāāfā narrating from Abū Yāsā al-Tirmidhī in his \textit{Al-Jalīs al-Anīs}.

\textsuperscript{14} \textit{Idā'atu'l Dujnā fī Iýtiqādī Ahli’s Sunnah}, Pg.13.

\textsuperscript{15} Ṭahmābādī al-Maqirrī al-Maghribī al-Māliki (992-1041 AH / 1584-1631CE).

\textsuperscript{16} Ábd al-Ghanī an-Nablūsī is a well-known Ḥanafī scholar and author who passed away in 1143AH.

\textsuperscript{17} \textit{Rāyiĥatu'l Jannah Sharĥ Iđā‘atu’Dujnā fī Iýtiqādī Ahli’s Sunnah}, Pg.30.
In a hadīth18 narrated by ĀbdAllāh ibn Ámr ibn al-Āāś, the Prophet ṣallAllāhu álayhi wa sallam said:

‘How will you be when you will remain [living] among the scum19 of the people, whose covenants and trusts are all entangled and mixed up? They shall dispute and differ until they become like this’ [the Messenger ṣallAllāhu álayhi wa sallam] gestured by entwining the fingers [of one hand with the other]. And he said: ‘What do you bid me do?’

He said ṣallAllāhu álayhi wa sallam: ‘Take what you recognize as right and abandon that which you [recognize as] false. Take care of your own self and leave the doings of the common folk.’

Ālī al-Qārī says in its commentary20 that it means that when such differences arise, it will be difficult to tell the righteous from the evil, the trustworthy from the dishonest; and matters of religion will get entangled and all mixed up.

This paper discusses an irrational issue, which was unknown to Muslims until the recent past. Neither has such a belief validated by reliable scholars of kalām or áqīdah. Indeed, it is that, which even ancient philosophers and other faiths consider abominable. This was also foretold by RasūlAllāh ṣallAllāhu álayhi wa sallam when he said:21

‘There shall be, among the last ones in my ummah, people who will narrate [those things] which you would not have heard, nor your forefathers. Beware of them!’

Allāh táālā knows best and only He gives guidance.

Notes:

1. Much of what has been translated seeks to be as close a literal translation as possible. Some phrases in Arabic defy verbatim translations; the translator is forced to convey the meaning in his own words. At this point, it is more important to convey the meaning than merely translating words. In our paper, such instances are rare; but still, the reader is requested to bear this in mind, and evaluate once again, if he feels the translator has not been faithful to the text.

2. Definite articles in transliterated Arabic terms, are omitted as a rule. Thus, al-wājib al-dhāti is wājib dhāti and al-mustaĥīl al-árađī is mustaĥīl árađī.

3. Quotes selected for this document are mostly obvious and direct quotes. Quotes which do not explicitly address the issue at hand, but are indicative and imply the idea, are avoided as far as possible to pre-empt accusations of misinterpretation.

4. The first version was released in some haste, and thus, many errors went unchecked. This is the second version of the paper.

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18 Mishkāt 5398; Bukhārī 6434.
19 ḥuthālah: chaff; also means rubbish, refuse, garbage, vile, nasty.
20 Mirqāt al-Mafātīĥ, vol.10/Pg.28.
21 in the preface of Şaĥīĥ Muslim, Ḥadīth 6.
II. THE ISSUE

1. The Deobandišs and their elders in their various books and fatāwā have said that falsehood is possible for Allah tāllā – exalted is He from such attributes. They have used the term imkān e kizb (imkān al-kadhib). 23

2. When ulama of Ahlu’s Sunnah refuted them, they tried a justification: it is not mustaḥil dhātī but mustaḥil āraḍī, they said.

3. Some contemporary scholars have also bought into this befuddling and claim that falsehood is an impossibility for Allah tāllā but only contingently; and not intrinsically. That is, they claim that it is mustaḥil āraḍī and NOT mustaḥil dhātī.

4. Is kadhib (falsehood) mustaḥil dhātī or mustaḥil āraḍī? What is the position of scholars until the 13th century? 26

5. The Deobandis claimed that kadhib is included in Divine Power; and argued that if it is not, it necessitates that the creation has power the Creator does not have; and thus, the Creator’s power becomes lesser than that of creation.

6. When refuted, some Deobandis switched the argument and said that kadhib is a corollary of khulf fi’il wayīd; and since some Ashárīs differed that, it is permissible (khulf fi’il wayīd), the Deobandis stretched it to include kadhib. The Deobandi argument is:

   a. khulf fi’il wayīd is differed upon by Ashári mutakallimūn

   b. kadhib is a corollary of khulf fi’il wayīd

   c. Therefore, Ashari scholars differed upon imkān al-kadhib.

7. The Deobandis cite certain passages from books of kalām (incomplete and out of context) and insist that this is conclusive proof that a difference exists and insist that these scholars:

   a. either held the belief themselves (as they said it)

   b. or did not refute this and therefore, accepted this as a valid position among Ahlu’s Sunnah

8. The Deobandis also say, “Falsehood is possible in kalām lafẓī, though it is impossible in kalām nafsī.” 28

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22 Followers of the Deoband school; established in the 19th century and is situated in the state of Uttar Pradesh in North India.

23 The word is kadhib in Arabic; Tāj al-Árūs includes a few more variants including kidhīb (and notes that it is not commonly used), kidhāb (like kitāb) and kidh'dhāb (like jinnān); in Urdu, it is commonly pronounced as kizb, but kazib is also acceptable. It is perhaps erroneously mentioned as kizab in Fayruz u’L Lughāt; Platts does not consider this variant.

24 Nuḥ Keller is well known in the English-speaking world as a scholar, translator and a Sufi shaykh; and who has made statements supporting this odious belief.

25 mustaḥil dhātī is translated as Intrinsically Impossible; mustaḥil āraḍī is translated as Contingently Impossible.

26 The Islamic Calendar – coinciding with the 19th century of the Common Era. The 13th Century because, that is when Ismāyi Dihiaw proposed these heretical ideas in his books. [In the previous version of this paper, I had written “the 12th Century” based on Iṣmāyi Dihiaw’s year of birth; but appropriately, it should be in the 13th when he spread his heresies.]

27 This is the claim of the Deobandis and those who followed them in their mendacity. It is cited here as their statement, which will be refuted in the following pages – Allah tāllā willing.

28 This is a red herring because, we now move from relatively straightforward argument to a much complex subject. Suffice it to say, that the science of kalām came into being, and indeed the eponym, because of the complex and complicated discussions concerning the kalām or Speech of Allah tāllā.
III. THE SUNNI VIEW

1. Kadhib is falsehood, lying. That is, saying something, which is unlike or contrary to what has actually occurred.

2. Kadhib/falseness is a flaw by the consensus of all sensible people.

3. It is impossible for the Creator – exalted is He – to have any flaw: whether in His Person (dhāt) or in His Divine Attributes (ṣifāt).

4. Therefore, it is mustaḥīl (or muḥāl) for kadhib/falsehood to exist in any divine attribute.

5. The mustaḥīl mentioned above is mustaḥīl dhāti and is not just mustaḥīl āraḍī.

6. That which is subject to Divine Power, are only mumkināt (contingent) and not mustaḥīlāt (impossible) nor wājibāt (necessary).

7. Kadhib/falsehood is classified as muḥāl / mustaḥīl; it is therefore not included in the Divine Power.

8. Muḥāl/ mustaḥīl mentioned in kalām books, is mustaḥīl dhāti and not āraḍī unless specified otherwise.

9. It is said clearly and unambiguously in Sunni books of áqīdah that kadhib is muḥāl for Allāh tāālā.

10. By point 8 above, we know that anything termed as muḥāl, is muḥāl dhāti; thus, applying it to point 9, kadhib is muḥāl dhāti for Allāh tāālā. Translated, it means that falsehood is intrinsically impossible for Allāh tāālā.

11. Falsehood is an attribute of speech/kalām. It is not a separate entity in itself nor is it a discrete action.

12. Kalām or Divine Speech is a divine attribute and transcends all constraints and flaws that can occur in created speech.

13. Kalām or Divine Speech is pre-eternal. Its associated attributes are also pre-eternal.

14. Falsehood/kadhib is dependent on the occurrence of a particular event or its non-occurrence. If the possibility of falsehood/kadhib exists in pre-eternal Divine Speech, then it would necessitate that:
   
   a. Divine Speech would be dependent on an external factor and an accident (ḥādith) and would thus be subject to change (taghyīr)
   
   b. Divine Speech (which is qadīm) being dependent on an external factor would render that external factor as pre-eternal (azalī/qadīm)
   
   c. If not, Divine Speech would be ḥādith; and not pre-eternal.

15. The Deobandis try to deceive laymen by claiming that a valid difference of opinion exists and drag in the argument about ḥusn-qubḥ – the property of something being inherently praiseworthy or inherently ugly.

\[29\] qadīm
Mūtazilis say that falsehood is impossible because it is ugly. The Ahl as-Sunnah say, it is *muḥāl* not because it is ugly, but because it is a flaw. In the course of this discussion, certain statements are made by ṣulāmā of kalām; Deobandis present these quotes, stripped of their context, as their evidence.

16. *Khulf fi’l waād* (reneging on the promise of reward) and *khulf al-wa’yīd* (waiving the threat of punishment) are two concepts debated upon by theologians. Everybody agrees that the first, *khulf al-waād* (reneging on promise of reward) is *mustahīl*.

17. Nevertheless, some Asháris disagreed that *khulf al-wa’yīd* (waiving the threat of punishment) is also *mustahīl*. They said that it is *mustahīl ārađī* and not *mustahīl dhāṭī* (not intrinsically impossible.)

18. The Deobandis say that *kadhib* is a corollary of *khulf fi’l wayīd* and then equate the two. Their argument restated is:
   a. Asháris differed on the matter of *khulf fi’l wayīd*
   b. Some Asharis said that it was *muḥāl ārađī*, contingently impossible.
   c. *Kadhib* is a corollary of *khulf fi’l wayīd*
   d. Ergo, *kadhib* is *muḥāl ārađī*, contingently impossible.

19. The Māturīdī contention is that *khulf* implies *kadhib*; but Asháris responded to it and gave various answers to prove that it does not imply *kadhib*. This clearly shows that they don’t believe in *kadhib*. Else, why would they refute this Māturīdī objection?

20. It is incorrect to include *kadhib*/falsehood as a corollary of *khulf al-wa’yīd* (waiving the threat of punishment) as explained in various books of *áqīdah*.

21. Even if such a statement is found in a book of *kalām*, whether by error or by corruption of texts, it is still incumbent upon every Muslim to believe that falsehood is absolutely and intrinsically impossible (*mustahīl dhāṭī*); and that it is not included in Divine Power because it is a flaw; and that the Lord Almighty – exalted is He – is free from all flaws and faults.

22. It is not necessary to follow any scholar who makes this kind of mistakes and rather, it is obligatory to reject this heretical idea, irrespective of the standing of that scholar who proposes, attests or abets this view.

Imām Sanūsī in his *Muqaddimāt* says describing the basic reasons for infidel and heretical beliefs:

*Taqlid ar-Radiyy* or reprehensible following: to blindly follow someone, merely out of bias and prejudice; and not because of seeking the truth [or aiding it].

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30 Even the *later* Mutilazilah agree that it is *muḥāl*; however, their reasoning to arrive at this conclusion is different. Moreover, the early Mūtazilites believed that falsehood and oppression were included in Divine Power – and there was intense disagreement among their own factions. Eventually, some of their later scholars abandoned this concept, though they argued about it elsewhere and said that falsehood is *muḥāl* because it is ugly.

31 See the commentary of Jawharah al-Tawḥīd and a mention further in this paper.

32 *Al-Muqaddimāt*, Pg.47
Ismā’il Dihlawi, the founder of Wahabism in India and an elder of the Deobandis was perhaps among the earliest, if not the first, to state this abominable belief. Other Deobandi elders followed him in his heresy.

Many scholars in the subcontinent refuted this Neo-Mūtazilīte, and among those who refuted them was Imām Āḥmed Rida Khan al-Barelwi (1272-1340AH) who wrote extensively on this subject and three of which are well-known:

1. *Subḥān as-Subbūḥ an Kadhibi Āybun Maqbūḥ*[^33]
2. *Dāmān e Bāgh e Subḥān as-Subbūḥ*[^34]
3. *Qam’a al-Mubīn Li Āmāl al-Mukadh’hibin*[^35]

This paper has benefitted immensely from the above works and particularly the first one. Those interested in an in-depth analysis of the issue and a comprehensive discussion, are recommended to read the book *Subḥān as-Subbūḥ.*[^38]

[^33]: While this is similar to the Mūtazilī heresy, Ismā’il had a different take on this as evident from his pamphlet: *Ek-Rozi.*

[^34]: He is known as Alahazrat in the subcontinent. Alahazrat means ‘one of august presence’ or colloquially, ‘The Grand Master.’ This is similar to the titles ‘His Highness’ or ‘His Majesty.’ Alahazrat – the title – was used to address prominent people, including the Nawwabs and rulers until the 20th century. Today, by default, this title refers to no other than Imām Ahmed Rīḍā Khān who rightfully deserves the title – as he is truly ‘the Grand Master’ of Islamic sciences. Allāh tāālā be praised and He knows best.

[^35]: *Glorious is Subbūḥ from the ugliness and flaw of falsehood* (Subbūḥ: free from all flaws, His Divine Name)

[^36]: *The Courtyard of the garden of Subḥān as-Subbūḥ*

[^37]: *An Articulate Reprimand: Dashing the hopes of the falsifiers*

[^38]: This was written in 1307 AH by Alahazrat Imām Āḥmed Rīḍā Khān al-Barelwi answering the request for a fatwa in about 140 pages.
IV. A PRIMER ON KALÂM TERMINOLOGY

It is necessary to understand the terms used in kalâm literature in order to understand the argument and the flaws in the counter-argument. Much of the confusion is due to the lack of clarity about the key terms in this discussion. Imâm Sanûsî wrote many books on doctrine (áqîdah) and theology (kalâm), three of which, are well known and many commentaries are written on his books. In fact, Al-Sanûsî himself wrote commentaries on these books. Al-Sanûsî, in the opening lines of Umm al-Barâhîn, says:

"Know that these three definitions cover the rational argument:"

a) wujûb [wâjib]: necessary
b) istihâlah [mustaĥîl]: impossible
c) jâyiz [mumkin]: contingent

\[\text{wâjib} \text{ is that, whose non-existence is inconceivable; }\]
\[\text{mustaĥîl} \text{ is that, whose existence is inconceivable; }\]
\[\text{jâyiz} \text{ is that, whose existence and non-existence are both conceivable and possible.}\]

Al-Sanûsî explains that ‘rule’ in this context means to attest to something or to negate it. And such a ‘rule’ is due to these reasons: revealed law (sharîâh), habit (áâdah) and intellect (áql). Therefore, a ruling falls into one of these three classes: sharayî, áâdi or áqlî. It is necessary to know that the first two classes, namely sharayî and áâdi are not dealt with, in rational theology (kalâm); in this science, we deal only with the rational argument, that is, hukm al-áqlî.

Al-Sanûsî’s explains: “the rational ruling falls in one of the three categories” thus:

Everything that the intellect perceives, comprehends or imagines; about essences of things or their attributes; the attributes that exist or attributes that cannot exist; or about something being pre-eternal or an accident; all of these will fall in one of the three categories.

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39 i) a short beginner’s text named Umm al-Barâhîn; also known as Al-Sanûsîyah al-Şughrâ
   ii) an intermediate text known as Al-Sanûsîyah al-Wustâ
   iii) an advanced text named Áqîdatu Ahl al-Tawĥîd; better known as Al-Sanûsîyah al-Kubrâ

40 Each of these has a commentary by Imâm Sanûsî himself. Initially, he wrote a book (Al-Kubrâ) on áqîdah which was a complex treatise and required simplification, so he wrote a simpler version (Al-Wustâ); even this was not sufficient and he simplified it further (Al-Şughrâ). His student, Al-Malâlî writes, that upon the request of his father, the Imâm simplified it further and named it Şughrâ al-Şughrâ.

41 The phrase used is hukm al-áqlî: literally, ‘the rational ruling’, which is further explained in the commentaries.

42 What is observed and is commonly known by habit.

43 Summarized from Al-Sanûsî’s explanation of Al-Şughrâ

44 Three terms that describe three categories; the words ‘term’ ‘definition’ ‘category’ are used as is appropriate for the Arabic word qisam.

45 dhawât, plural of dhât meaning essence; when used with Allâh tââlâ it is better translated as Person or Self.

46 šifâât wujûdiyyah: attributes that exist and are attested

47 šifâât salabiyyah: attributes that are absent and are negated

48 qadîm: pre-eternal; opposite of ĥâdith.

49 ĥadith: that which is occurred, happened and it was non-existent prior to this occurrence.

50 of wujûb, mustaĥîl and jâyiz/mumkin
And in *Al-Wustā*, he says:\(^{51}\)

(an understanding) of these three terms is essential for any discussion in the science of *kalām*.

Explaining the above, he writes in *Sharḥ al-Wustā*:\(^{52}\)

Undoubtedly, the idea\(^ {53}\) of these three concepts and the knowledge of the quiddity\(^ {54}\) of these terms, is the fundamental principle of the science of *kalām*. Because, when a scholar\(^ {55}\) discusses an issue, he will have to describe it in one of these three terms, to attest or negate or derive a corollary of the issue; and if that scholar does not know the true (definition) of these terms, he will not be able to understand what has been attested or negated (in this science). Imām al-Ĥaramayn considered that the comprehension of these three terms as fundamental intelligence, and one who does not understand these three is not counted among the sane and discerning.\(^ {56}\)

Thus, the basic requirement for any discussion in *āqīdah* is a thorough understanding of these three terms. Imām Ibn Áāshir says in *Murshid al-Muýīn*:\(^ {57}\)

\[\text{aqsāmu muqtađāhu bi’l ḫaṣri tumāz} \]
\[\text{wa hiya al-wujūb al-istiḥālatu al-jawaz}\]^\(^ {58}\)

\[\text{fa wājibun lā yaqbalu’n nafyiya bi ḫāl} \]
\[\text{wa mā ābā al-thubūta āqlan al-muḥāl}\]

\[\text{wa jāyizan mā qabila’l amrayni sim} \]
\[\text{li’d darari wa’n nażarī kullun qusim}\]

the requirement of the (rational categorization) is covered under distinct categories which are (three): *wājīb* (necessary), *istiḥālah* (impossible) and *jawāz* (contingent)

*wājīb* is something that cannot be non-existent
that which the intellect refuses that it can exist, is *muḥāl*

*jāyiz* is that which can be either way (possible to exist or not-exist)
and each of these terms are classified as: imperative\(^ {59}\) and inferred\(^ {60}\)

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\(^{51}\) *Sharḥ al-Wustā*, Pg. 78

\(^{52}\) Ibid.

\(^{53}\) *taşawwur* which in this context, is to have an idea, the notion or the concept in the mind.

\(^{54}\) *ḥaqīqah*, pl. of *ḥaqīqah* meaning reality of something or quiddity

\(^{55}\) *mutakallim* - a scholar of *kalām*; ‘scholar’ can be used in English to mean either an erudite master or a student, which is befitting in this case.

\(^{56}\) *āqīl*, sane, intelligent, discerning. in this context, he means one who can discern the arguments of *kalām* as he concludes in the following sentences.

\(^{57}\) These are verses 7,8 and 9 from the versified book (317 verses) describing Islamic knowledge that is necessary for everyone *Murshid al-Muýīn*; these verses cover topics on *āqīdah*, *fiqh* and *taşawwuf*.

\(^{58}\) An interesting sidenote is, the verse can be extended to the issue of *kadhib* and it means: that it is necessary [wujūb] to consider the impossibility [istiḥālah] of its being contingent [jawāz]. Sub’hānAllāh.

\(^{59}\) *đarūri*: imperative; absolutely necessary or required; unavoidable.

\(^{60}\) *nażarī*: inferred; that is, to derive by reasoning; conclude or judge from premises or evidence.
As explained by Mayārah in *Al-Durr al-Thamīn*, these three terms are the basis of all discussions in rational theology; and any issue or a rule, has to be described in these three terms. And the classification of each of these terms is due to two reasons: imperative and inferred.

That is, a thing is classified as wājib, mustaţīl or jāyiz due to an imperative reason (that which is obvious; for example, two is greater than one); or an inferred reason (that which is not established initially, but upon examination and other evidence, it is inferred; for example, that it is wājib for Allāh tāālā to be qadīm).

He further says that wājib mentioned by the author (Ibn Áāshir) is always wājib dhātī (intrinsically necessary) and NOT wājib áradī (conditionally necessary); that the author did not specify that wājib is wājib dhātī simply because, when it is said that it is wājib, it means nothing but wājib dhātī and will not be considered as wājib áradī except when explicitly mentioned as such.

Mayārah’s conclusion then decimates the argument of the *kadh’dhābiyyah*. He says that similarly, mustaţīl mentioned is mustaţīl dhātī and not mustaţīl áradī. He also gives an illustration to describe the difference to clear any confusion or misunderstanding of these terms by novices and unskilled scholars.

The conclusion of this [cautionary] note is: wājib mentioned is wājib dhātī and not wājib áradī; and mustaţīl is mustaţīl dhātī not áradī; and jāyiz is jāyiz dhātī [by nature, contingent].

If a certain thing is ordained wājib by the Lawgiver that it shall happen thus, it is wājib áradī; or if its being ordained impossible is made known by a report from sharā‘ī source that it shall not happen, it is mustaţīl áradī; however jāyiz does not mean permissible or one is allowed to do a certain act.

We have seen earlier, that the focus in *kalām* literature is the rational argument; and that anything is described in three key terms. It is clear from the above that these definitions are considered absolutely, intrinsically and essentially necessary, impossible or contingent; unless it has been explicitly specified otherwise. So, the many texts that we shall quote hereafter mean wājib dhātī [essentially/intrinsically necessary] or mustaţīl dhātī [essentially/intrinsically impossible] when mentioned without any specification.

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61 Állāmah Muĥammad ibn Aĥmed Al-Fāsī, famously known as Mayārah.

62 *Durr al-Thamīn* is a commentary of previously mentioned Murshid al-Muýīn of Ibn Áāshir.

63 that is, one is initially unable to classify a thing as wājib or mustaţīl; but upon examination, it can be eventually classified as one of the three.

64 dhātī is translated as ‘intrinsically.’ I have preferred the word ‘essentially’ because it conveys both meanings of ‘pertaining to the essence’ and ‘absolutely’ for additional emphasis, and is thus closer to the literal translation.

65 similarly áradī is translated varyingly as ‘hypothetically’ and ‘contingently’; I prefer to use ‘conditionally’ because the previous two translated words cause confusion with the third term jāyiz/mumkin. However, for the purpose of this article, we will continue to use ‘intrinsically’ for dhātī, as used by Nuh Keller and other apologists; and hypothetically/contingently for áradī. Yet, in various places (particularly in translations), I will use what I consider a more accurate term. Allāh tāālā knows best.

66 Summarized from *Al-Durr al-Thamīn* Vol.1, Pg.16-18

67 Alahazrat referred to those who believe and advocate, that falsehood is possible for Allāh tāālā, as kadh‘dhābiyyah: the Falsifiers, the Falsists.

68 *Al-Durr al-Thamīn*, Vol.1, Pg.17

69 That is, something which is not by nature wājib or mustaţīl – but it has been ordained so for some reason [árad] and this is conveyed by the sharā‘ī. This does not mean that anything that is conveyed by the sharā‘ī is automatically wājib áradī or mustaţīl áradī.

70 because jāyiz is a term used in jurisprudence to mean ‘permissible’ or ‘allowed’.
Mayārah quotes Al-Sanūsī from his *Al-Şughrā* thus:71

Know, that for every sensible person who wishes to succeed in [gaining] knowledge about Allāh tāālā and His messengers – may Allāh tāālā bless them and give them peace – it is mandatory to gain an in-depth knowledge of these three categories, and to practice them well and understand them by iteration and illustration, such that one’s heart is at rest regarding their description; and such that one does not have to ponder upon their meaning or that one should not have any difficulty in recalling the [meaning and description of the] three categories when mentioned.

Álī al-Qārī in *Daw al-Máālī*:72

*Muḩāl* : whose existence is impossible as deemed by the intellect; and it is said: *muḩāl* and *mustaĥīl* are essentially that which should NOT-EXIST.

Al-Bannānī in *Al-Mawāhib ar-Rabbāniyyah*73 after describing the three classes of *sharaýī*, *áādī* and *áqlī* briefly, says about the rational argument which is comprised of three categories:74

Know that each of these three categories are further categorized as conceptual [*taşawwur*] and attestation [*taşdīq*]; each of *taşawwur* and *taşdīq* is further categorized as imperative [*darūrī*] and inferred [*nażarī*]; each of these is further categorized in two other: *wājib dhātī*75 and *wājib ārađī*; and each of *wājib dhātī* and *wājib ārađī* is further classified in two as affirmation [*ithbāti*] and negation [*nafyī*]; so these three main categories are sub-divided making a total of twenty-four categories.

He then lists illustrations for the sub-categories of *sharaýī*, *áqlī* and *áādī*. The examples for the eight sub-categories of rational categories are described by Al-Bannānī thus:

...the example of *taşawwur* or conceptualization is, our understanding of ‘the world,’ that everything that exists in it except Allāh tāālā; the example of *taşdīq* or attestation is, that the world is an accident and its Creator is Pre-Eternal; the example of *darūrī* is, that one is half of two; or, that space is required for size; the example of *nażarī* is, that one is the tenth part of a fourth of forty. The example of *wājib dhātī* is the Existence76 of the Creator; the example of *wājib ārađī* is the existence of the creation;77 the example of *ithbāt* is the affirmation that everything except Allāh tāālā is created and came into being;78 and that ten is an even number; the example of *nafyī* is the negation of seven being an even number; or negation of a partner unto Allāh tāālā.

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71 Mayārah in *Al-Durr al-Thamān* Vol1, Pg.17 quoting from Al-Sanūsī from his *Sharḥ al-Şughrā*

72 *Daw al-Máālī*, Pg. 63 explaining under *wa lākin laysa yarđā bi'l muĥāli*

73 A marginalia on *Al-Muqaddimāt* by Al-Sanūsī.

74 *wājib*, *mustaĥīl* and *mumkin*

75 Al-Bannānī is using *wājib* as an illustration, because *dhātī* and *ārađī* applies for all the three categories as we have seen in Mayārah’s explanation earlier and as Al-Bannānī himself explains further.

76 *wujūd*

77 See Mayārah’s commentary and Al-Sanūsī’s own commentary on his *Al-Muqaddimāt* for a simpler explanation.

78 *hudūth*
In the commentary of *Umm al-Barāhīn*, Al-Dasūqī says describing the statement ‘*mustahil*’ is that whose existence cannot be conceived:

> By *wujūd* (existence) he means, ‘affirmation.’ That is, it includes every thing impossible whether in essence or attributes of existence or of the state of being.

Muḥammad al-Shahrastānī in his *Nihāyat al-Iqdām fī ʿilm al-Kalām* writes explaining these terms in a slightly different manner:

*We say: the rational argument is covered in three definitions: *wājib*, *mustahil* and *jāyiz*. *wājib* is that, which should necessarily exist; such that even hypothetically, its annihilation or non-existence is impossible; *mustahil* is that, which should necessarily not-exist; such that, its existence is impossible, even hypothetically; *jāyiz* is that which is not necessary to either exist or not-exist.*

Here he emphasizes that *mustahil* is that which cannot exist even hypothetically. It is also necessary to note that the terms *mustahil li dhatih* (intrinsically impossible) and *mustahil li ghayrih* (extrinsically impossible) are also used outside kalām literature.

Al-Zuĥaylī explains this in context of jurisprudence:

*Mustahil li dhatih*: intrinsically impossible is that whose existence cannot be conceived by the intellect; like the concurrence of two opposites; or the coincidence of two mutual contradictions; or to exist in two spaces at the same time. For example: the permissibility and non-permissibility of the same thing on the same person at the same time.

*Mustahil li ghayrih*: extrinsically impossible is that which is imaginable but it is not possible due to constraints; for example, the flying of a human without flying machines, or his creation of bodies, or his carrying a huge mountain [on his back].

The definitions above are used in the context of *taklīf* – responsibility ordained by the Sacred Law is only for that which is *mumkin*; and that one is not liable or held responsible for that which is *mustahil* – regardless of whether such a *mustahil* is intrinsic or extrinsic.

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79 *thubūt*
80 *dhāt*
81 *wujūd or ḥāl*
82 *Nihāyat al-Iqdām fī ʿilm al-Kalām* Pg.15
83 Dr. Wahbah Al-Zuĥaylī, a contemporary Syrian scholar and the author of *Fiqh al-Islāmī wa Adillatuh* and *Usul al-Fiqh al-Islāmī*.
84 *Al-Wajīz fī Usūl al-Fiqh*, Al-Zuĥaylī, Pg.149.
85 that is two opposite things existing in the same place: like day and night at the same time which is absurd.
86 that is two contradictory things occurring at the same time in the same thing at the same place: like fire and water to exist in the same bowl at the same time.
87 literal translation: it is not considered as possible by common observation or occurrence.
We end this section with a couple more quotes from Al-Sanūsī:\footnote{Sharḥ al-Muqaddimāt, p.77}

This wājib that is mentioned is wājib dhātī [intrinsically necessary]. As for wājib áraḍī, it is that which is related to the Divine Will of Allāh tāālā – like the punishment of Abu Jahl. Because, when we look at the innate nature of this thing – it is jāyiz, possible; both the possibility\footnote{wujuduh wa ádamuh} of punishment and its absence are rational.

However, when we look at the Divine Will of Allāh tāālā to punish him, as has been informed to us by the truthful and veritable Messenger\footnote{şādiq,muşaddaq}: The prophet şallAllāhu álayhi wa sallam. He is truthful and his being truthful is attested and evident.\footnote{punishment of Abu Jahl} this becomes necessary [wājib] and it cannot be conceived that it\footnote{ádam}; thus a contingent thing becomes wājib due to the extrinsic reason of Divine Will. This is wājib áraḍī.

Verily, it is not necessary to consider something wājib dhātī only upon proviso, because by default and absolutely, wājib does not mean anything except wājib dhātī. And it cannot be considered wājib áraḍī except with an express qualification.

He further says after giving the definition of mustaḥil:

Similarly, this mustaḥil is also mustaḥil dhātī;\footnote{mustaḥil áraḍī is separate from this because it is actually a form of jāyiz, like the impossibility of the faith of Abū Lahab, which is so, because of the extrinsic reason – that is the Divine Will of Allāh tāālā.} as for mustaḥil áraḍī it is separate from this because it is actually a form of jāyiz, like the impossibility of the faith of Abū Lahab, which is so, because of the extrinsic reason – that is the Divine Will of Allāh tāālā.

The summary of the discussion above is:

1. Impossible (muḥāl/mustaḥil) is categorized as intrinsically or extrinsically (dhātī/áraḍī);
2. These two arabic terms can be translated as essentially and conditionally (dhātī/áraḍī);
3. Whenever, mustaḥil/muḥāl (impossible) is mentioned, it is always mustaḥil dhātī/muḥāl dhātī;
4. And NOT mustaḥil áraḍī/muḥāl áraḍī unless explicitly specified.

Finally, Imām Sanūsī describing the reasons that cause heretical ideas says:

[One of the reason] is ignorance of the fundamental principles of rational rulings: that is the knowledge of what is necessary, what is contingent and what is impossible.

That is, if one does not understand these categories properly, they are well on their way to confuse them and hold a heretical idea or belief. Worse, lose their way and advocate such ideas to make a multitude go astray. We seek Allāh’s refuge from such a malady.
V. KALĀM TERMINOLOGY: A SUMMARY

Any student of kalām should know the primary definitions very well, described adequately in various introductory, intermediate and advanced texts. Those who do not understand or confuse these terms are ineligible to discuss these issues. I will try to summarize these concepts and their definitions as a quick reference for students like myself and as a handy guide to laymen.

Remember that there are three classes of rulings:

1. *Sharaýī*: That which is ordained by scripture and revelation; this is also known as something ordained by *Dalîl Samîyî*.
2. *Áâdī*: That which is understood by habit and is considered as common knowledge. Like, fire burns and that fire is extinguished by water.
3. *Áqlî*: That which is known and proved by a rational argument.

Rulings in each of these classes fall in these three basic categories:

4. *Wâjib*: That, which is necessary to exist; it is impossible for something *wâjib* to NOT exist.
5. *Mustaĥīl*: That which is impossible to exist; it is impossible for something *mustaĥīl* to exist.
6. *Mumkin*: That which is contingent – can or cannot exist; it is not necessary for a contingent thing to exist and nor is it impossible for it to exist.

Each of these rulings can be established as being fundamentally necessary [*Darûrî*] or arrived upon by reflection and analysis [*Nažarî*].

The lexical meaning of *li-dhatihî* means, in itself, intrinsic, by nature, essentially and so forth; and the meaning of *li-ghayrihî* is because of an external dependency, extrinsic, because of external influence and so forth.

7. *Wâjib Dhâtî*: That which is *wâjib* in itself; essentially necessary or intrinsically necessary.
8. *Wâjib Li Ghayrih* or *Wâjib Árađî*: That which is not *wâjib* in itself, but because of an extrinsic reason it becomes *wâjib*.
9. *Muĥâl Dhâtî*: That which is *muĥâl* by itself; essentially impossible or intrinsically impossible; this is also known as being *Imtinâá Bi’dh Dhât*.
10. *Muĥâl Árađî* also *Mumtaniý bi’l Ghayr* or *Mustaĥîl Árađî*:* That which is not *muĥâl/mustaĥîl* in itself; but because of extrinsic reasons it becomes *mustaĥîl*; this is also known as being *Imtinâá Bi’l Ghayr*.
11. *Mumkin Dhâtî*: That which is contingent in itself; it is also known as *Imkân Bi’dh Dhât*; and known as *Jâyîz*, and one way of saying it is *Jawâz*.

Unlike the two categories of *wâjib* and *muĥâl*, *mumkin* does not change into the previous two categories and it is not right to say, *Mumkin bi’l Ghayr*. So anything that is *mumkin* is *mumkin dhâtî*, and since this is a category of *Hukm Áqlî* – rational argument, this is *mumkin áqlî* or *jawâz áqlî*.

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95 Also known *mumtaniý* or *muĥâl*.
96 Also known as *jâyîz*.
97 Also known as *árađî*.
98 Notice the *mumtaniý* and *mustaĥîl* are used interchangeably and mean the same thing.
That is Jawāz Āqli is just another way of saying any of the following:

a. Imkān Dhātī
b. Imkān
c. Mumkin
d. Jāyiz

The above is condensed from various books of Imām Sanūsī: Muqaddimāt and its commentary, Şughrā, Wustā, Kubrā, Şughrā al-Şughrā and his own commentaries on all of these; Imām Sanūsī’s other work, Sharḥ Al-Jazāyiryyah; the commentaries of Īlaysh, Hud-Hudi, Dasūqī and Al-Bannani on Sanūsī’s books; Mayārah’s commentary on Ibn Āāshir’s book; Al-Mawaqīf of Al-Ījī, its commentary by Sharīf Al-Jurjānī and a supercommentary by Siyālkūtī. Indeed, the older works of kalām (like books by Al-Baydāwī, Al-Shahrastānī, Al-Rāzī are indicative of this idea.) However, some latter ulamā did say that imkān bi’l ghayr or mumkin ārađī is a possible category; upon examination, it is found that it is not a proper term.

In Al-Mawaqīf, Al-Ījī discusses the concept of mumkin li dhātih (contingent by nature.) It should be noted, that the dhātih (intrinsically) here is not vis-à-vis mumkin li ghayrīh. In his marginalia of Sharḥ Al-Mawaqīf, Hasan Chalpi says:

\{I say, imkān dhātī (contingent intrinsically)\} here, the specification of 'intrinsic' for imkān dhātī (intrinsically contingent) is to caution against imkān istiýdādi, not against imkān bi’l ghayr.

Al-Jurjānī explains the concept in his commentary thus:

...so imkān dhātī is not supposed here at all, simply because there is no mumkin bi’l ghayr, extrapolating [on the categories of] wājib bi’l ghayr or imtināá bi’l ghayr. The secret here is: that wājib bi’l ghayr and imtināá bi’l ghayr are effected upon a mumkin and that which is not mustaĥīl. Because it is the mumkin that can exist or not exist; and is equally poised concerning the essence of that thing [the contingent thing] to exist or not exist.

99 See Sharḥ al-Muqaddimāt of Al-Sanūsī, Pg.79: “In the terminology of kalām scholars, jāyiz āqlī and mumkin āqlī are synonyms and refer to the same thing.” However, in the parlance of logicians/philosophers there are two categories: jāyiz āqlī – general contingency and jāyiz khāş – specific contingency. We do not consider this category following Imām Sanūsī’s lead.

100 Al-Mawaqīf, Pg.71

101 Sharḥ al-Mawaqīf, Vol.3, Pg.179

102 This is the text of Sharḥ al-Mawaqīf.

103 imkān istiýdādi is also known as imkān al-wuqūyi. Note that a thing can be contingent intrinsically does not necessarily mean that it will come into existence; however, it can be transformed to wājib bi’l ghayr or mustaĥīl bi’l ghayr due to an external reason. Contingent existentially means: that if its existence is supposed, it cannot be transformed into either wājib or mustaĥīl; whether dhātī or āraqī in either cases of existence and non-existence.

104 That is there is no thing as imkān bi’l ghayr.

105 Sharḥ al-Mawaqīf, Vol.3, Pg.180; The Third Rank; The Fourth Objective: Discussion about mumkin li dhātih.

106 wājib āraqī

107 muĥāl āraqī or mustaĥīl bi’l ghayr

108 that is: only a mumkin can be transformed into mustaĥīl āraqī/imtināá bi’l ghayr or wājib āraqī/wājib bi’l ghayr because of extraneous reasons. and this because only mumkin can either exist or not-exist; when an extraneous constraint is applied, it simply becomes impossible to exist or necessary to exist.
Siyālkūṭī in his marginalia on Al-Jurjānī’s commentary writes:

that is if it was intrinsically contingent [imkān dhātī], this extraneous clause would then have an influence on the contingent nature of that thing. And what follows is invalid because, we do not have conditional contingent [mumkin li ghayrih] in describing ‘contingent’ as it is in the case of necessary and impossible [wājib, imtināā] which are caused due to an external condition or dependency or its absence.

12. Kalām Nafsī: The Divine Attribute of Allāh tāālā, Divine Speech; this is pre-eternal, self-subsistent, unchangeable and wājib; all properties that are valid for attributes of Allāh tāālā are applicable here and conversely, all properties that are impermissible to be admitted for the Attributes of Allāh tāālā are impossible.

13. Kalām Lafżī: The letters and words that convey Divine Speech; or the letters and words that are indicative, denotative of the Divine Speech of Allāh tāālā. Words and letters are accidents, but the meaning they convey is pre-eternal and self-subsisting.

It should be noted that the above sub-categorization of nafsī and lafżī is merely superficial. This was mentioned by scholars, in the context of Mutazili objections as explained by ālamā, and indeed, in Sharḥ al-Mawāqif itself, that there is no real difference:

Therefore, the kalām nafsī according to him [Al-Ashārī] includes both words and their meanings and are Pre-eternal.

This categorization was used, also to refute the anthropomorphist heresies, some who went as far as to claim that the letters, words, sounds, ink, paper and binding [of the book] are all pre-eternal! One scholar answering this quipped, ‘Then, what stopped him from saying that the hands that made those covers are also pre-eternal?’ Most Ashārī imams wrote a separate section in their books clarifying that there is no difference in both and that ‘the Speech of Allāh tāālā is one.’

How can words that are indicative of Divine Speech be false, without entailing the same in Divine Speech? It is like saying the words can be false but the meaning is true. 

14. Ĥusn: Praiseworthy, or something inherently beautiful.

15. Qubĥ: Deplorable, or something inherently ugly.

The Mútazilah say that things are inherently beautiful or ugly. And that Allāh tāālā does not do ugly things. The Ashārī argument here is that the Will of the Lord Almighty Allāh is what ordains something beautiful or ugly. If He says that something is ugly, it is ugly. For example, fasting in Ramadan is praiseworthy and beautiful; but fasting on the first of Shawwāl (Eid day) is ugly. Telling lies is ugly in general; however, if someone is pursuing a Prophet seeking to kill him, it is not ugly to tell a lie to save the Prophet. The point Ashārīs make, is that anything is beautiful or ugly, as declared by the Sharīāh not by the inherent nature of that thing.

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109 Marginalia of Ābdu'l-Ĥakīm Siyālkūṭī on Sharḥ al-Mawāqif, Vol.3/Pg.180

110 which is absurd because contingent itself means that its existence is dependent, and is neither necessary nor impossible.

111 that is wājib li ghayrih or mumtaniй li ghayrih are caused due to an external factor.

112 qiyāmuhu bi nafsih.

113 Sharḥ al-Mawāqif, Vol.8, Pg.117 [Marşad ar-Rābiý:Maqşad al-Sābiý]

114 qadīm

115 that is the commandments or ordaining of the Lord Almighty Allāh.

116 The difference between Mútazilī, Māturīdī and Ashārī scholars on this topic is beyond the scope of this paper.
Furthermore, the Mútazilah say that falsehood in the speech of Allāh táālā is muḫāl because it is ugly. Sunnis object to it and say, that it is muḫāl not because it is ugly, but rather because it is a flaw. Either one tells a lie out of natural vileness, or fear, or greed, or other reasons, which are all flaws; and the Creator is free from them. Notice, that both agree it is muḫāl, but the difference is the route by which they arrive at the conclusion.

Sunnis object to, and show the problem with the Mutazili position and say, if falsehood ceases to remain ugly, as in the case of saving a Prophet, then falsehood becomes possible. And our original standpoint – the foregone conclusion – that falsehood is muḫāl for Allāh táālā becomes invalid. Therefore, it is necessary to rule that falsehood is a flaw and therefore muḫāl for Allāh táālā.

17. Kamāl: Perfection; opposite of flaw and imperfection.
18. Maqdūr: That which is included in or subject to Divine Power.¹¹⁷
21. Irādah: Divine Will, it is that attribute which specifies [or chooses] some of the contingent to bring it into existence or make it non-existent.
22. Qudrah: Divine Power: It is that Divine Attribute, which can bring into existence anything contingent, or annihilate it according to Divine Will.
23. Ĥādīth: That which came into existence and is not pre-eternal; everything, except the Person and Attributes of Allāh táālā are ĥādīth.
24. Qadīm, Azalī: that which is pre-eternal and has existed without a beginning. Only Allāh táālā and His Attributes are qadīm; everything else is ĥādīth.
25. Ādam: Non-existence.
26. Mādūm: That which in non-existent. This does not mean that it is impossible to exist. It just means that hitherto, it is non-existent.
28. Mawjūd: That which is existent.

¹¹⁷ İnşāAllāh, this will be elaborated in the next section, that only the mumkin is included in the maqdūr; and neither wājib nor muḫāl are included in maqdūr.
VI. IS MUḤĀL INCLUDED IN DIVINE POWER?

Even a beginner in this science knows that 
muḥāl (or mustaḥīl) by definition, is not included in Divine Power. Just as wājib is not included or governed by Divine Power.

The preclusion of mustaḥīl from Divine Power does not cause a deficiency in Power, but rather, the very thing that was not included in Divine Power is flawed, and because of its defect, it is not included in Divine Power. Keep in mind from the previous discussion that muḥāl is muḥāl dhātī unless explicitly mentioned otherwise.

The following citations emphatically prove that none has disagreed on the principle that, Divine Power includes everything that is contingent (mumkin); it does not include nor govern the impossible (mustaḥīl/muḥāl) or the necessary (wājib).

1. In Jawharah al-Tawḥīd verse 33:

\[
\text{fa qudratun bi mumkinin tālqaqat}
\]

bīlā tanāhī mā bihī tālqaqat

Divine Power governs only the contingent
Without any limits to that which it governs (that is mumkināt or the contingent)

2. Al-Bājūrī in Tuĥfatu'l Murīd explains the above verse:

As if he is saying: It (Divine Power) is not concerned (with anything) except the contingent (mumkin). That is, every possible thing (or everything that is contingent.) Even though the noun is indefinite, within the context of attestation (such indefinite nouns are) used as a term of generalization. As it is said in Qurān: 'the soul shall know what it has sent forth' [actually] means 'every soul'. So, Power, is concerned with all contingent things; because, if any contingent thing were beyond this Power, then it would necessitate powerlessness, which is muḥāl for Allāh tāālā.

3. He further says:

The following are excluded from mumkin: wājib (necessary) and mustaḥīl (impossible) as Divine Power is not concerned with these two kinds. Because, if it concerns the existence of wājib, it necessitates bringing into existence that already exists; and if it concerns with its annihilation, then it overturns the very nature of wājib; because by definition and by its very essence, wājib means that which cannot be non-existent. And if Divine Power concerns the mustaḥīl, it would be opposite to the case of wājib.

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118 qudrah
119 Tuĥfatu'l Murīd Pg.116, published by Al-Maktabah al-Az‘hariyyah li’t Turāth
120 mumkin is indefinite in the verse, but actually means all mumkināt
121 ālimat nafsun mā āḥdarat, Sūrah Al-Takwīr, Verse 14
122 ājz
123 the wājib
124 ādam
125 That is, if mustaḥīl were to be in existence, this would overturn the nature of mustaḥīl; because by definition and by its nature, it is that which cannot exist; and if mustaḥīl were to be annihilated, it is already the case.
4. Al-Sanūsī says in *Al-Muqaddimāt*:

Eternal and Divine Power: is the description of the Attribute by which every contingent thing is brought into existence or annihilated (or not brought into existence) according to Divine Will.

5. Al-Bannānī explaining this, says:

And he cautiously says *mumkin*, so that it is understood that *wājib dhātī* and *mustaĥīl dhātī* are not included [in Divine Power] because Divine Power in its perfection, and Divine Will, are not concerned with these two...

6. In *Sharḥ al-Maqāṣid*:

Nothing, which is muñāl, is included in Divine Power

7. Imām Yāfiýi says:

No rational impossibilities are subject to Divine Power

8. In *Sharḥ Fiqh al-Akbar*:

The furthest in the matter is that such a thing is by itself impossible like the coinciding of opposites, or the overturning of the realities or the annihilation of the pre-eternal; none of these things are included in Divine Power that is Pre-eternal.

9. In *Sharḥ al-Mawāqif*:

The Knowledge of Allāh tāālā, in general, encompasses everything that is comprehensible: whether contingent, necessary or impossible; this is even more generic (and all-inclusive) than Divine Power because, Power governs only the *mumkin* (contingent); not the *wājib* (necessary) and the impossible (*mustaniy*).

10. In *Al-Musāmarah*:

Thirdly, that which concerns Divine Knowledge is much more general in scope than that which is governed by Divine Power. Because, Divine Knowledge is inclusive of [everything:] *wājib*, *mumkin* and *mustaniy*; whereas, Divine Power is concerned only with the mumkin and not the *wājib* or *mustaniy*.

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126 *qudrah al-azaliyyah*
127 *Al-Mawāhib ar-Rabbāniyyah fi Sharḥi'l Muqaddimāt al-Sanūsīyah*
130 *mustaĥīlāt al-áqliyyah*
131 *Minaĥ al-Rawđ al-Az'ĥar Sharĥ Fiqh al-Akbar*, Álī al-Qārī. Pg.56
132 that is, it is a basic premise itself without requiring additional proof
133 *Sharḥ al-Mawāqif*, Al-Marṣad al-Rābi'y, Al-Maqṣad al-Thālith. Vol.8, Pg.70
134 *Al Musāmarah Sharḥ al-Musāyarah*, The Second Pillar: Knowledge of the Attributes of Allāh tāālā. Pg.85
11. In *Sharḥ al-Āqāyīd*,<sup>135</sup> *Usūl al-Dīn*<sup>136</sup> and in *Al-Inşāf*:<sup>137</sup>

He has [absolute] Power over all things that can be governed<sup>138</sup> by Divine Power.

12. The statement: ṣādirun al-ālā jamiʿy al-maqdūrat<sup>139</sup> is explained by the Ashārī Imām Abu’l Muḥaffar al-Isfarayinī<sup>140</sup> in *Al-Tabṣīr*:<sup>141</sup>

Just as it is permissible to say that He is the Knower of all things, it is permissible to say that Allāh tāālā has Power over all things that can be governed<sup>142</sup> by Divine Power. It is impossible to say that He has Power over everything absolutely. Because the Pre-eternal<sup>143</sup> is a thing and it is impossible (*mustaḥil*) for Divine Power to be concerned with it [or govern it].

That which is in the Qur’ān that [is apparently all-inclusive]: ‘He has Power over all things’, is an expression that has a specification.<sup>144</sup> It actually means, ‘He has Power over all things that are governed by His Power.’ It is therefore, that the people of knowledge have said that the verse of knowledge<sup>145</sup> [is general] and has no exception and there is no specification; but the verse of power<sup>146</sup> has a specification.

When it is said that ‘Knowledge and Power [are general] and have no specification’ it is actually meant that: Knowledge is general [without any specification, takhşīṣ] and encompasses everything that can be known. Moreover, Power is general [and all-inclusive] in all things that are governed<sup>147</sup> by Divine Power.

13. Finally, Mayārah in *Durr al-Thamīn* citing *Sharḥ al-Ṣughrā* of Al-Sanusi:<sup>148</sup>

That which is governed by Divine Power and Divine Will is just one [category]: that is, the *mumkin*, the contingent – and not the *wājib*, nor the *mustaḥil*.

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<sup>135</sup> *Sharḥ al-Āqāyīd*, Al-Taftāzāni. Pg.58: His Eternal Attributes.

<sup>136</sup> *Usūl al-Dīn*, Abdu'l Qāhir al-Baghdādī. Pg.115

<sup>137</sup> *Al-Inşāf*, Al-Baqillānī, pg.51

<sup>138</sup> maqdūrat.

<sup>139</sup> He has [absolute] Power over all things that can be governed by Divine Power.

<sup>140</sup> Abu’l Muḥaffar al-Isfarayinī, d.471AH

<sup>141</sup> *Al-Tabṣīr fi’d Dīn* Pg.142

<sup>142</sup> maqdūrat

<sup>143</sup> qādim

<sup>144</sup> takhşīṣ

<sup>145</sup> And Allāh has the Knowledge of all things. Qur’ān, Al-Āhzāb v.40

<sup>146</sup> And Allāh has Power over all things. Qur’ān, Al-Māyidah, v.17

<sup>147</sup> jamiʿy al-maqdūrat

<sup>148</sup> *Durr al-Thamīn*, Vol.1, Pg.24
Further, he says:

The people of truth say that *mumkin* is governed in three ranks. That which is related to Divine Power; that which is related to Divine Will and that related to Knowledge concerning the *mumkin*. The first is because of the second, and the second because of the third.149

Divine Power and Divine Will do not concern *wājib* and *mustaḥīl* because, Power and Will are two influencing Attributes. Therefore, that which necessitates influence to bring something into existence after non-existence, then it is necessary for it [such influencing attribute] to not be non-existent in the first place, like *wājib*. Thus, *qudrah* and *irādah* do not have influence on *wājib*. Else, it would be attempting to bring into existence that which is already present.150

And that, whose existence cannot be accepted at all - the *mustaḥīl* - does not accept the influence of the two attributes [of *qudrah* and *irādah*] as well. Otherwise, the reality [of definitions] becomes topsy-turvy and that which is [classified] as *mustaḥīl* becomes contingent [*jāyiz*] itself!

Therefore, it is not a shortcoming of the two eternal attributes of *qudrah* and *irādah*, if they do not concern *wājib* and *mustaḥīl*; rather, if they are concerned with them,151 then it necessitates a shortcoming in these two Divine Pre-eternal attributes. Then, according to this corrupt logic152 it becomes possible to annihilate the very two attributes153 themselves; rather, to annihilate the Self of Allāh tāālā, Himself! And [possible] to attest an accident to godhood, which is not the attribute of God 154 (of *ilāh*); and to accept that, necessary attributes can be made void.

Exalted and glorified is Our Lord from such things.

Where is any flaw or mischief greater than this? In summary, this corrupt idea leads to a grave confusion; and then, nothing remains from faith [*iman*] alongside [this idea] or anything rational remains.

Therefore, the key point to remember is that only *mumkin* is included in Divine Power; neither *muḥāl* nor *wājib* are included in, or subject to, or governed by Divine Power.

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149 That is, His Power governs according to His Will which is according to His Knowledge

150 That is, *wājib* is pre-eternal and has always existed. Then what is the point of Power and Will to effect upon it as *wājib* doesn't accept any influence.

151 *wājib* and *mustaḥīl*

152 *at-taqdir al-fasid*

153 *qudrah* and *irādah*

154 *ilāh*
VII. ALLĀH MOST HIGH IS TRANSCENDENT FROM ALL FLAWS

One of the fundamental principles of Islamic doctrine is that Allāh táālā is free from all defects and flaws. It is a postulate from which further rational rulings in áqīdah are derived and understood. This is the basic belief, which even a child can understand. Almost every áqīdah book describes this and it is an automatic assumption. It is incredible to believe that a person who claims to be a scholar and from the Sunni creed can doubt this postulate. Even disbelievers negate imperfection to their own false gods; even though they try to prove certain things as perfection, which we Muslims believe are imperfections. Therefore, the argument is not whether the Creator is free from flaw; everyone agrees that He is; the argument is about what constitutes an imperfection. Yet, one person – defending the Deobandi position – in an argument said, 'Where does it say that the Creator cannot have a flaw?' We seek Allāh’s refuge from this kind of heretical audacity that prompted Imām Aĥmed Ridā to say:155

jahāN meīN koyi bhi kāfīr ke kāfīr aysā ho
jo apney rabb pey safāhat156 ka dāgh le ke chaley
Is there anyone, even the worst infidel?
Who proudly walks around claiming the blemish of vileness upon his lord?

Statements from úlamā that say Allāh táālā is free from all flaws:

1. In Al-Mawāqif of Al-Ījī:
The Attributes of Allāh táālā are all attributes of perfection and they are free from [every] flaw.

2. In its commentary, Al-Jurjānī writes:157
It is muĥāl for Him to have any flaw and this is a unanimously agreed-upon [fact].

3. The first line of Al-Jazāyiriyyah:158
subĥānahu jalla án shibhin wa án mathali
Sanctified is He and Exalted is He from similitude and examples.

4. Imām Sanūsī in the commentary of Al-Jazāyiriyyah:159
As if answering the question for the proof of sanctification of Allāh táālā and that He is transcendent from all flaws. As if, he [the author] is saying: He is transcendent from all flaws; because, He is exalted from having any similitude or example. One way to prove this, is that if He is attributed with a flaw – exalted is He from such things – then He would be dependent on something that would make Him [or His Attributes] perfect; as that flaw would negate perfection; this would necessitate, that He is powerless and dependent – and this is the character of the ĥawādith;160 that would make Him similar to accidents. How can this be, when you have demonstrated His being free from similitude?

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155 Ḥadāyiq e Bakhshish, Imam Ahmed Ridā al-Baraylawī
156 Because in Juhd al-Muqill, a Deobandi author tries to prove that vileness is in Divine Power.
157 Sharḥ al-Mawāqif Vol.8, Pg.38
158 Kifyatu’l Murīd, Imām Aĥmed Al-Zawwāwī, d.884 AH
159 Al-Manhaj al-Sadīd, Al-Sanūsī p.29
160 Accidents. Plural of Ṣadīth.
5. Al-Sanūsī in the explanation of Divine Names:  
**Al-Quddūs:** That He is transcendent from all flaws.

6. Qāḍī īyād in Al- īylām:  
Flaws and defects cannot approach His Attributes.

7. Ibn Humām in Al-Musāyarah:  
Every semblance of flaw, like ignorance and falsehood, are mustaḥīl for Allāh táālā.

8. Ibn Abi’sh Sharīf in its commentary Al-Musāmarah:  
It is {essentially impossible} for Him (Allāh subḥānahu wa táālā) {all attributes of flaw like ignorance and falsehood}; rather, it is also absolutely impossible for Him {to have} any attribute that has neither perfection nor flaw, because, every attribute of the Lord Almighty Allāh is that of perfection.

9. Ibn Abi’sh Sharīf in the same book:  
We say: There is no difference of opinion among Ashārīs or others that, anything that is considered as a flaw for creation, then the Creator is also Transcendent from that. He is free from it and it is essentially impossible [muḥāl] for Allāh táālā. Falsehood is an attribute of flaw/fault for creation. [Hence it is muḥāl for Allāh táālā]

10. Qāḍī al-Bāqillānī in Al-Inşāf:  
Belief in Allāh táālā comprises of [belief in] Oneness of Allāh, Sanctified is He; and to attest His Divine Attributes and negation of flaws from His Attributes; as flaws necessitate anyone having them to be accidents.

11. Imām al-Ḥaramayn explaining Divine Names:  
**Al-Quddūs:** .. it means that He is Transcendent from any attribute of flaw, and anything that leads to [the conclusion that it is] an accident

12. Al-Tūnisī in Al-Nukat al-Mufīdah:  
The verdict [derived from] intellect and evidence from revelation is, that it is necessary to attribute Allāh táālā with Attributes of Perfection; and these two proofs mandate the impossibility [istiḥālah] of flaw or anything that is not befitting His Majesty.

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161 Al-Asnā fi Sharḥi Asmā’ā Allāh al-Ḥusnā
162 Al-īylām bi Ḥudūd al-Islām Pg.37
163 Al-Musāyarah with Al-Musāmarah, Pg.326
164 Al-Musāmarah with Musāyarah as inline text, Pg.326: The Description of the Ahlu’s Sunnah Doctrine.
165 mustaḥīl, that is mustaḥīl dhāti
166 Ibid, Pg.178
167 Al-Inşāf, Pg.34
168 That is, Allāh táālā and His Attributes are all pre-eternal; if there were a flaw in any attribute, it would be an accident – which is muḥāl.
169 Al-Irshād, Al-Juwaynī. Pg.145
170 ḥādith; that is anything that is opposed to His Attribute of being Pre-Eternal, qādim.
171 An-Nukat al-Mufīdah Sharḥ Khutbatu’l Āqidah of Al-Qayrwānī, Al-Tūnisī Pg.90
13. Imam Ibn Ḥajar al-Haytamī in his *Al-Iýlām* says:  
Whosoever attests or denies something that explicitly attributes a flaw to Allāh tāālā is a *kāfir*.

ilâh al-khalqi mawiâna qadîmun
wa mawṣûfun bi awṣâfi’l kamâli

Our Lord, the Creator, is Eternal and His Attributes are attributes of Perfection.

15. Álī al-Qârî writes:  
All of Allâh’s attributes *Exalted is He* are that of Perfection and He is transcendent from every sign or indication of flaw or decline or decay.

The Lord *Sanctified and Exalted is He* is transcendent from every semblance of flaw  
Anything that suggests an accident or an indication of flaw, then the Lord Almighty is transcendent from such thing.

17. In *Jawharah* it is said:  
qiýāmu bi’n nafsi waḥdāniyyah
munazzahan awṣafuhu saniyyah  
His Existence is by Himself, and He is Alone  
His Lightsome Attributes are Transcendent

18. Al-Şāwī commenting on this:  
Or ‘*sanâ*’ with elongation, meaning exaltedness. Because, His Attributes are Exalted and are transcendent and free from all flaws. Thus, His Attributes *Sanctified is He and Exalted* are Lofty, Beautiful and Majestic.

19. Al-Jurjānī in *Sharḥ al-Mawāqif*:  
Anything among the attributes, whose non-existence is praiseworthy and existence is a flaw, *Falsehood is one such thing. Its non-existence is praiseworthy and its existence a flaw, ergo it is wâjib to consider Him transcendent from such attribute. I say: Did Sharīf al-Jurjānī forget this in the space of a few pages? (See Appendix C for discussion on a problematic quote)*
20. Imām Rāzī in Lawāmiý al-Bayyināt explaining the Divine Name **Al-Quddūs**:\(^{182}\)
The meaning of this name is, that Allāh táālā is free from and transcendent from all flaws and defects.

21. Imām Sanūsī in Sharḥ al-Kubrā:\(^{183}\)
*He Exalted and Glorified is He* is free from every flaw; [known by] rational [proof] and by revelation.

22. Al-Isfarāyinī in Al-Tabşīr:\(^{184}\)
Know that it is not possible to attribute Allāh Sanctified is He with any flaw, or a pitfall. Because, a pitfall is a kind of an obstacle, and an obstacle would necessitate someone creating or causing that obstacle – and there is no one above Allāh tāālā to prevent Him [from doing what He Wills.] He has cautioned about this when He says: 'And He is Allāh, there is no God except He, The Malik, The Quddūs, The Salām, The Mu’mīn, The Muhaymin, The Ázīz, The Jabbār, The Mutakabbir. Glorified and Sanctified is He from the partners they ascribe to Him.'\(^{193}\)

**As-Salām** is one who is Immune from flaws, defects and pitfalls. **Al-Quddūs** is one who is transcendent from all flaws and obstacles; He has described Himself as: 'The Lord of the Throne, The Majīd':\(^{194}\) Majīd, in the parlance of Arabs means immense glory, such that if anything has a flaw or something that prevents perfection, then such an entity cannot be called Majīd. When He has attributed Himself as Majīd, Sanctified is He, we know that no flaw or defect can approach Him [or His Attributes].

23. Al-Baydāwī in Ţawāliý al-Anwār:\(^{195}\)
The second reason: Verily everything that can be attributed to Allāh tāālā is an attribute of perfection (by agreement). If [such an attribute] is bereft [of perfection] then it would be a flaw – and it is muĥāl [for Allāh tāālā to have a flaw in His Attributes].

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\(^{182}\) Lawāmiý al-Bayyināt Sharḥ Asmā‘a Allahi wa’s Şifāt, Pg.194

\(^{183}\) Sharḥ al-Kubra w. Marginalia of ĥāmidī, Pg.194

\(^{184}\) Al-Tabşīr, Pg.137-138

\(^{185}\) The King

\(^{186}\) The Absolutely Transcendent

\(^{187}\) Immune from defects

\(^{188}\) One who attests to the veracity of His Prophets and Messengers

\(^{189}\) One whose dominion encompasses everything, by His Knowledge, Will and Power

\(^{189}\) He who has Power upon all contingent things – and to do or forsake anything He Wishes

\(^{190}\) One who can impose on His creation what He likes, whether they like it or not.

\(^{191}\) One whose Greatness of Self, Attributes and Action s are made known by intellect and revelation. These meanings are summarized from Al-Asnā of Al-Sanūsī, Pg.28-30.

\(^{192}\) Sūrah Al-Ĥashr, Verse 23

\(^{193}\) Sūrah Al-Burūj, Verse 51

\(^{194}\) Ţawāliý al-Anwār, Pg.171
The unsuspecting reader may wonder why these quotes are being translated. One may ask: ‘Isn’t it a fundamental article of faith, that Allāh tāālā is transcendent from flaws?’ The reason is because, this issue – and Deobandi blind following – has reached such nadir, that one of their apparently better-knowing fellows said on an internet forum:

Where does it say it is intrinsically impossible for Allah to have a flaw? I quoted shaykh Buti earlier as saying "He is not disabled to do so, but He is exalted to commit indecencies and all misdeeds...by His own free decision". Hence since lying is a flaw Allah chooses to be free of it.

SubḥānAllāh! Exalted is Allāh tāālā from such things attributed to Him by irreligious people. In that argument, I struggled to rationalize Shaykh Buti’s and Keller’s comments. After failing to find some plausible excuse for these two well-known personalities, I realized that it was a mistake to rationalize those words in the first place.

Let the reader be aware, that before Keller’s own admission came to the fore, we tried to find an excuse for him, continued to respect him, and even addressed him as ‘Shaykh Nuh.’ We still withhold from criticizing Shaykh Buti as the attribution to him is doubtful. Concerning Nuh Keller, we said: ‘perhaps, he was explaining the other position in the article... perhaps he did not believe it himself...’ But alas! Keller flushed away our excuses down the drain with his confession.

The same irreligious person wrote:

What makes you so sure my view is blasphemous and problematic and abu Hasan’s view isn’t? He hasn’t provided a single quote (neither from shaykh Ahmad Rida Khan or the kalam scholars) contradicting what I or shaykh Buti have said. Allah is munazzah from lying and it is impossible for Him to lie, but our contention is that it remains in His power, and this is a result of His choice. My point simply is since shaykhs Buti and Nuh advocate this opinion and attribute it to the scholars of Asharis (and abu Hasan has not shown anything contrary) why do you not accept this position?

He kept digging the pit further:

Allah is munazzah from all flaws - I do not deny this. But why is Allah free of all flaws? Is it because of intrinsic impossibility or contingent? You have not addressed this question from the words of the scholars. You have seen shaykh Buti's comments - are those comments kufr?

196 It is not necessary to point who said it; but only that it was said. wa billahi’t tawfiq.
197 I had written a cautionary footnote, when a brother brought to my notice that Shaykh Buti has protested against this vile accusation. His clarification was published on a website recently and a translation can be found in Appendix G.
198 And he was offended that I told him he was lying!
199 In the same argument, circa 2008. Highlighting by underline or boldface was done by the irreligious person himself.
The reason is, when the ālamā of kalām mention muḥāl, they mean muḥāl dhātī; or intrinsic impossibility. When they say that it is muḥāl for Allāh tāālā to have a defect or flaw, they mean it is muḥāl dhātī. This is a basic belief and a fundamental premise. I have provided quotes earlier – and Alhamdulillah, I can cite a hundred more, if not more. It should be clear to a Muslim that it is impossible for Allāh tāālā to have a flaw or imperfection. Let us summarize the position of Ahl al-Ĥaqq:

1. Allāh tāālā is transcendent from all flaws
2. It is muḥāl for Allāh tāālā to have a flaw
3. Unless specified, it is muḥāl dhātī.
4. Therefore, it is intrinsically, essentially impossible for Allāh tāālā to have a flaw.
5. The Person and Attributes of Allāh tāālā are wājib and not subject to Divine Power.

O Muslim, think! Do you still need a scholar to ratify this basic idea? And you will turn your backs if a scholar – in these perilous times and patchy knowledge of latter scholars – claims otherwise? Read the hadith of RasūlAllāh ﷺ quoted earlier and be warned; flee with your faith from the influence of corrupt scholars.

Only Allāh tāālā gives guidance.

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200 which I have omitted here for brevity and hoping that it is enough for a Muslim, whose belief is not shackled in taqlīd ar-rādiy, reprobate blind following of blundering scholars. Al-ıyādhu billah.

201 As the scholars of this science say: ‘The people of Truth’ or Righteous, Rightfully Guided. wa billahi’t tawfiq.

202 see the section above: A primer on Kalām terminology.
VIII. DEFINITION OF KADHIB

Kadhib is falsehood. To say something, that is contrary to what has actually occurred.

1. ʿImām Sanūṣi in his Al-Muqaddimāt says:

   Şidq / Truth: Describes that information which conforms to what has actually occurred; whether it is contrary to the belief [of the utterer/informer] or not.

   Kadhib / Falsehood, Lie: That information which is contrary to what has actually occurred; whether it conforms to the belief [of the utterer/informer] or not.

2. In the commentary of Al-Muqaddimāt, Al-Bannānī writes:

   Truth and falsehood are diametric opposites: where truth is [that saying] which is according to the occurrence and falsehood is [that saying] which is contrary to the occurrence.

3. Zabīdī in Tāj al-Árūs:

   Imām Raghib says: Truth and falsehood [şidq - kadhib] are actually related to speech, whether in the past or in the future; whether related to promise or otherwise. These two are not in the former except in speech; and they are not in speech except in information given [khabar], unlike other forms of speech. It is therefore, Allāh tāālā has said:

   **Who is more Truthful than Allāh in Speech?**

   **Who is more Truthful than Allāh in what He Says?**

4. In Sharḥ al-Mawāqif:

   ...because falsehood is an attribute of speech/information [being given]

5. Al-Shahrastānī in Nihāyatu’l Iqdām:

   Truth and falsehood are nothing in reality, except when associated with something, like it is said, ‘Truth is information that conforms to what has actually occurred and falsehood is information that is contrary to the actual occurrence.’

6. Al-Farhārī in Al-Nibrās:

   Truth and falsehood are attributes of information [khabar]

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203 Tāj al-Árūs, Vol.26, Pg.5; entry: s-d-q:
204 Truth and falsehood
205 Sūrah An-Nisā’a v.87
206 Sūrah An-Nisā’a v.122
207 Sharḥ al-Mawāqif v8,p211
208 khabar
209 Nihayatu’l Iqdām fi ʿilm al-Kalām, p
210 Al-Nibrās , Ābd al-ʿAzīz al-Farhārī Pg.49.
The reason why I have deemed it necessary to include these definitions is to clarify that truth and falsehood are not things that are separate entities in themselves; when it is said: ‘power over truth’ or ‘power over falsehood’, it should not be thought that these can be isolated from speech. These are not individual actions in themselves, unless speech is considered an action; even then, these are attributes that define that ‘action’ of speech.

Since falsehood is an attribute of speech, it lends its attributes to that speech in which it is found. If falsehood is ḥādīth, then that speech is also ḥādīth; and if falsehood is mumkin, then that speech becomes mumkin. And that which is mumkin is also ḥādīth. But, we know by necessity, that Divine Speech is wājib; because it is an attribute of Allāh táālā Most High. Therefore, falsehood would render it mumkin; and therefore ḥādīth, which are both invalid.

7. Saáduddīn Taftāzānī says,\textsuperscript{211} citing Imām Rāzī:

Because we believe that Truth in the Speech of Allāh táālā is pre-eternal, therefore it is impossible for falsehood (to occur); because, when something is proven that it is pre-eternal, it is impossible for its annihilation or non-existence.\textsuperscript{212}

As we have seen by the definitions above, şidq is the absence of kadhib and vice-versa. The other thing is that kadhib is a flaw. There is a difference between the Sunni and the Mútazili argument even though, both consider kadhib as impossible for Allāh táālā.\textsuperscript{213} Our basis of ruling impossibility is that kadhib is a flaw; and Mútazili argument is that it is an ugly thing. I will avoid repeating quotes, as they shall be mentioned elsewhere, but here are a few more to complete this section.

8. In Ţawāliý al-Anwār,\textsuperscript{214} under the discussion of Divine Speech

Falsehood is a flaw, and a flaw for Allāh táālā is muĥāl.

9. In Al-Mawāqif, discussion of Divine Speech\textsuperscript{215}

[this issue] that it is impossible for falsehood for Allāh táālā is agreed by all; the Mútazilah say that falsehood is ugly and Allāh táālā does not do ugly things; as for us, it is because it is a flaw, and a flaw for Allāh táālā is muĥāl by unanimous agreement\textsuperscript{216}

10. Kamāl ibn Humām in Al-Musāyarah\textsuperscript{217}:

Every semblance of flaw, like ignorance and falsehood, are mustaňīl for Allāh táālā.

11. Imām Rāzī\textsuperscript{218} writes explaining a verse:

The second attribute of the Word of Allāh is, that it is Truthful; and the proof is that falsehood is a flaw, and a flaw for Allāh táālā is impossible.

\textsuperscript{211} Sharḥ al-Maqāṣid, Vol.5, Pg.154
\textsuperscript{212} ádam: annihilation. That is, if Truth is pre-eternal, then its ádam/non-existence is impossible. Because, if falsehood is considered at any point of time, then Truth is non-existent at that point.
\textsuperscript{213} Though early Mutazillis said similar to Ismāýīl Dehlavi and his followers, the Deobandis, later Mútazilī scholars abandoned the tradition of their elders. This is why the revival of a position abandoned by Mútazillis themselves is such a preposterous idea, but the Deobandis and their followers will go to any length to justify statements made by their elders. May Allāh táālā protect us from dumb, blind and mindless following.
\textsuperscript{214} Tawāliý al-Anwār Al-Bayḑāwī, Pg.172
\textsuperscript{215} Al-Mawâqif, Pg.295
\textsuperscript{216} Ijmā‘ of Ahl as-Sunnah scholars. Or the Ijmā‘ of all mutakallimin. Or the Ijmā‘ of all sane people.
\textsuperscript{217} in Tafsīr al-Kabīr, under Sūrah Al-Baqarah, Verse 80: \textbf{Do you say about Allāh táālā, that which you do not know?}
\textsuperscript{218} Fakhruddīn Muĥammad ibn Úmar ar-Rāzī (d.606AH), the Imām of later kalām scholars.
IX. STATEMENTS OF SCHOLARS THAT KADHIB IS MUḤĀL

I will now list, InshāAllāh, quotes from books of kalām that clearly say that kadhib is muḥāl; remember, that muḥāl is dhātī and not ārađī unless explicitly mentioned.

1. In *Sharḥ al-Maqāşid*, under the discussion of Speech:219

   Falsehood is muḥāl by the unanimity of all scholars; because falsehood is a flaw as agreed by all rational people; and it (falsehood) is muḥāl for Allāh tāālā [summarized].

2. Under the discussion of ḥusn-qubḥ, in the same book:220

   We have clarified earlier in the discussion of Speech, that falsehood is impossible for Allāh tāālā without causing a circular argument.

3. In the same book,221 under the discussion of taklīf bi'l muĥāl222

   Ignorance and falsehood are both impossible for Allāh tāālā; Exalted is He from such things.

4. In the same book:223

   (Considering) falsehood in the saying224 of Allāh tāālā is ugly even if it is on account of a beneficial objective; and this would prevent many other kinds of good as this would cause untold problems and a patent nuisance; an invitation for the revilement and vilification of Islam, as is obvious. Among such examples225 are the sayings of philosophers concerning the hereafter and denials of the irreligious. This also invalidates the ījmā'á that the infidels will stay in hell forever226 as this is among the clear messages given by Allāh tāālā.

5. In *Al-Mawāqif*, under the discussion of Divine Speech:227

   [this issue] that it is impossible for falsehood for Allāh tāālā is agreed by all; the Mūtazilah say that falsehood is ugly and Allāh tāālā does not do ugly things; as for us228 it is because it is a flaw, and a flaw for Allāh tāālā is muḥāl by unanimous agreement.229

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219 *Sharḥ al-Maqāşid*, Vol.2, Pg.293
220 *Sharḥ al-Maqāşid*, Vol.2, Pg.143
221 *Sharḥ al-Maqāşid*, Vol.3, Pg. 299. Even though, it is interspersed as a part of the cited objection, the intention of the author is apparent by his exoneration: tāālā án dhālik : exalted is He from such things.
222 taklīf bi'l muĥāl: that Allāh tāālā does not hold us responsible by ordering us to do the impossible.
223 *Sharḥ al-Maqāşid*, Vol.5, Pg.154-155
224 akhbūr, plural of khabar: is news, message, information; but here it is general for everything said by Allāh tāālā.
225 of potential attacks on Islam, if we considered falsehood possible
226 it is unanimously agreed that disbelievers will stay in hell forever, as informed by Allāh taala. If falsehood is considered possible, then this information will be invalidated.
227 *Al-Mawāqif*, Pg.295
228 Ahl as-Sunnah
229 ījmā'á of Ahl as-Sunnah scholars.
6. In *Al-Mawāqif* and its exegesis *Sharḥ Al-Mawāqif* in the discussion of ḥusn-qubḥ:230 The basis of our saying that falsehood is impossible for Allāh tāālā is not because it is considered as an ugly thing by intellect;231 because, if falsehood ceases to be considered ugly, then it necessitates that falsehood does not remain muḥāl anymore; therefore, there is another basis for this,232 which we have explained earlier.233

7. In the same book, under discussion of miracles:234 It has been mentioned earlier in the discussion of Divine Speech that our position concerning Divine Attributes is that falsehood is impossible235 for Allāh tāālā, Glorified and Exalted is He.

8. In *Ţawāliý al-Anwār*,236 under the discussion of Divine Speech Falsehood is a flaw, and a flaw for Allāh tāālā is muḥāl.

9. Kamāl ibn Humām in *Al-Musāyarah*:237 Every semblance of flaw, like ignorance and falsehood, are mustaḥīl for Allāh tāālā.

10. Kamāluddin Muḥammad ibn Abi’sh Sharīf in the exegesis of his teacher’s work mentioned above, titled *Al-Musāmarah*:238 If one objects: The point of contention is that these two [ḥusn and qubḥ] are [considered] in actions of creation [afāāl al-ibād] not in the Attributes of Allāh tāālā.

    We say: There is no difference of opinion among Ashāris or others that, whatever is considered as a flaw for creation, then, the Creator is also Transcendent from that. He is free from it and it is essentially impossible [muḥāl] for Allah tāālā. Falsehood is an attribute of flaw/fault for creation. [Hence, it is muḥāl for Allāh tāālā as well].

    If one objects: We do not accept that falsehood is an attribute of imperfection for creation absolutely; because, sometimes, it is also good for them. Rather, it is obligatory for them to utter a falsehood to save an innocent person when a pursuer asks about him and intends to kill him unjustly.

    We say: It is obvious that kadhib/falsehood is a flaw according to intellect; and to utter falsehood is [usually] because of some necessity; [such as] for the weak, to defend themselves with falsehood, [which] does not apply for Allāh tāālā.

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230 *Sharḥ al-Mawdaqīf*, Sharīf al-Jurjānī, Vol.8, Pg.214
231 qubḥ al-dāqlī
232 that falsehood is muḥāl
233 that it is because falsehood is a flaw and a flaw is impossible for Allāh tāālā.
234 *Sharḥ al-Mawdaqīf*, Sharīf al-Jurjānī, Vol.8
235 mumtaniy
237 *Al-Musāyarah*, Pg.326
238 *Al-Musāmarah Sharḥ Al-Musāyarah*, Pg.178
It is not valid to use this analogy for Allāh tāālā, who is Omnipotent, whose Power is Absolute and is Absolutely Independent - Glory to Him.

Therefore, it can be concluded that, kadhib or lying is an attribute of flaw, even when you attribute the Hallowed Lord Almighty with it. It is absolutely impossible [mustaňil] to attribute Him -Glory to Him - with it [falsehood]

11. Imām Fakhruddīn Rāzī in his *Tafsīr Al-Kabīr*:

When Allāh tāālā says: 'And he shall not renege on His Promise' raises proves that Allāh tāālā is free from falsehood in His promise of reward and punishment. Our scholars have said that it is because falsehood is an attribute of flaw, and flaw/defect is muňāl for Allāh tāālā. The Mútazilah said that because falsehood is ugly, and it is impossible that He does ugly things; therefore, falsehood is muňāl for Him.

12. Allāh tāālā says:

The Words of your Lord have been fulfilled with Truth and Justice; none can change His Words, and He is the Hearer, the Knower.

Imām Rāzī writes explaining the above verse:

The second attribute of the Word of Allāh is that it is Truthful; and the proof is that falsehood is a flaw, and a flaw for Allāh tāālā is impossible.

13. He further says:

The validity of all the evidence from revelation, is dependent on [the premise that] falsehood is muňāl for Allāh tāālā.

14. Allāh tāālā says:

Allāh tāālā shall not take a son, glorified and exalted is he from such a thing.’ The Mútazilah used this verse as their evidence (for an idea of theirs) and refuting them, Imām Rāzī says:

Our people answered, 'because falsehood is muňāl for Allāh tāālā’

15. Saáduddīn Taftāzānī says, citing Imām Rāzī:

Because we believe that Truth in the Speech of Allāh tāālā is pre-eternal, therefore it is impossible for falsehood (to occur); because, when something is proven that it is pre-eternal, it is impossible for its annihilation or non-existence [ādam].

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239 Sūrah Al-Baqarah, Verse.80
240 munazzah: meaning free from defect, transcendent from all faults.
241 wād – wājīd
242 as-ĥābunā: lit. our companions, meaning our scholars of Ahl as-Sunnah or Ashárīs.
243 Sūrah Al-Anáām, Verse.115
244 dalāyil al-samýiyyah: proof from revelation
245 lit. ‘those things held by the Mútazilah’
247 Ahl as-Sunnah
248 *Sharĥ al-Maqāşid*, Vol.5, Pg.154
16. In *Sharḥ al-Muqaddimāt*, Imām Sanūsī says: 

He who Informs, our Lord – Glorified and Exalted is He – is free from the flaw of falsehood both by rational and *sharayī* proofs.

17. In the same book, discussing *jāyiz* he says:

[This would necessitate] falsehood and giving information contrary to its occurrence, which is mustaḥil.

After a few lines he says:

This would necessitate falsehood for Him, and falsehood is rationally impossible for Him.

18. Jalāluddin al-Dawwānī in his commentary of *Áqāýid al-Áđudiyyah*:

I say: Falsehood is a flaw and a flaw for Allāh tāālá is *muḥāl*. It is not included in the *mumkināt* and neither is it included in Divine Power. This, just as His Divine Power does not include anything that implies that there is a flaw in Him – exalted is He – like ignorance [*jahāl*] and powerlessness [*ájz*]; or negation of the attribute of Speech or any other attribute of perfection.

19. After a few lines he says yet once again:

A flaw for Allāh tāālá is *muḥāl áqlī*.

20. In *Sharḥ Aqāyid an-Nasafī*:

It is *muḥāl* for falsehood in the Speech of Allāh tāālá.

21. *Tafsīr Baydāwī* explaining the verse: ‘And who is more Truthful than Allāh tāālá?’

Here, it is being refuted that anyone can be more Truthful than Allāh tāālá. Because, falsehood can never approach His message, His Speech; because it is a flaw, and [thus] it is *muḥāl* for Allāh tāālá.

22. *Sharḥ Al-Sanūsīyah*:

Falsehood for Allāh tāālá is impossible [*muḥāl*] because it is baseness, and it is a contemptible thing.

249 *Sharḥ al-Muqaddimāt* p.158
250 *āqlan wa naqlan*
251 Ibid, Pg.79
252 *Sharḥ Áqāyid al-Áđudiyyah*, Jalāluddin Dawānī, Pg.65
253 Before some foolish objection is raised by saying: ‘A ha! it is *muḥāl áqlī*, not *muḥāl sharaýī*’ one has to understand that anything that is claimed as *muḥāl sharayī* should be proven from *nuşūş* : that is the Qur’ān and Sunnah. Where is such proof that says: ‘Flaw is Possible’? al-íyādhu billāh.
254 *Sharḥ Aqāyid an-Nasafī*, Pg.71
255 *Tafsīr Anwāru’t Tanzīl wa Asrār at-Ta’wīl*, Al-Baydāwī
256 Sūrah An-Nisā’a, Verse.87
257 *Sanūsīyah álā Al-Jazāyiriyyah*, Pg.
258 It is therefore, a flaw; and a flaw for Allāh tāālá is *muḥāl*. 
23. Tafsir Madārik:259

’And whose Speech is more Truthful than Allāh tāālā?’: Here, the interrogative tense is actually a negation; that is, ‘There is no one more Truthful than Him’ in His saying, His promise of reward or punishment; because of the impossibility of falsehood for Allāh tāālā due to its ugliness,260 because it is saying something other than what something is, in reality.

24. Tafsir Abu's Súūd Ímādī:261

’And whose Speech is more Truthful than Allāh tāālā?’: This is a negation; because none can be more truthful than Allāh tāālā, whether in His Promise or any of His sayings262 because of [falsehood being an] impossibility; and why not! After all, falsehood is muňāl for Allāh tāālā but not for others.

25. Tafsir Rūḥ al-Bayān:263

’And whose Speech is more Truthful than Allāh tāālā?’: This is a negation, a rejection that anyone else can be more truthful than Allāh tāālā; because falsehood is a flaw and it is muňāl for Allāh tāālā unlike for others.264

26. Sayfuddin al-Ab'hari in his commentary265 of Al-Mawāqif:

[Everybody is] in agreement, that falsehood is impossible for Allāh tāālā, because lying is a flaw and a flaw for Allāh tāālā is muňāl.

27. Sharḥ Jalāluddin al-Dawwāni:266

Falsehood, kadhib is a flaw; and flaw for Allāh tāālā is muňāl. It cannot be considered among contingent thing [mumkināt], nor is it included in the Divine Power just as all other such defects [are not included in His Power] like ignorance and powerlessness, weakness.

28. In the same text:267

Neither ignorance, nor falsehood – for they are flaws; and a flaw for Allāh tāālā is muňāl.

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259 Tafsir Madārik’t Tanzil, also known as Tafsīr an-Nasafi; Sūrah An-Nisā’a, Verse.87

260 Alahazrat’s comment from Sub’hān as-Subbūh : The Imām, may Allāh have mercy on him, said ‘ugly’ in his argument, based on the obvious; [not the inherent ugliness as claimed by the Mūtazilah] and because, he was an Imām of our Māturīdī madh’ha b.  The Ashārī imāms like the author of Al-Mawāqif [Al-‘I] and the author of Majāfī [Rāzī] as you have seen their quotes have veered away from this proof for this reason. However, that a thing is considered ugly rationally, as in the above example, [that is falsehood is an ugly thing] is something agreed upon by the rationalists [úqalā.] These Ashārī imāms, may Allāh have mercy upon them, have themselves attested in their quotes. So do not be distracted by such statements, as we have hinted in our introduction.’

261 Irshād al-Áql al-Salīm, Abu’s Súūd Ímādī. Sūrah An-Nisā’a, Verse.87

262 Akhbār: message, news, information – saying, in general.

263 Sūrah An-Nisā’a, Verse.87

264 that is, kadhib or a flaw for others is not impossible/muňāl.

265 Cf Sub’hān as-Subbūh.

266 Jalāluddin al-Dawwāni, Commentary on Áqīdah Áđudiyyah: the discussion of álā p.73

267 Ibid, the discussion of laysa, p.66-67
29. Álī al-Qāri in his commentary on *Fiqh al-Akbar* of Imām al-Aāžam:
Falsehood for Allāh táālā is muḥāl.

30. *Kanz al-Fawāyid*:
Glorified and sanctified is He from falsehood: whether by sharāyī proof or rational proof; because it is such an ugly thing, that the intellect readily recognizes the ugliness of falsehood, and does not require a proof from shariāh [to consider its odiousness]. So it [falsehood] is muḥāl for Allāh táālā, by rational and sharāyī evidence as validated by Ibn Humām and others.

31. In Muĥibbullāh al-Bihāri's *Musallam al-Thubūt*:
The Mútazilah said that if it were not a rational argument, it would not be impossible for Allāh táālā to lie; and the answer to this is that falsehood is a flaw, and it is necessary to consider Allāh táālā transcendent from flaws. And why not, as we have previously mentioned that it is a rational argument by the agreement of all rationalists.

Because, flaw is among those things, which cause a negation in the essentially necessary attributes of the Creator – Truthful exalted is He – and it [falsehood/flaw] is muḥāl for Allāh táālā, Glory to Him.

32. Nižāmuddin Sihālwī commenting on the above:
Falsehood is a flaw because this is a cause for negation in the essentially necessary [wājib dhātī] attribute of the Lord Almighty. Therefore, it is a rational impossibility. Even those philosophers who do not consider themselves bound to the shariāh do not admit the shariāh proof; the shariāh proof is only for those who believe in revelation. The rational philosopher admits only the rational proof – here, dalī āqlī.

33. Mayārah in his commentary of *Murshid al-Muýīn*:
... and that is falsehood, and contradicting the information given, which is mustaňīl...

34. Imām Rāzī in *Muĥaşşal*:
Because, falsehood is a flaw; and it is muňāl for Allāh táālā.

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268 *Minaĥ ar-Rawd al-Az’har fi sharĥ al-Fiqh al-Akbar*, Álī al-Qari Pg.23
269 Cf *Sub’ĥān as-Subbūĥ*
270 *Musallam al-Thubūt*, Vol.1, Pg.46
271 Faw’āth ar-Raĥmūt, Vol.1, Pg.46
272 the discussion of theology/doctrine is under two important categories: sharāyī : as revealed by the shariāh and āqlī: rational, that which can be perceived and validated by the intellect. There is a third category āddī: habitual, conventional; but this third category is not relevant to our discussion.
273 that is, philosophers who do not believe in revelation (yet, not atheists) do not admit the sharāyī proof; the sharāyī proof is only for those who believe in revelation. the rational philosopher admits only the rational proof – here, dalī āqlī.
274 wājib: an intrinsical, essential attribute
275 Al-Durr al-Thamīn, Pg.17
276 *Muĥaşşal Afkār al-Mutaqaddimīn wa’l-Muta-akh’khirīn*, Imām Rāzī. Pg.185
35. Even Naşīr Tūsī does not object in his commentary to the above:

I say: If kadhib is ruled muḩāl by revealed proof [dalīl samīy] then a circular argument will ensue.

36. Shāh Ábd al-Ázīz Dihlawi in Tafsīr Ázīzī, explaining the verse ‘And Allāh will never renege on His Promise’ says:

The speech of Allāh táālā is pre-eternal; falsehood is an enormous defect in [the attribute of] speech. Therefore, it is absolutely absent from the Attributes of Allāh táālā as He is free from every flaw and defect; to say something other than the actual occurrence [falsehood] is absolutely a flaw.

37. Imām Rāzī again in his Iýtiqādāt refuting the Mútazilī positions:

But falsehood is muḩāl for Allāh táālā – Exalted is Allāh from such things they attribute Him with.

38. Abd al-Qahir al-Baghdádī in Al-Milal wa’n Niĥal commenting on the confusion of the Mútazilah whether falsehood is possible for Allāh táālā:

...and they would consider falsehood muḩāl as we consider it muḩāl.

39. Al-Shahrastānī in Al-Milal wa’n Niĥal describing a Mútazilī faction and listing their heresies:

The first [heresy] about Divine Power: That he said that Allāh táālā has power to lie and oppress; and if He die lie and oppress, He would be known as the lying, oppressing Lord. Exalted is Allāh from what he says!

40. Imam Abu’l Ḥasan Al-Ashárī in Al-Maqālāt discussing the Mútazilah heresy that Allāh táālā has power over falsehood:

These statements are so ugly that no one considers it good to describe a righteous Muslim in such words! Similarly, one cannot describe Allāh táālā with such ascriptions – Glorified is He and Exalted from such things.
41. Bājūrī in his explanation of Jawharah says:

... there is a unanimous agreement that in all that He has said, Allāh tāālā is free from falsehood.

42. The leader of Ahlu's Sunnah, Imām Abū’l Ḥasan Al-Ashārī in Al-Lumá:

Similarly, it is not permissible to attribute Him with falsehood, not because it is ugly but because falsehood is mustaĥīl for Him. It is not permissible to attribute Him with Power over falsehood, just as it is not permissible to attribute Him with movement and Ignorance.

Disproving this at length, he indicates the odiousness of the idea once again thus:

...suppose we consider the Creator can lie – Exalted is He from such a thing!

43. Imam Abū Mašur al-Māturīdī in Kitāb al-Tawĥīd:

And we have said earlier refuting the Mútazilah, which is much more clear than this, along with what this necessitates in another issue: that is, they attribute Allāh tāālā with having power over falsehood, vileness and oppression...

And then, after criticising their positions, he says:

Thereafter, ruling this impossible according to our madh'hab is easy: that is, [we say] the inclusion of this in Divine Power is muĥāl.

Lastly, two important mutakallimīn explain why kadhib is muĥāl and that it cannot be proved muĥāl by revelation alone.

44. Imām al-Ĥaramayn in his Kitāb al-Irshād says:

Know, may Allāh tāālā guide you: the fundamental principles of doctrine are [three]:

a) that, which can be known rationally and it is not possible to know it by evidence of revelation
b) that, which is known by evidence of revelation and not possible to know rationally
c) that, which can be known either by evidence of revelation and by rational proof

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290 Tuĥfatu’l Murīd Sharḥ Jawharatu’t Tawĥīd, pg.145.
291 Ijmāá
292 Kitāb Al-Lumá , Imām Al-Ashārī. Pg.118,
293 Ibid.
294 Kitāb al-Tawĥīd, Imām Abū Mašur al-Māturīdī. Pg.200
295 kadhib, saf’h, žulm
296 That is, it is rationally impossible – muĥāl ḍaqī and this is the bone of contention.
297 Kitāb al-Irshād, pg.358: On Proofs from Revelation (samýyyāt)
That, which cannot be perceived except by the intellect, is every principle of religion which is made known by the Speech of Allāh tāālā and its necessary attribute that it is True;\textsuperscript{298} because the validity of all revealed proofs rely upon the Speech of Allāh tāālā. So it should be established first that Speech is a necessary attribute. Thus, it is impossible to know this by revealed proof.\textsuperscript{299}

And that which cannot be known, except by revealed proof is the ordaining that a certain contingent thing will come into existence.\textsuperscript{300} It is not necessary for something to really exist just because it is contingent; and the existence of something which is hidden from us cannot be known, except by way of revelation.

45. Imām Rāzī in the commentary of the verse:\textsuperscript{301}

The second attribute: from the attributes of the Word of Allah is, that it is truthful. The proof is that because falsehood is a flaw, and it is impossible for Allāh tāālā to have an attribute of flaw. It is not permissible to prove that falsehood is \textit{muĥāl} for Allāh tāālā [just] by revelation \textit{[dalāyil as-samýiyyah]} because the validity of proof by revelation \textit{[is itself]} dependent on the \textit{[premise]} that falsehood is impossible for Allāh tāālā. Because, if we attested impossibility of lying \textit{[imtināá al-kadhib]} by narrated proofs, it becomes a circular argument and \textit{[therefore renders it]} invalid.

Know, that just as this proves that it is \textit{muĥāl} for Allāh tāālā to renege on His promise of reward \textit{[khulf fi'l waád]}, it also proves that it is \textit{muĥāl} for Him to renege on His promise of punishment \textit{[khulf fi'l waýīd]} unlike what Wāĥidī has said in his tafsīr of the verse, Whosoever kills a believer deliberately, then his punishment is hellfire, wherein he shall abide forever:\textsuperscript{302} [Wāĥidī said:] It is possible for Allah ta'ala to forego His promise of punishment.

This is because His promise of reward and punishment \textit{[waád and waýīd]} are Words of Allah; and this verse proves that it is mandatory to attribute the Word of Allah with Truth; therefore just as reneging on His promise of reward is impossible \textit{[mumtaniý]} so also is not fulfilling His promise of punishment.

And only Allāh tāālā gives guidance.
From the point of view of classical logic, the proposition is absurd. This is an attestation of both opposites, and admitting contradictions at the same time and the same place: “He is truthful and speaks the truth absolutely, but still a possibility of falsehood exists.”

From the Wikipedia:303

The principle of explosion is the law of classical logic and a few other systems (e.g., intuitionistic logic) according to which "anything follows from a contradiction"; that is, once a contradiction has been asserted, any proposition (or its negation) can be inferred from it. In symbolic terms, the principle of explosion can be expressed in the following way (where "\(-\)" symbolizes the relation of logical consequence):

\[
\{\phi, \neg \phi\} \vdash \psi
\]

"If one claims something is both true (\(\phi\)) and not true (\(\neg \phi\)), one can logically derive any conclusion (\(\psi\))." The principle of explosion is also known as ex falso quodlibet, ex falso sequitur quodlibet (EFSQ for short) Latin: "from falsehood/contradiction (follows) anything".

Al-Āmidī explaining the definition304 of tanaquḍ/contradiction says:

That which describes opposites such that, if one is deemed possible, the other is impossible and vice versa. For example, if we prove truth for one thing (intrinsically), the opposite proposition automatically becomes false.

If you consider both propositions – i.e., contradictions valid at the same time, we end up with the principle of explosion. Alahazrat305 explains it thus:

If you understand this premise well, you will see that considering falsehood to be included in the Divine Power of Allāh will necessitate a possibility of falsehood in any information given by Him. If one says: ‘After all, the information given by Allāh says that He has never spoken an untruth nor will He tell a lie, in spite of having Power to do so’, then there is no reliance on this either.306

Because this is also another information coming from Him – and because you have already said that there is possibility of falsehood in His speech, it is nigh possible that His...

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303 [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_of_explosion](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_of_explosion). This is the simplest quote I could find, and definitions in books of Logic (that I looked into) are not self-explanatory and require further elaboration.

304 Al-Mubīn fī Māánī Alfāž al-Úlamā al-Mutakallimīn, entry 53.

305 Subḥān as-Subbūh

306 The reader must remember that Imām Aĥmed Riđā is positing these statements for the sake of argument and obviously to refute them by showing the foolishness of such argument.
assurance that He will not tell a lie is itself a lie. How then, can we be certain that this contingent thing, which is included in the Power of Allāh did not occur?

In summary, if falsehood is rationally contingent \([\text{mumkin áqli}]\), then it is not rationally impossible \([\text{mustaḥīl áqli}]\) as you yourself claim. Concerning the impossibility by canon \([\text{mustaḥīl sharāyî}]\), then it can be proven only by revealed proof and all revealed evidence is based on the Speech of Allāh (as we have seen in Imām a-Ĥaramayn’s quote above). Therefore, to prove that falsehood is \text{mustaḥīl sharāyî}, you will have to first prove that the evidence which proves it is true; inevitably, this becomes a circular argument [and hence renders it absurd and invalid].

Thus, you cannot prove that falsehood is \text{mustaḥīl sharāyî}; (and you already claim that it is not \text{mustaḥīl áqli}) – so now the Speech of Allāh becomes [as unreliable] like that of Zayd and Âmr. Exalted is Allāh from such things they attribute Him. When all of this is unreliable, then how can you have faith in Judgement day, Reckoning, Paradise, and Hell – all proven from revelation?

Deobandis go straight to the comment that it is \text{mumkin} and not \text{mustaḥīl} without proving anything. Note that \text{mustaḥīl árādî} or contingently impossible or \text{imtināá bi’l ghayr} is actually a form of \text{mumkin} as explained earlier. In their various ‘defence’ arguments, they struggle with basic terminology, but still have the audacity to criticise masters of the discipline.

May Allāh táālā give sense to their followers and show them the right way.

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\(^{307}\) \text{al-īyādhu billāh}

\(^{308}\) a) The only way to know that a contingent thing can be or cannot be is by being informed by Divine Speech.

b) If falsehood is considered as contingent and within Divine Power, then the only way to know that it has occurred or not is by Divine Speech.

c) And since the possibility of falsehood exists in Divine Speech, there can be no reliance on the assurance that Divine Speech can never be false.

\(^{309}\) An Arabic/Persian/Urdu expression equivalent of ‘Tom, Dick and Harry’ in English.
XI. KHULF FI’L WAÝĪD

This is one of the commonly known, minor points of disagreement among kalâm scholars. I will not elaborate on this point itself, as it is not the purpose of this paper; those interested can look it up in kalâm treatises or specific monographs like Al-Qârî’s Al-Qawl al-Sadîd. But, before we proceed to examine the issue in the context of kadhîb/falsehood, it is necessary to define two concepts:

**Khulf fi’l Waád:** Allâh táâlâ has promised reward to those who obey him and are righteous. This promise is mentioned in various verses of the Qur’ân and Hadith. The question is, can Allâh táâlâ renege on his promise of reward? This concept of ‘reneging from the promise of reward’ is known as khulf fi’l waád.

**Khulf fi’l Waýīd:** Allâh táâlâ has promised punishment to those who disobey him and are evil. This promise is described in various verses of the Qur’ân and Hadith. The second question is, can Allâh táâlâ forego his promise of punishment? This concept of ‘foregoing or waiving the promise/threat of punishment’ or ‘not fulfilling the threat of punishment’ is known as khulf fi’l waýīd.

Both are promises, but to differentiate between these two kinds of promises, different words are used in Arabic: waád for promise of reward and waýīd for promise of punishment. Accordingly, in English, we shall use the phrases ‘promise of reward’ for waád, and ‘threat of punishment’ for waýīd. Similarly, khulf is ‘reneging’ for reward and ‘foregoing’ punishment in certain places.

1. Álî al-Qârî explaining this subtle difference says:

   In the lexicon, waád promise [of good] is a more general term than aw-ád promise of retribution. It is said: ‘I have promised someone [waádtu] – whether good or bad’ and if it is not qualified by mentioning bad, I would say: waádtu, I promised. And if it is not qualified by good, I would say: awádtu, I promised retribution.

2. Thereafter, Al-Qârî summarizes the Ashârî position thus:

   *Khulf al-Waýīd* is not possible in the case of disbelievers, according to the unanimity of scholars. This is the summarization of what is discussed in Sharĥ al-Maqâşid and Sharĥ al-Áqâýid.

Sâduddîn Taftâzânî in Sharĥ al-Maqâşid: 

**khulf fi’l waád** – reneging on promise of reward is not possible, and there is an Ijmâá on this position. Compared to **khulf fi’l waýīd**; and because it is magnanimity and grace, some have allowed it [as possible]. Yes, that this necessitates falsehood and not keeping one’s word, which is a problem...

Notice that Taftâzânî does not say, kadhîb is accepted by some; he clearly says that this *khulf fi’l waýīd* raises the issue of falsehood – and the basic premise is falsehood is impossible – therefore, this is a problem. Thereafter he proposes explanations to ward off this accusation. Just think: if Ashârîs accept *a priori* that falsehood is mumkin, then all arguments in this topic become meaningless – what are these Ashârî imams trying to prove after all?

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310 literally, opposing, contradicting, reneging.
311 Al-Qâwî al-Sadîd fi Khulf al-Waýîd, Álî al-Qârî. All quotes by Al-Qârî in this section are from this book, unless mentioned otherwise.
312 Sharĥ al-Maqâşid, Vol.5, Pg.152
3. Imām Bājūrī says\(^{313}\) in the commentary of the verse:\(^{314}\)

\[
\text{wa munjizun liman arāda waáduh}
\]
And He shall reward those whom He Willed and [so] promised [them the reward]

The author\(^{315}\) indicates by this, that concerning the Divine Promise of paradise for believers, Allāh tāālā will not renege from it (and this is proved by sharīāh absolutely) as He said: This is the Promise of Allāh; and verily Allāh will not renege from His promise.\(^{316}\)

Some scholars of tafsīr said that this refers to His promise of reward. Because, if He reneges on His promise of reward, this would necessitate falsehood, indecency and breaking a promise. This\(^{317}\) is invalid, therefore that which causes this\(^{318}\) is also invalid.

Therefore, \textit{khulf fi'īl waád} is a flaw; it is necessary \([wājib]\) to believe in the Transcendence of Allāh tāālā \([\text{from all flaws}]. \) Both Asháris and Māturidīs agree upon this.

As for \textit{khulf fi'īl wayīd}, Asháris considered it possible; because this foregoing of promise is not a flaw, but rather considered as magnanimity, which is praiseworthy, as a poet\(^{319}\) says:

\[
\text{wa inni in awádtuhu aw waád-tuhu}
\]
\[
\text{la mukhlifu īyáādī wa munjizu mawýidī}
\]
And I, if I promise a reward or threaten retribution
I may forego my threat of retribution but I will fulfill my promise of reward

Moreover, those who objected on the possibility of foregoing threat of punishment, they also said that it necessitates numerous problems among which is: falsehood in the information given by Allāh tāālā; and there is a unanimous agreement\(^{320}\) that in all that He has said, Allāh tāālā is free from falsehood.

4. In Musāmarah/Musāyarah:\(^{321}\)

\{The author of Úmdah\} - Állāmah Abu'l Barakat an-Nasafi – \{among Ḥanafīs said: “a mu'min to remain forever in hell and a kafir to go to paradise is permissible by intellect according to them\} - that is the Asháris. \{They say however, there is revealed evidence against this occurring.\} Therefore it is ruled that it is impossible \([yamtaniy]\) on account of evidence from revelation \([dalil as-sama'a]\) and we Ḥanafīs say: It is not possible.”

[Here ends the statement of Úmdah along with its explanation\(^{322}\)]:

\(^{313}\) Tuĥfatu'l Murīd Sharḥ Jawharatu't Tawḥīd, pg.145.
\(^{314}\) Jawharah at-Tawḥīd, verse 46.
\(^{315}\) Burhānuddīn Ibrāhim Al-Laqqānī.
\(^{316}\) Sūrah Ar-Raād v.31
\(^{317}\) lāzim :this is what is necessitated if you suppose \textit{khulf} possible
\(^{318}\) malzūm : that is, reneging on a promise, is the premiss.
\(^{319}\) Abū Ámr ibn al-Álā'a, according to Al-Qārī.
\(^{320}\) ijmpādā
\(^{321}\) Al-Musāyarah with Al-Musāmarah, Pg.178 , text in brown color is from Al-Musayarah.
\(^{322}\) Ibn Humam ending his citation from Úmdah of Al-Nasafi.
5. Jalāluddin al-Dawwānī in his commentary\textsuperscript{323} of Áqāýid al-Áđudiyyah:

Rather, the answer to this objection\textsuperscript{324} is what we have indicated earlier that \textit{waád} and \textit{waýīd}\textsuperscript{325} are based on conditions and restrictions; and these conditions are known by \textit{sharaýī} evidence. So it is possible to not fulfilling these promises based on the absence of the conditions – and the reason for making His Intention known, is to persuade \textit{[to do good]} and dissuade\textsuperscript{326} \textit{[from evil]}.

6. He writes a little later:\textsuperscript{327}

Know that some scholars have held the opinion that foregoing the threat of punishment \textit{[khulf fi'l waýīd]} is contingent \textit{[and thus included in His Divine Power]} for Allāh táālā.

7. And cites Al-Wāĥidī\textsuperscript{328} who narrates a Ŧadīth that RasûlAllāh şallAllāhu álayhi wa sallam said:

To those, whom Allāh táālā has promised a reward for their deeds, He will fulfill it; and to those whom He has promised punishment for their deeds, then it is His Choice\textsuperscript{329} \textit{[and He may forego it]}.

One of the defence arguments is, that the ‘promise’ of punishment is actually making known the intention\textsuperscript{330} that He might punish; not saying\textsuperscript{331} that He will punish. And because, it is just an intention, the implication of falsehood does not arise. The other explanation given is that it is a conditional and not absolute, as explained above.

8. In Radd al-Muĥtār:\textsuperscript{332}

And the preferred position is, that the possibility of foregoing the promise of punishment is for Muslims specifically, and not for the infidels.

One important thing to note here is, that the Ashárīs vociferously reject the implication of falsehood that the Māturīdīs say \textit{khulf fi'l waýīd} necessitates. Ashárīs write elaborate proofs refuting that it necessitates falsehood. This clearly shows that they abhor the idea that falsehood is contingent. Otherwise, there was simply no need to refute the Māturīdī objection. All they had to say was, ‘So what? We already believe that falsehood is only contingently impossible; your objection does not apply to us. Move on.’ In fact, if one were to consider the statement of Jurjānī,\textsuperscript{333} as the Deobandis plaster it everywhere, it is not even contingently impossible. It is straightaway \textit{mumkin}.

\textit{Al-Íyādhu Billāh.}

\textsuperscript{323} \textit{Sharň Áqáýid al-Áđudiyyah}, Jaláluddin Dawwānī, Pg.102

\textsuperscript{324} that \textit{khulf} necessitates falsehood. Notice that Jalal al-Dawwani is saying that falsehood is \textit{muĥāl} and cannot be used to justify \textit{khulf}; rather there be other justifications which he explains.

\textsuperscript{325} Promise of reward and Threat of punishment.

\textsuperscript{326} \textit{targhīb}: to persuade to do good. \textit{to interest}, attract and induce people towards doing good by promising the reward; \textit{torhīb}: warning from doing evil and to keep away from it by threat of punishment.

\textsuperscript{327} Dawwānī álā Ađudiyyah, Pg.103

\textsuperscript{328} Álī ibn Aĥmed al-Wāĥidī, d.468AH; he was a scholar of \textit{tafsīr} and Qur’ānic sciences; he has written tafsīrs: \textit{Al-Basīt}, \textit{Al-Wajīz} and \textit{Al-Wasīt}.

\textsuperscript{329} \textit{khiyār}: to choose. \textit{that is} He may choose to forego the promise of punishment as it is considered Grace and forgiveness.

\textsuperscript{330} \textit{inshā}

\textsuperscript{331} \textit{khabar}

\textsuperscript{332} \textit{Radd al-Muĥtār}, Vol.1,Pg.563

\textsuperscript{333} We shall, InshāAllāh deal with this statement in the next chapter: \textit{‘What Sharíf al-Jurjānī said’}
We can understand this better by another analogy; but first, let us restate the Deobandi argument:

a) Some Ashāris said that khulf fi'l waŷīd is possible.
b) Khulf fi'l waŷīd necessitates falsehood.
c) Therefore, some Ashāris said that falsehood is possible.

This is a syllogistic fallacy known as the *quaternio terminorum* or the fallacy of four terms. The problem with the above is that the second statement was an objection by Māturīdīs. I will give a few more examples to illustrate this.

a) Ḥanafīs accepted that *fatiĥah* can be omitted in prayer.
b) Omitting *fatiĥah* necessitates invalidating *şalāt*.
c) Therefore, Ḥanafīs accepted invalidating *şalāt*.

The problem in the above argument is, that the second statement is a Shāfiʿī objection.

In another example, [Here, the second statement is actually a Ḥanafi objection]:

a) Shāfiʿīs accepted that after blood flows from a cut, one can pray [without renewing ablution].
b) Flowing blood, from a cut breaks ablution.
c) Therefore, Shāfiʿīs accepted that one can pray after breaking ablution.

In a third example, [Here also, the second statement is actually a Ḥanafi objection]:

a) Shāfiʿīs said that funeral prayer without the bier is acceptable.
b) Praying without the bier is invalid.
c) Therefore, Shāfiʿīs said invalid funeral prayer is acceptable.

I end this section with the verdict from Taftāzānī who ends his discussion on *khulf* in the following words:334

...as for those who said that forgiving [the *kafir*] is rationally possible; and falsehood in his promise of punishment – either [they said based on] the fact that falsehood is permissible when the objective is to do good,335 or that anything said about the future cannot be counted as falsehood.336 Along with the fact that there are explicit verses in which Allāh táālā has informed us that He shall not forgive an infidel and that the infidel shall dwell in hell forever.

Then, the possibility of reneging on this promise [of punishment] and that it may not occur as informed, is hypothetical. When this is invalid,337 then it is known that falsehood in the information given by Allāh táālā is not possible absolutely.

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334 Sharḥ al-Maqāṣid, Vol.5, Pg.155
335 the mutazilah position as he explains in a previous page that causes the conclusion: ‘this kind of falsehood is absolutely good.’
336 the position of some Ashāris
337 that forgiving a kafir can never happen – as informed by Allāh táālā.
XII. WHAT SHARĪF AL-JURJĀNĪ SAID

In his commentary on *Al-Mawāqif*, Sharīf Al-Jurjānī has said that falsehood is impossible for Allāh tāālā. By the ground rules (which he also explains elsewhere) of *kalām*, unless specified, it is *muḥāl dhāṭī* or essentially, intrinsically impossible. The original passage of *Al-Mawāqif*:338

**A sub-section on the discussion of Speech**: It is unanimously agreed that falsehood is impossible [in Allāh’s Speech.] According to the Mutazilah, it is because of two reasons:

a) That it is ugly and Allāh tāālā does not do ugly things; and this is based on their principle of rational ruling339

b) It is against what is good [for the creation]. And that it is necessary for Allāh tāālā to do what is best for the creation. And we answer340 this by saying: ‘It is not necessary for Allāh tāālā to do what is best [for the creation.]’

As for us, [the reasons why kadhib/falsehood is *muḥāl*):

**Firstly**, because it is a flaw; and it is *muḥāl* for Allāh tāālā to have a flaw. Also, if this were true, then we would be more perfect at certain times than Him. Know, that I do not see any difference between a flaw in action and that, which is rationally ugly.341

Because, the flaw in actions is in itself deemed rationally ugly – only these are two different descriptions.342

**Secondly**, if He were to be attributed with falsehood, then His falsehood would be pre-eternal – because nothing, that is an accident [*ḥādith*] can be associated with Allāh tāālā. This would necessitate that truth is impossible for Allāh tāālā because, whatever is established as pre-eternal, its annihilation is impossible. Therefore, it is invalid.343 And we know by necessity, that one who knows something, it is possible that they can give the information that is conforming to the actual occurrence.344 [Therefore] this argument only proves the truth in *kalām nafsī* but not in that345 which is denotive of *kalām nafsī*.346

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338 *Al-Mawāqif*, Pg.295 Mawqif al-Khāmis;Marşad ar-Rābiý;Maqşad al-Sābiý

339 Which makes something beautiful or ugly rationally.

340 This is another dispute with the Mutazilah – *wujūb al-aşlaĥ* – who say that it is necessary for Allāh tāālā to do what is good for us. We reject it and say that He is the Lord and Creator – who does what He Wills; it is NOT ‘necessary’ for Him to do what is good for us.

341 *naqş fi'l fiýl / qubḫ al-áqlī*

342 That is, it is only a semantic difference. one should not hastily conclude by their own take on this sentence. This is in itself an elaborate discussion and to touch upon it is beyond the scope of this paper.

343 *lāzîm*, that which necessitates that truth is impossible is invalid.

344 That is, it is possible to tell the truth some time, so *şidq* is not *muḥāl*; he is proving that truth is not impossible.

345 As it is in Jurjani’s commentary: ‘that which describes the Eternal Speech’

346 Notice that he presents a proof in his dialectical argument and also says that this proof only proves truth in *kalām nafsī* and is not adequate to prove truth in *kalām lafžī*. This does not mean, however that there can be falsehood in *kalām lafžī*.
Thirdly, [and upon which is reliance] the information given by the Prophet șallAllāhu álayhi wa sallam – and this is known [the knowledge is among] necessities of religion. If one objects: 'after all, the Prophets being true is known by the truth (in Allāh’s speech) and if you say it is impossible for falsehood in Allāh’s speech (by the Prophet’s information) then it causes a circular argument. We say: 'The Prophet’s veracity is known by miracles.'

Notice, that Al-Ijī is not considering falsehood as possible anywhere. He has categorically stated that it is muḥāl. The argument however is about the proof – and how valid it is. Sharīf al-Jurjānī comments this at length, posits dialectical arguments, and even wonders at one stage: ‘How will our companions (the Ashārīs) be able to ward off the accusation of falsehood, if this be the case?’ This clearly indicates that nobody disputes falsehood as muḥāl. The whole discussion is about how to prove it muḥāl. The following is the commentary of Sharīf Al-Jurjānī: 347

{and the answer is: it is not obligatory for Him to do what is best for us} because basically, nothing is obligatory for Him – He is absolutely free and exalted from all such things. 348 {As for} falsehood being impossible 349 for Him {we have three proofs for it. The first is that falsehood is a flaw, and a flaw for Allāh tâālā is muḥāl} by ijmāā, by unanimous agreement.

{Also, because, it necessitates} that is, if falsehood occurs in His speech {it will be that} we {are more perfect than Him at certain times} meaning: when we are truthful in our speech. This argument proves that kalām nafsi which is pre-eternal is truthful.

Otherwise, it will necessitate that there is a flaw in the Attribute of Allāh tâālā and at the same time, perfection in our attributes. This does not lead to truth in letters and words that He creates, in the bodies that are indicative of intended meaning. Therefore, when someone says that ’He created a liar’ is also a flaw in His Actions; and that which he is warning against comes back {as the position} itself.

To ward this off, he says: {Know, that I do not see any difference between flaw in action and that which is rationally ugly. Because, the flaw in actions is itself deemed rationally ugly} in it. {only these are two different descriptions} So how will our companions who reject [the concept of] ‘rationally ugly’ defend against falsehood in kalām lafžī by implicating flaw in the Actions of Allāh tâālā?

{Secondly, if He were to be attributed with falsehood, then His falsehood would be pre-eternal – because nothing, that is an accident, can be associated with Allāh tâālā. This would entail that truth is impossible for Allāh tâālā} juxtaposed with such falsehood.


Bold text in flower brackets is by Al-Ījī; running text by Sharīf Al-Jurjānī; comments in square brackets meant to clarify the translation inserted by the author of this paper.

348 obligations

349 imtināā al-kadhib: impossibility, kadhib being muḥāl
Otherwise, that would entail that such falsehood would extinguish, which would be muḥāl\footnote{Notice that here too Jurjānī is not making a statement but assuming the premise already. That is:} {because whatever is established as pre-eternal, its annihilation is impossible.}

That entails truth is impossible for Him\footnote{That is proposition that falsehood is pre-eternal.} and this entailing thing \{is invalid because we know by necessity that whosoever knows something, it is possible\} for him \{to give information corresponding to the actual event and this\} second facet is also invalid.\footnote{Which is termed as kalām lafžī} \{Verily this proves that Divine Speech\footnote{Which is termed as kalām nafsī} \textit{is Truth}\'}\footnote{That is veracity and the proof of truthfulness in \textit{kalām nafsī} and \textit{kalām lafžī} together \{the information given to us by the Prophet \textit{ṣallAllāhu ălayhi wa sallam}\} that He is Truthful in All His Speech. \{And this\} that is, the information given by the Prophet \{salutations upon him and blessings\} on the Truthfulness of Allāh \{is something that is among necessities\footnote{That is proposition that falsehood is pre-eternal.} of religion\} describing proofs for this \{statement\} is not necessary. And its\footnote{Continuing from the previous proposition that ‘supposing falsehood is pre-eternal, truth becomes accident’} veracity itself; and not just to prove that one information\footnote{That is, information of the Prophet is truthful.} true. Rather we say: it is reported by all\footnote{Tawātur – is used here to mean without exception.} prophets – Allāh’s blessings

\footnote{To know and to believe.}

\footnote{That is proposition that falsehood is pre-eternal.}
upon them – that Allāh tāālā is Truthful, just as it has been reported by all of them that He Speaks [with His Divine Attribute of Speech].

{If one objects:} the truth of the prophet is known by the attestation of his truth by Allāh tāālā {and this is proof of his attestation} for the Prophet {of his truth} that is, truth of the Prophet [is possible only] {when it is impossible for Him} Exalted is He {to be free from falsehood}. This necessitates that His Speech is Truthful; because the Prophet’s being truthful, is known only by the Truth of Allāh tāālā {and this is a circular argument} if you attest for the truth of Allāh tāālā relying upon the truth of the Prophet, as you do.³⁶³ {We say: testimony to the Prophet’s truth is in miracles} as it has been discussed earlier.

Notice that Al-Jurjānī clarifies that it is impossible for falsehood in both kalām nafṣī and kalām lafẓī, but still those who fancy their nafs and desire insist otherwise. Al-Īyādhu Billāh.

I was in the process of making a final review, when a brother brought to my notice, a link where an irreligious person writes, hell-bent on proving the Deobandi aberration right. His newest attempt is putting words in Al-Ījī’s mouth.³⁶⁴

The person translates from Al-Mawāqif, omitting the commentary but still adds his own take:³⁶⁵

The last point refutes the argument that this is circular as the Prophet’s own vindication is through his miracles so his confirmation of the words of revelation, i.e. the uttered-speech, affirm their truthfulness according to al-Iji. Thus, al-Iji denies the “rational impossibility” of falsehood in the uttered-speech, but affirms its contingent impossibility.

Just in case, someone misunderstands, the above passage was translated by a kadh’dhābī and I am citing it here. It is not mine, Al-ĥamdulillāh.

Where did Al-Ījī say that it was a ‘contingent impossibility’? We have seen earlier that unless categorically stated and explicitly qualified, the muḥāl mentioned by ūlamā of kalām is muḥāl dhātī. And Al-Ījī only said that it was muḥāl; so it is muḥāl dhātī, intrinsic impossibility.

Moreover, the person does not seem to understand that the two kinds of impossibility in kalām terminology are: contingent and intrinsic; not contingent and rational. Anyone reading the Arabic text can easily see the tense and that Al-Ījī is only commenting that, the evidence being examined is not adequate to prove falsehood emphatically. By shifting the emphasis, he is trying to give a new meaning to the text.

It is thus, by twisting and giving fancy interpretations to obscure statements in books of kalām, these deviants try to prove their point. May Allāh tāālā vouchsafe us all from such fitnah and destroy the fitnah of liars and slanderers.

Al-Īyādhu Billāh!

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³⁶³ those who bring taṣdīq of nabīy as proof for the Truthfulness of Allāh tāālā.
³⁶⁴ This was on the 3rd June 2010.
³⁶⁵ A screenshot of the full comment is included in Appendix F
XIII. CONCLUSION

The specialist and the layman alike should have understood the issue by now and learnt that there cannot be any difference of opinion in this subject at all. The 'difference' is carved out by some people, solely to exonerate the erring mullā. Summaries have been provided throughout, and here we sum up the issue once again following the example of our elders. For instance, in Al-Musāyarah, after detailed arguments, Imām Kamāl ibn Humām says:366

{Conclusion} [of the book/our discussion]: An explanation of the āqidah of Ahl as-Sunnah wa'l Jamāāh.

The author, may Allāh have mercy upon him said: {And we conclude} this {book with an explanation of the beliefs of Ahl as-Sunnah wa'l Jamāāh;} so that we mention in summary the major points that have been explained in detail earlier; because a concise summary after a detailed exposition in various places gives more clarity and explains the objectives more clearly because of their contiguousness and being in one place [is also] easy to refer; and that is: the creed of Ahl as-Sunnah.

It is as if the Imāms are saying: 'The book was a discussion which also included statements from heretics and mulhidin which were also refuted where they appeared. However, here in the conclusion, we state our belief in case you have misunderstood or mixed up any quotes earlier'.

1. Allāh tāālā is free from all flaws. It is muḥāl – intrinsically impossible – for Allāh tāālā to have any flaws.
2. The entire ummah is in unanimous agreement that it is muḥāl for Allāh tāālā to have a flaw.
3. It is a fundamental principle – of tanzīh – that one should believe that flaw is muḥāl for Allāh tāālā.
4. Kadhib – falsehood – is a flaw.
5. Therefore, it is muḥāl for Allāh tāālā to have falsehood in His Speech.
6. We have seen that falsehood is not an action or a thing but rather, an attribute of speech. Thus, any property of falsehood is relayed to the attribute it is associated with and vice versa.
7. Falsehood is either pre-eternal or an accident. If it is a property of the Attribute of Speech, then it is pre-eternal. And that which is pre-eternal is only wājib. Thus falsehood becomes wājib and ceases to be mumkin anymore.
8. This entails that if anyone says that falsehood is not included in Divine Speech, he becomes a kafir; because, he denies an attribute that is wājib for Allāh tāālā.
9. If falsehood in Divine Speech is possible, then its opposite is muḥāl. That is, truth becomes wājib and ceases to be mumkin anymore.
10. In addition, that which is pre-eternal cannot be annihilated; which means, that falsehood abides in the attributes of Allāh tāālā. Exalted is He from such obnoxious things.
11. No scholar said that it is possible (mumkin) for falsehood to be included in Divine Power.367

366 The running inline commentary of Al-Musāmarah by his student Ibn Abi’sh Sharif is in blue text.
367 This is the Mūtazilah standpoint, that it is included in mumkināt. See Ábd al-Qāhir’s Al-Milal wa’n Niḥal, Pg.137-139
12. All Sunni scholars have said that it is muhāl. And the muhāl mentioned is muhāl dhātī, unless specified otherwise. That is, it is intrinsically, essentially, absolutely impossible for falsehood to exist in the Speech of Allah tāālā.

13. Certain statements in kalām books are quoted by heretics to prove their false belief. These statements are either cited out of context or poorly worded or should be simply rejected. One cannot abandon reason and the majority opinion for the sake of a mistake in a kalām book. Moreover, one does not learn áqīdah from books of kalām.

14. Sharīf Jurjānī is quoted that he said ‘mumkin.’ This is one ambiguous sentence mentioned in a different issue. Indeed, he has written pages upon pages proving it muhāl earlier under the discussion of Speech, where it is relevant. A judicious person should abandon that which is pithy, confusing and unclear for that which is lucid and explained in detail.

15. One should not try to look for áqīdah in books of kalām because a misunderstanding (like this) can lead someone to heresy. This is why ālamā warned against kalām; Al-Qārī citing the Hanafi Imām, Abū Yūsuf that he said:

He who seeks knowledge by way of kalām will fall into heresy368....

...It is therefore, Ibn Rushd, the grandson and the author of Tahāfut at-Tahāfut said – and he was among the most knowledgeable about philosophy: 'The result of [indulging in] kalām and argument causes one to be perplexed in the present state, heresy and doubt [or scepticism] in the end.'369

16. The issue of khulf fi'l wa'yīd is entirely different and has nothing to do with the issue of falsehood; some scholars considered that khulf fi'l wa'yīd is possible and that it is not muhāl.

17. Indeed, those who deem khulf fi'l wa'yīd possible vociferously refute and reject the objection that it necessitates falsehood. From this, it is known that they rejected falsehood and rationalized khulf by other means and repeatedly asserted that 'this is not falsehood'.

Every person should take care of his own faith and should not be fooled by the devil and follow erring scholars. Imām Sanūsī says:370

I have endeavored to make this a concise guide without saying a even a little bit more [than necessary], eager to maintain the brevity of the text for common benefit. In spite of knowing that, for many in our time, truth weighs in heavy upon their hearts – yet, they are very attentive in listening to the adorned and deceptive words of the devil.

Thus, the devil hijacks them from the path of salvation and to such folk, he makes it appear as if they are in a perfect condition concerning true belief [āqāyid]. And their crime – even if they have become famous because of it, even if that crime is on account of blind following – the devil makes it appear to them as accomplished gnosis. The devil fixes this deception in their hearts and drives them to hear similar [whisperings] from his aides – evil scholars and ignorant sufis.

We seek Allāh’s refuge from evil and beseech Him to guide us on the right path.

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368 Sharḥ Fiqh al-Akbar, Pg.6 : One who seeks knowledge by way of kalām will fall into zandaqah, or become a zindīq. Like the zindīq who tried to justify Deobandis and fell to asking whether it was intrinsically impossible for Allāh tāālā to have a flaw.

369 Ibid Pg.10

370 Sharḥ Sanūsī álā Al-Wustā, Pg.20
KELLER’S TALK

In an audio clip supposed to be the voice of Nuh Keller, he can be heard saying:\n
Assalam alaykum wa rahmatullahi wa barakatuh. Alhamdulillah, [erm] it seems like you are listening to the shaytan a bit here. Is it possible for Allah to lie? This is not intrinsically impossible but only contingently impossible.

All you have to know, Sidi, is that it’s impossible. That’s sufficient for you. [er..] And, as for the, [er..] it’s not a genuine aqida issue. You don’t have to know whether it’s intrinsically impossible or contingently impossible; but you only have to know that it’s impossible. So, that’s the only thing that you have to know about it. As for the, [er..] major ulama that have said that it’s intrinsically impossible, not, and contingently impossible and not intrinsically impossible, as I have; [er..] you can find the same thing with Jurjani in his Sharh of the Mawaqif with Iji.

If you know something about the advanced books of, [er..] aqida, [er..] you know very well who these are; and so if there’s anything to argue about, it’s in the top ulama in the field and not just Shaykh Nuh. And, so, all you have to know is that Allah does not lie and it is not possible for Allah to lie and this is contingently impossible.

And, if someone were to say: no, it’s intrinsically impossible, I would not consider him a kafir or a fasiq or anything else but really someone with a different impression than mine and different and...so, the Qur’an is haqq. Allah does not lie, does not lie, but, and for more details and that, you just have to ask someone that has time to waste and has this, [er..] time on his hands to devote to meaningless questions.

And nobody busies himself with useless doings but someone who is useless. And, so, try to not be useless yourself, and turn to Allah subhanahu wa ta’ala, and, [er..] inshaAllah ta’ala, Allah will illumine[...ate?] your heart with dhikr and with ta’ah and not with arguments. That’s the least of your effective way to reach Allah subhanahu wa ta’ala.

Wa billahit tawfiq. Assalam alaykum wa rahmatullah wa barakatuh.

Analysing all the implications of this talk is a waste of time. Unfortunately, if this kind of careless talk is left unattended, it slowly becomes an accepted position. Therefore, it is necessary to point out major errors in this short speech.

Allâh tââlâ gives guidance.

\[371\] Many thanks to a brother who kindly consented to transcribe the above from the audio found on the Internet.
1. **It seems like you are listening to the shaytan a bit here.**

This kind of ‘Sufism’ is simply being evasive when one doesn’t know the answer or if one is on thin ice and has no proofs for their own shaky position. It is an obligation – *fard* – to investigate genuine *aqīdah* and *wājib* for one who knows to explain it, instead of using emotional blackmail.

True, shaytan whispers in ears of people of false *aqīdah*; whispers like ‘falsehood is only contingently impossible and not intrinsically impossible.’ It is the duty of a scholar to clarify and eliminate this kind of satanic whispering instead of merely criticising someone with a genuine query.

Perhaps, it was the devil whispering in the ear of Ismayil Dihlawi, who first proposed this *aqīdah*.372 Ironically, Keller chooses to side with the whispering of the devil instead of refuting it.

2. **Is it possible for Allah to lie? This is not intrinsically impossible but only contingently impossible.**

We have seen earlier in this paper that it is intrinsically impossible – *muhal dhātī* – for Allāh tā́ālā to lie. The same can be found in numerous books of *Aqīdah*, Kalām and Tafsīr; and a sample has been listed in this paper already. Alahazrat Imām Aḥmed Riḍā Khan has written extensively on this subject, and one of his books *Sub‘hān as-Subbūh*, is a 140 page treatise which quotes and explains proofs from classical books and úlamā establishing the fundamental Islamic belief, that falsehood is *muhal dhātī* for Allāh tā́ālā.

3. **It’s not a genuine aqidah issue.**

It is related to the fundamental principle upon which everything we believe as Muslims depends upon; dismissing it summarily as not being a genuine *aqīdah* issue indicates, either abject ignorance of *aqīdah* or the implications of such a corrupt idea. Alahazrat says in his *Sub‘hān as-Subbūh*:

> Glory be to Allāh! If we consider falsehood as a possibility for Allāh tā́ālā, then Islam will be beleaguered with such accusations and criticism that it will become impossible to refute them all. Atheists will raise such objections and put forth arguments that cannot be answered [alongside this odious belief].

> The evidence of the Qur’ān will become completely unusable. Judgement day, life after death, reckoning on that day of Judgement, heaven, hell, reward, punishment everything becomes questionable.

> Because, after all, our belief in these things is because Allāh tā́ālā has informed us; and if falsehood is a possibility in His speech (and thus information), then rationally, a possibility of untruth exists in every information.

> Perhaps, He might have said it just like that;373 perhaps it might not come true. Glory to Him and Exalted is He from what they374 attribute Him; there is no power, or strength except that granted by Allāh, the Exalted, the Greatest.375

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372 In the subcontinent. That is, he revived the forgotten and dead Mūtazilī belief.
373 That is, without its being truth.
374 Heretics, apostates.
375 *Sub‘hānahu wa tālā ámmā yaṣifūn; wa lā ḥawlā wa lā quwwata illā billah.*
This refutation can be restated thus:

a) Mumkin is that which can exist or not-exist.
b) When something is categorized as mumkin, then one cannot claim that it can never exist, nor that it has ever existed by merely applying [one’s] thought.
c) Because this is related to Divine Will (and Divine Knowledge); that is, to bring a certain thing into existence or not.
d) Divine Will is an unknown, unless Allah Himself reveals it.

The claim of heretics that, ‘Allah has never lied, nor shall He lie; even though falsehood is mumkin’ becomes absurd because:

a) If falsehood is mumkin
b) No one can claim that falsehood can never exist [because only muňāl is known that it shall never exist]
c) Because this is related to Divine Will (that He Will never say an untruth).
d) Divine Will is an unknown until He reveals it Himself.

The clincher is:

e) Has He told us of His Divine Will?
f) And if He has told us of His Will Himself, then has He really said the truth?
g) Because, if falsehood is deemed a possibility, it is quite possible that he has told a falsehood (al-iyādhu billāh) that ‘He will not lie.’

This is why it is necessary to believe that falsehood is muňāl and NOT mumkin. Alahazrat quotes Imam Râzî in this regard in the commentary of the verse: ‘The Words of your Lord have been completed with Truth and Justice’ who provides rational proof that falsehood is impossible for Allah and says:

It is not permitted to bring evidence that falsehood is impossible for Allah from revealed proofs. Because the very basis for the validity of revealed proofs is dependent on the [fundamental] premise, that falsehood is impossible [muňāl] for Allah. If we attest for the impossibility of falsehood by revealed proofs, it would cause a circular argument and thus invalid.

4. You don’t have to know whether it’s intrinsically impossible or contingently impossible; but you only have to know that it’s impossible.

We have seen earlier from primary āqidah texts, that it is obligatory for every Muslim to learn what is possible and impossible for Allah and His Messengers. True, an ordinary Muslim cannot learn everything found in books of āqidah; but when a doubt on any such thing is raised, it is necessary for them to get it right by asking a scholar and getting the doubt clarified.

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376 Tafsir Kabir, Sûrah Al-Anââm, Verse.115.
377 dalîl âqlî
378 dalâyîl al-samîyiyah
379 lazîma’d dawr
The other issue, is that a Mufti who does not understand his times (or the context) is an ignoramus. When people without proper knowledge of áqīdah are floating around the heretical idea that ‘falsehood is only contingently impossible’, one should clarify it, instead of burying one’s head in the sand and advising others to ignore it. Nevertheless, Keller ignores his own advice after a short while when he says:

And, so, all you have to know is that Allah does not lie and it is not possible for Allah to lie and this is contingently impossible.\textsuperscript{380}

Suppose Keller had left it without qualifying the ‘impossible’, a ‘useless’ person would have come to the right conclusion after investigation that, when muḥāl/impossible is mentioned without qualification, it is muḥāl dhātī; intrinsically and essentially impossible.

It is reminiscent of a quote: ‘Paint the cars any color as long as it is black’. And here, Keller is saying: ‘You are not required to know if it is intrinsically or contingently impossible; just that it is impossible and this is only contingently impossible.’ Go figure.

5. **Major ulama that have said that it’s intrinsically impossible... not... and contingently impossible and not intrinsically impossible, as I have; you can find the same thing with Jurjani in his Sharh of the Mawaqif with Eeji.**

Where did ‘major’ úlamā say this? Can he provide proof by citations instead of the fallacious reasoning proffered by other Deobandi apologists? Where did Jurjani say it in his *Sharḥ* of Al-Mawāqif?

We have already seen what is said in *Sharḥ al-Mawāqif*, that kadhib/falsehood is muḥāl by unanimous agreement of the ummah. It is also in the same book that muḥāl āradī or wājib āradī are actually, mumkin which has been transformed to muḥāl or wājib on account of an extrinsic condition. And note that anything described as muḥāl without qualification is muḥāl dhātī: meaning intrinsically, essentially impossible. If anyone claims that, it is muḥāl āradī or contingently impossible, they must provide proof, and they should start with the definitions. The only way a man can absolve himself of such blame is by providing proof for his claim. Sure, one can keep quiet and extol the virtues of silence, but on the Day of Judgement, evasion will not be an option.

6. **If you know something about the advanced books of... aqida... you know very well who these are;**

The advanced books of kalām, whether Musāyarah, its *Sharḥ* Musāmarah or *Sharḥ* al-Maqaṣid or various books of Imam Rāzī or the *Sharḥ* al-Mawāqif or the half a dozen books of Imam Sanūsī on kalām and the various commentaries, all refute the belief Keller proposes in this talk. Yet, Keller insists otherwise. This could be due to either genuine ignorance, or a deliberate intention to pervert the truth. I am restraining myself from suggesting the third possibility of falsehood, as Keller’s followers and admirers may take offence.\textsuperscript{383}

Let him list ‘these’ statements and translate ‘these,’ as he is a well known translator. If he has no time, let him at least mention these ‘advanced books’.

\textsuperscript{380} These are Keller’s own words. See the talk above.

\textsuperscript{381} As he qualifies the impossible: ‘only contingently impossible’

\textsuperscript{382} If he is referring to an apparently ambiguous statement – just one confusing line – see Appendix C for a detailed analysis. Still, we would like to see where Sharif al-Jurjānī has said that it is ‘contingently impossible.’

\textsuperscript{383} Indeed, suggesting the possibility of falsehood in Allāh’s speech is faith, and in that of Keller is ‘bad adab’? SubḥānAllāh! If you are still unmoved, you may want to weep at the hardness of your heart and the expanse of your ignorance. May Allāh tāālā guide you.
7. **And so if there’s anything to argue about, it’s in the top ulama in the field and not just Shaykh Nuh.**

Related to 6 above. He states a false premise that ‘top ulama in the field’ have this áqīdah, and derives the fallacious conclusion that Nuh is with them. The truth of the matter is, none of the top úlamā have this áqīdah and it is only with Nuh. However, if Nuh Keller is referring to the Deobandis, it is another matter. The first group of wayward scholars to innovate this áqīdah was that of Deobandis and their elders and Keller is blindly following them.

8. **And, so, all you have to know is that Allah does not lie and it is not possible for Allah to lie and this is contingently impossible.**

Keller has proven that he cannot be relied upon for citations; here, he also fumbles with derivations. Alahazrat demolished this mendacious idea in such words:

> I say, with the guidance of Allāh: The definition of possible is that, which is equivalent in relation to existence and non-existence; anything the intellect considers possible, the intellect cannot rule out the possibility of its existence, no matter how far-fetched and incredible such a thing might be; because, every possible thing is included in Divine Power [maqdûr]; and everything governed by the Divine Power is related to Divine Will [irādah].

And the Divine Will is an unknown and beyond the intellect [to know it]. Then how can one claim [on the basis of intellect] that: ‘even though falsehood is included in Divine Power, I have knowledge of His Will; and thus, He has never spoken a lie nor will He ever tell a lie from the pre-eternity to eternity.’ One can talk of Divine Will only when, He who Wills, reveals it Himself, that He will never do something, like He has Himself said:

> And Allāh shall never burden a soul more than its capacity. And He has said:

> He wishes ease for you; and He wishes not hardship upon you.

Also, see point 4 for Keller pushing his own agenda and being holier-than-thou at the same time.

9. **And, if someone were to say: no, it’s intrinsically impossible, I would not consider him a kafir or a fasiq or anything else but really someone with a different impression than mine and different and...**

On the contrary, one who does not believe that falsehood is intrinsically impossible is at best a mubtadiý – heretic and wayward; and at worst, a kafir (al-iýādhubillāh). Keller is trying to trivialize the issue simply because he does not understand the issue himself, nor is acquainted with kalām terminology, which is obvious from this talk and his screed elsewhere.

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384 Indeed, this is an old controversy. But everyone knew that it is an ancient Mūtazilī belief. No one who claimed to be a Sunni ever said this.

385 Subḥān as-Subbūh

386 that is, it anything that can be existent or non-existent is considered as mumkin, by the very definition.

387 ghayb

388 Qur’ān 2:286

389 Qur’ān 2:185

390 Iman, Kufr and Takfir – which has been refuted elsewhere.
10. **So, the Qur’an is haqq. Allah does not lie, does not lie, but, and**
The above is a correct belief. But the requirement for this correct belief is that falsehood is absolutely, and intrinsically impossible for Allāh tāālā. See point 8 above.

11. **For more details and that, you just have to ask someone that has time to waste and has this time on his hands to devote to meaningless questions.**
This is an attempt to pre-empt any refutation to this meaningless talk; and tinged with context-blindness about the history of the issue. Muslims were not bothered with this meaningless question and a person with a lot of time to waste concocted it; and his followers promoted it – and some others are defending this in our age.

If one tries to correct this false idea, then they are wasting their time. If Keller were sincere in ‘not wasting time’, he would have abstained completely from making any comments on this issue. If someone meddles in things which they have no knowledge of, or even circulate utter lies, they are being useful; but, if someone refutes that false idea, they are useless. Arrogance and újb are the sufī’s bane.

12. **And nobody busies himself with useless doings but someone who is useless.**
When fitna rears its head, and false, heretical beliefs are sneaked into Islam, it is an obligation for every Muslim who knows, to fight it. This is what our salaf, our elders did. This is what the imams, Al-Ashārī, Al-Maturidi, Ghazzali, Rāzī, Subki and Sanūsī did. Perhaps they were being useless as well.

13. **And, so, try to not be useless yourself, and turn to Allah subhanahu wa ta’ala, inshaAllah ta’ala, Allah will illumine your heart with dhikr and with ta’ah and not with arguments. That’s the least of your effective way to reach Allah subhanahu wa ta’ala.**
The first step in sulūk is to investigate and profess correct áqīdah. This is a part of dhikr itself. Some sufīs, who have not properly understood the objectives of sharīāh, foolishly think that dhikr is only litanies. Ahmed Ibn Áţāyillāh as-Sakandarī, the spokesman of the sufīs, and a Shadhili imām says in the opening lines of Miftāĥ al-Falāĥ: 391

Dhikr or Remembrance means liberation from negligence and forgetfulness. And this is achieved by having an attentive and a mindful heart in the presence of Allāh tāālā. It is also said: ‘that you seek the name of the remembered one, by the heart and by the tongue.’ It is the same whether you remember [do dhikr of] Allāh tāālā or any of His Attributes; or any of His commandments; or any of His Divine Actions; or establish evidence392 that guides you towards them;393 or Prayer,394 Or remembering any of His Messengers, His Prophets or His Friends395 or anyone related to them; or anyone who tries to come closer to the Lord by any means.396

391 Miftāĥ al-Falāĥ wa Mişbāh al-Arwāh fī Dhikrillāhi’l Karīm al-Fattāĥ, on Dhikr/Remembrance of the Lord Almighty. By Imām Aĥmed Ibn Áţāyillāh as-Sakandarī.
392 for example to prove that the Attributes of Allāh tāālā are all transcendent from all flaws; including flaws like falsehood and
393 that is anything that provides evidence to Attributes, Actions and Commandments of the Lord
394 duáā
395 Awliyā’a
Or any action [that bring you closer to the Lord Almighty] like reciting the Qur'ān, litanies, poetry, singing/recitation, or attending a lecture or retelling of stories.

So, the Mutakallim is a dhākir; the teacher is a dhākir; the Mufti is a dhākir; the preacher is dhākir; the thinker who marvels at the Greatness of Allāh and His Glory, His Power, His Signs, the heavens and the earth is a dhākir; one obeys the commands of Allāh and abstains from His Prohibitions is a dhākir.

Imām Ghazzālī writes, in the discussion on the superiority of ascetism and abstaining from company:

... That is, he should seek Allāh tāālā by this knowledge; the knowledge about Him, His Attributes, His Actions – because knowledge of these is far superior than every good deed [āmāl]. Rather, the very objective of good deeds is to remove one's heart from the creation and be solely focused on the gnosis and love of the Almighty.

Both deeds and knowledge about deeds, are meant to attain this knowledge. And this [secondary] knowledge is the destination of the seekers in this path and as if it is a condition on this path.

Al-Sanūsī explaining the importance of refuting heresies:

It is reported that Master Abū Is'ňāq al-Isfarāyini during the time when heretical ideas were intensely debated [and heresies were rising] went up the mountain, Mount Lebanon, a place of seclusion and worship, and which was the dwelling of friends of Allāh [Awliyā'Allāh].

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396 Obviously as advised by the Sharīah or is compliant with it.
397 Dīkhr here, is used as litany.
398 Permitted by the sharīah and that which is in praise of Allāh, His Messengers, His Friends or imparting wisdom; In general, Islamic poetry.
399 Gīnā here means vocal singing of permitted poetry. Like the Burdah for example and odes in praise of the Prophet șallAllāhu álayhi wa sallam.
400 Obviously, Islamic lectures.
401 True stories from the lives of Prophets, Awliyā’a and other righteous Muslims. As the Lord Almighty has said: ‘Verily, in their stories, there are lessons for people of understanding.’ [Sūrah Yusuf, 12:111].
402 A scholar or student of Kalām, when it is meant to establish evidence for the Attributes of Allāh; to refute false ideas and to remove heretical ideas being planted in the minds of common muslims.
403 One who is busy remembering his Lord.
404 Mutafaqqih: one who is learning fiqh. The scholar or student of Jurisprudence. When one becomes a master of this science, he is termed a Faqīh. The master of jurisprudence, fiqh.
405 Mutafakkir fī āžamatillāh: One who spends time observing, thinking about the creation and marveling at the Greatness and the Immense Wisdom of the Creator.
407 Of Attributes of Allāh tāālā, His Divine Actions.
408 ghāyatu’n murīdīn
409 That is, a condition to reach the goal is true knowledge about the Attributes of Allāh tāālā.
410 Sharḥ Sanūsī ál-Al-Kubrā, Pg.20
He found them withdrawn from common people and busy in the worship of Allāh tāālā and he said:

'O people who live by eating grass! You have fled [to seclusion] here, and forsaken the followers of Prophets ṣallAllāhu álayhi wa sallam [vulnerable] in the hands of heretics?’

They replied: 'Master! We do not have the strength to live among people; but Allāh tāālā has given you strength and you are capable to [repel them].'

The teacher radīAllāhu ánhū returned and busied himself with refuting heretics and wrote his book, Al-Jāmiý Bayna'l Jalī wa'l Khāfī.412

It is said that Master Abū Bakr ibn Al-Fūrak spent time learning and after mastering the sciences, withdrew from public life into seclusion and worship. He heard someone say: 'You have become a living proof of [correct doctrine sent by] Allāh tāālā for His creation, but you flee from them?' The teacher came back and resumed his teaching.

Al-Zabidi in the explanation of Ghazzali’s comments in The Book of Knowledge; where413 he cites the author414 of Qūt analysing the Ḥadīth 'it is obligatory for every Muslim to seek knowledge':

Among scholars who considered this to be the Knowledge of Tawḥīd,416 there is a disagreement upon the method of seeking it and the nature of supplementing it. Some said, it is by evidence and reflection;417 some others said, by research and examination;418 and yet some others said, by testimony and tradition.419

One group of scholars420 said: 'This means421 to actively seek knowledge of problematic issues and things that cause doubt422 whenever a man comes across such ideas and hears them. However, he is allowed to refrain from seeking [to learn about] these things as long as he is himself unaware of these issues; and as long as he is upon the fundamental faith of all Muslims, and accepts the standard doctrine.423

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411 aklatu hashīsh: grass eaters; one should not confuse this with the modern usage which means drug addicts. These noble people subsisted by eating edible grass and vegetables, hence the address.
412 A Compendium of the Manifest and the Obscure.
413 It’ĥāf al-Sādah al-Muttaqīn. vol.1/pg.200.
414 Abū Ţālib al-Makkī, Imām of Ahl as-Sunnah of his time, d.386AH
415 Qūt al-Qulūb, by Al-Makkī and one of the earliest books of Tasawwuf; it is said that Imām Ghazzalī used Qūt as a model for his InternalServerError. Allāh tāālā knows best.
416 That is Knowledge of Doctrine of Ahlu’s Sunnah. It is also known by synonyms: īlm al-tawḥīd, īlm al-uşūl or īlm al-kalām.
417 al-istidlāl wa'l iýtibār
418 al-baĥth wa'n nažar
419 at-tawqīf wa'l athar
420 That is, scholars of kalām
421 The original says: he intended; that is, he ṣallAllāhu álayhi wa sallam intended [by saying ‘seeking knowledge is obligatory…]
422 mushkilāt - shubuhāt
423 of Ahl as-Sunnah
As long as nothing disturbs his thought, nor gnaws from the inside, he is allowed to keep away from doubtful and controversial ideas and he is exempted from researching the reality about such things.

However, if something falls in his ear from such doubtful, controversial or problematic issues and takes root in his heart,\textsuperscript{424} and he himself does not have the knowledge to resolve it or remove it from his heart, nor have the sufficient knowledge to differentiate between truth and falsehood, then, it is not permissible for him to sit silent.\textsuperscript{425} Because, otherwise, he may retain a false and heretical belief or negate or repudiate a correct doctrine. Therefore, it becomes obligatory for him to seek knowledge about it\textsuperscript{426} from the masters of that science and get clarifications from them until he gains confidence and firm belief in the right doctrine and reject false ideas; thereby resolving those issues that perturb him.

He should not neglect seeking knowledge of this kind nor abandon it, because he may then follow his own desire because of doubt, or be doubtful of religion and then depart from the way of the believers. Or he may accept a heretical thought and thus go out of the madh‘hab of the Ahl as-Sunnah without even realizing it.

This is why [Abū Bakr] Al-Siddiq said: ‘O Allāh! Make truth apparent to us, so that we follow it; and falsehood apparent so that we keep away from it.’ This is the madh‘hab of Abū Thawr, Ibrāhīm ibn Khālid al-Kalbī, Dāwūd ibn Álī, Ḥusayn al-Karābīsī, Ṣahr\textsuperscript{427} ibn Asad al-Muĥāsibi among the kalām scholars.

We pray Allāh táālā to guide wayward Muslims and make them see the truth and recant heretical ideas. We ask Him to make us walk the path of those whom He has guided, and be like those whom He loves – in our lives and in our death. This, by His Immense Favor and we ask Him to save us and all Muslims in these difficult times from evil and mischief. We ask Him for the sake of the Best of creation, our Master Muĥammad \textit{ṣallAllāhu álayhi wa sallam}.

Allāh táālā alone gives guidance and success.

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\textsuperscript{424} that is, the idea – whether for or against, finds a place in the heart. In this example, no Muslim was bothered about such an odious idea that falsehood is not impossible for Allāh táālā. When this is being planted by a group of ignorant scholars, it is now obligatory for anyone who hears it to get a clarification; and for those who know the truth to refute it. Allāh táālā is a sufficient Helper.

\textsuperscript{425} Obviously, this means: one should ask the knowledgeable and resolve it. So seeking knowledge about this is obeying the sunnah, not listening to the whispering of the devil. Al-?’ádhu Billāh.

\textsuperscript{426} That particular issue which has been bothering him

\textsuperscript{427} Two versions of \textit{It‘ĥāf}, the Bulaq edition and the modern Dar Kotob al-Imliyah edition say Ţarth; however he is widely known as Ţārith.
Appendix B

A CLARIFICATION

Did Alahazrat coin the phrase *imkān e kizb* or was it in use prior to his ruling on it? Did Deobandis themselves use it or was it ‘mistranslated’ by Alahazrat?

1. In *Fayslah Haft-Mas’alah*, Ĥājī İmdādullāh Muhājir-Makkī mentions the 6th and the 7th question as:

   chaTTa aur saatwaN mas’alah: imkan e nazir o imkan e kizb ka
   the sixth and seventh issue: on the possibility of similitude and the possibility of falsehood.

2. In *Ek-Rozah* by Ismaîl Dihlawī, on pg.17, he mentions the phrase *imkān-e–kazib* and perhaps is the first salvo in this controversy.

3. In *Barāhīn e Qaţiáh*, Khalīl Ahmed mentions this phrase on page 6: ‘this issue of the possibility of falsehood (*imkān e kizb*) is not a new one; the difference of opinion on the matter of *khulf al-waýid* has existed among the ancients.’

4. In *Fatāwā Rashīdiyyah*, a purported letter from Ĥājī İmdādullāh Muhājir Makkī is presented which mentions the phrase *imkān e kizb* and that it is included in the Divine Power.

5. In *Juhd al-Muqil* by Maḥmūd al-Ĥasan Devbandi, he writes:

   khulāsā ye nikla mā bihi’n nizāá bayn al-farīqayn, imkān e kazib fi’l kalām al-lafżī hai, imkān e kazib fi’l ilm hargiz nahīN
   the summary of the dispute between the two groups is in the matter of possibility of falsehood in uttered speech (of Allāh tāālā) not in the possibility of falsehood in His Knowledge.

Thus, tries to prove this corrupt belief; not surprisingly, it is the same fallacious ‘evidence’ that has been regurgitated *ad nauseum* to this day – some, in a few sentences and some in hundreds of pages. Unfortunately, some contemporary scholars have fallen prey to this deception and are circulating an *áqīdah* that has no place in Islam.

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428 Nuh Keller, a contemporary American scholar accuses Alahazrat of ‘mistranslating’ this phrase in his article titled *Iman, Kufr and Takfir*.

429 *Juhd al-Muqil*, means ‘hardship of a poor man’ as mentioned in Ḥadīth. The Saharanpur edition (published in the lifetime of the author) has diacritics on the title to read: *Jahd ul-Muqill*, which means: ‘toiling of a poor man’. Indeed, this is the ‘toiling of a beggar.’ It is obvious that similar to contemporary ‘scholars,’ this ‘scholar’ from Deoband is ignorant of *áqīdah*, kalām and logic. As if, the title of the book already declares the poverty of thought and faith in that book.
A drowning man clutches at a straw, hoping that it will save him. When irreligious people are refuted soundly, they cling to obscure statements found in books of kalām and try to justify their odious belief. It is strange that we have to cite from scores of books to prove that falsehood is *muĥāl* for Allāh táālā; but the opposite camp thinks that quoting a couple of problematic passages will absolve them (and their elders who first made these mistakes) from all blame.

The first thing is that kalām books tend to be long winded and the reader is expected to keep track of the original comment, objections, counter-objections and so forth. In many places, Jurjānī’s dialectic gets a bit confusing – the casual reader [or the quote-hunter]430 who is starting from the middle, might be misled easily into thinking that this is the position of Jurjānī himself. It is important to remember the advice of Al-Ijī in his book warning against such dangers:431

> And you know the madh'hab of Ahl al-Ĥaqq432 that sight is created by Allāh táālā in the living and it is not necessary to put conditions of light, nor facing or otherwise. We shall not object to such things, relying upon your knowledge433 where it is relevant.

Jurjānī in his commentary elaborates:434

> {We shall not object to such things, relying upon your knowledge where it is relevant} Thus, it is mandatory for you to consider [and be mindful of]435 the principles of Ahl al-Ĥaqq in all the discussions we make, even if we do not explicitly mention them.

Al-Ījī and Al-Jurjānī are clearly saying that ‘in the course of our discussions we shall state the positions of others without mentioning our objections; and we rely upon your knowledge to recognize this. The rule of thumb in all these discussions is you should measure it against the principles and statements made in the true creed of the righteous folk [and follow it] even if we do not explicitly describe that.

In *Sharĥ al-Maqāşid*, Al-Taftāzānī says:436

> There are numerous opinions of philosophers that are false and invalid [according to our religious belief] and mentioned without stating [our] objection or refuting them, except where additional clarification is required.

Therefore, it is important always, to hold to the principles of Ahl al-Ĥaqq when reading books of kalām; and no matter what is said in there, one should not lose track of the correct āqīdah.

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430 Someone who browses books to search for a quote of his liking, with scant regard to context or even bothering if the quote is a citation in itself!
432 Ahl al-Ĥaqq is the phrase used to refer Ahl as-Sunnah Muslims because they are on the Right Path. Literally, The People in the Right [or with the right creed]
433 That is the position of Ahl al-Ĥaqq
434 *Sharĥ al-Mawāqif*, Vol.5, Pg.246
435 riáāyah
436 *Sharĥ al-Maqāşid*, Vol.2/Pg.273; The Third Objective: First Category: Third Type.
A. The problematic quote of Sharḥ Al-Mawāqif as cited by a heretic:437

It is written in Sharḥ al-Mawaqif: “The entire Mu’tazilah and Khawarij consider punishing the sinner if he dies without repentance necessary (wajib) and do not consider possible Allah will forgive him, by a twofold reasoning: First, He has threatened with punishment for major sins and informed (us) of it and if He does not punish and forgives, reneging on His threat and lying would result, and they are impossible (muhal). The response is: its objective [i.e. the threat’s] is the incidence (wuqu) of punishment, so where is the necessity of punishment concerning which our discussion is on (?) since there is no doubt that non-necessity and incidence does not entail reneging or lying. It cannot be said: ‘it entails their possibility, which too is impossible (muhal)’, because we say: ‘its impossibility is untrue – how so, when they are from the possibilities (mumkinat) which His power include’.”

B. Context for this quote vis-à-vis other quotes:

Translations that were presented earlier were from the main discussion about Speech; and a direct argument against falsehood was presented there; whereas, this seemingly problematic quote is found in the discussion of ‘good-ugly’ as a dialectic argument. It is obvious that a lone statement within a subsidiary argument cannot be presented as a statement of faith, where a direct argument is already presented contradicting and refuting it.

Moreover, Al-Jurjānī himself states his position prior to this dialectic when he says:438

The basis of our saying that falsehood is impossible for Allāh tāālā is not because it is considered as an ugly thing by intellect;439 because, if falsehood is not considered ugly, then it necessitates that falsehood does not remain muĥāl anymore; therefore, there is another basis for this; which we have explained earlier.440

So, the argument in the above quote is about the validity of stating qubĥ al-áqlī as proof for refuting falsehood; not a dispute about falsehood itself. Actually, Állāmah Sharīf is using the Mutazilah argument to refute them when he prefixes as ‘then we shall say’ which actually means, ‘so we bring your other argument to refute this one’.

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437 Sharḥ al-Mawāqif, Vol.8, Pg.331. This was posted on an internet forum.

438 Ibid, Vol.8, Pg.214

439 qubĥ al-áqlī

440 that it is because falsehood is a flaw and a flaw is impossible for Allāh tāālā.
Why would Sharīf make such a blatant mistake when he has himself presented lengthy proofs earlier, that falsehood is muĥāl? Moreover, why would he say something without providing proof – that which contradicts almost every Sunni mutakallim?

At this point, I will only point out that when Sharīf says: ‘because then we shall say’ he is actually saying: ‘If you say so, then we shall say [citing your own principle]: ‘that you cannot claim it is mustahīl because [according to you] they are mumkin and are included in Divine Power.’

I will engage in a similar dialectic with those who pose this argument: The most important issue here is the explicit statement that it is mumkin. If you already believe that Sharīf said it is mumkin and included in Allāh’s Divine Power, then why do you present so many excuses and confuse commonfolk by naming terms they do not understand? Why don’t you explicitly state it as your áqīdah and do away with all pretenses of imtināá bi'l ghayr etc?

What about Al-Jurjānī’s own assertion that it is muĥāl in the very same book in its appropriate place? Why did he have to prove that kadhib is muĥāl in the first place? All he had to do was just say: ‘kadhib is mumkin.’ End of story.

The fact is, that it is a Mútazilī principle that kadhib and žulm are included in Divine Power. Every student of kalām and hersiology knows this. Ábd al-Qāhir al-Baghdādī Al-Milal wa’n Niĥal says:

Historians narrate about a gathering of seven prominent Mútazilī scholars and their argument about the issue of Divine Power over oppression and falsehood.

Some statements of Mútazilah scholars mentioned in the story are:

- [And Abu’l Hudhayl ] said: ‘I say that Allāh tāālā has Power on that He can oppress and that He can lie; and because He knows that He will not do them.

- Bishr ibn Al-Mútamir said: I say that Allāh tāālā has Power over all those things.

- Al-Ashbaĥ said: I say that He has Power over oppression and falsehood.

Concluding the story, he writes:

These people [the Mútazilah] were forced to accept their inability to answer in this issue. If they were guided to the correct answer, and came back to our answer that Allāh tāālā has Divine Power over all things subject to His Power [maqdūr], and if He did it, it would not be oppression; they would [also] consider falsehood muĥāl like we consider it muĥāl and would be blessed with [this correct belief].

Praise be to Allāh tāālā who has vouchsafed us and delivered us from such heresy, and because of which they are confused and perplexed, like Jews and Christians are [in issues specific to them].

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441 The proof for this is given in the following sub-sections.
442 And therefore, those terms are described separately in this paper.
443 Ábd Manşūr Ábd al-Qāhir al-Baghdādī, d.429AH – He is famous for his other book Al-Farq Bayn al-Firaq.
444 Al-Milal wa’n Niĥal, Al-Baghdādī Pgs.136-138
445 In the footnote by Al-Kawtharī it is, Al-Ashajj and that he was a contemporary of the prominent Mútazilī, Bishr ibn al-Mútamir.
446 The Ahlu’s Sunnah
Notice that Ábd al-Qāhir al-Baghdādī plainly says that the Sunni position is that ‘falsehood is muĥāl.’ And the Mútazilī position is that ‘falsehood and oppression are included in Allāh’s Power’.

Al-Baghdādī in his other work, Al-Farq Bayn al-Firaq listing the heresies of Mútazilah mentions this issue as a Mútazilī belief. Under the entry of Iskāfī:447

And he448 contradicted those of his elders who said that Allāh táālā has power over oppression and falsehood; but He does not do them because of His knowledge that they are ugly and that His being free of doing [ugly things].

Muĥammad Al-Shahrastānī, whom Sharīf Al-Jurjānī praises as knowledgeable of the positions of the community of kalām scholars, says in his Al-Milal wa’n Niĥal discussing Mardāriyyah:449

Followers of Yišā ibn Şabiţ Al-Mardār, student of Bishr ibn al-Mútamir:

The first [among his heresies]: is his position concerning Divine Power of Allāh táālā and that He has power to lie and to oppress. And if He did lie and oppress, He would be the oppressing and the lying god.

Exalted is Allāh from what he450 says!

SubĥānAllāh! Notice how Shahrastānī expresses his revulsion from such an ugly belief. Shahrastānī, whom Sharīf praised as quite knowledgeable considers it abhorrent; did Sharīf al-Jurjānī not know this?

And finally, let us see what Imām Abū’l Ĥasan al-Ashárī said about it. Talking about the Mútazilī heresies, he mentions many of them who claimed that Allāh táālā has power to lie and oppress; in the 15th statement he says:451

Abū Mūsā452 and many Mútazilah said: ‘Verily Allāh táālā has power to oppress and lie, but He does not do them. If they are asked: ‘Suppose He does?’ They said: ‘Fundamentally, He doesn’t do such things.’

These statements are so ugly that no one considers it good to describe a righteous Muslim in such words! Similarly, one cannot describe Allāh táālā with such ascriptions – Glorified is He.

Does the zindiq still claim that Jurjānī was ignorant of such basic positions? As mentioned in the hadīth of the Messenger ụṣūlAllāhu alayhi wa sallam:453

If you have no shame, do whatever you want.

Only Allāh táālā gives guidance.

447 Al-Farq Bayn al-Firaq, Pg. 125
448 Abū Jáfar Muĥammad ibn Abdullāh al-Iskāfī, d.240 AH.
449 Al-Milal wa’n Niĥal, Al-Shahristānī Pg.54, Mardāriyyah among the Mútazilah.
450 that is, the heretic Al-Mardār.
452 this is Al-Mardār as we learn from Al-Shahristānī.
453 Şaĥīĥ al-Bukhārī, hadīth 3483
The discussion is about the Mūtazilī position, in *Al-Mawāqif*:

**The Fifth Objective:** The Mūtazilah have derivation based on their principle of rational ruling and obligation upon Allāh tāālā; and that which examined here is about reward and punishment.

Describing the issue, he says:

**As for punishment, there are two points to discuss here:**

**The First Point:** All the Mūtizilah and Khawārij say that it is obligatory for Allāh tāālā to punish those who commit major sins for two reasons:

**The First Reason:** Because He has promised punishment and has given information about it [that He will punish them]; if He does not punish them, it will entail breaking a promise and [presence of] falsehood in His information, and this is muñāl.

**[Our] Answer:** The furthest extent is for punishment to occur, so where is the obligation?

Let the reader note that the context is not the discussion of the issue per se; but rather an objection resulting from the Mūtazilī principle of ‘obligation on Allāh tāālā.’ We say that there is no obligation on Allāh tāālā whatsoever. In its commentary by Sharīf al-Jurjānī:

{As for punishment, there are two discussions. The first: All [scholars of] Mūtazilah and Khawārij said that it was wājib for Allāh tāālā to punish those who commit major sins.} That is, when he dies without repentance and they said that it was not possible for Allāh tāālā to forgive them. {This, for two reasons: First because Allāh tāālā promised punishment} for those who commit major sins {and gave information about this} that is about the punishment for committing major sins {and if He does not punish them} on their major sins and forgave them, {then it necessitates khulf – reneging on his promise of punishment and falsehood in His speech which is muñāl.}

{The answer is: the furthest extent is for punishment to occur, so where is the obligation?} in which we dispute; because, there is no doubt that the occurrence [of punishment] without obligation [upon Allāh tāālā] does not necessitate either khulf [reneging on promise] nor kadhib [falsehood].

One cannot say: [But] that will necessitate that considering them both [khulf and kadhib] as contingent, which is also muñāl.

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454 *Al-Mawāqif*, Pg.376

455 *Sharḥ al-Mawāqif*, Vol.8, Pg.331

456 the Kharijites, extremist faction and forerunners of today’s Wahhabis. The derive the name from going out against the fourth and the rightfully guided caliph, Ālī raḍiyAllāhu ánhū.

457 that is, converting a muñāl to jāyiz is muñāl.
Then we shall say: ruling that both [khulf and kadhib] as muĥāl is not permitted; how can it be when they are among contingent things which are included in the Divine Power of Allāh tāālā.

These kinds of arguments are common in both Al-Mawāqif and its commentary. lā yuqāl / li annā naqāl, ‘let this not be said/because then we shall say’ is usually given as an accusative proof where the latter is aso the statement of those who have stated the objection.

For example, in the chapter on Divine Power, Al-Ījī mentions the Mútazilī confusion about free will and Divine Power of the Creator, and says:

Don’t say: That which is subject to Allāh’s power will happen, because His Power is all encompassing;

Because then we will say: The meaning of Encompassing Power in relation to all other things except this thing upon which creation has power [maqdūr]. So He has no influence in this thing [maqdūr] and both the Creator and the slave are equal with respect to this thing.

Is Ījī saying that Allāh tāālā has no power on actions of creation? Indeed, anyone with elementary knowledge of áqīdah and the history of Mútazilah will scoff at such a misreading of the text. This is the kind of casual browsing that Ījī lamented in the preface of his book:

And among such, are those similar to a person fetching firewood in a pitch dark night; and one bereft of men and mount. He collects what he finds from the statements of kalām scholars and copies them blindly, without using his mind – and does not realize whether that which he has gathered has festered and worthless, or valuable and priceless. And [doesn’t know whether] that, which he has put together is weak and absurd or strong and anchored.

A little earlier, in the same preface, which is very relevant to those who insist on Sharīf al-Jurjānī’s seemingly confusing line, he says:

Among this kind, is one who fabricates and [cites] mistakes, just to further his own opinion – without realizing that there are critics behind him [who will expose him]. And one who looks at mere premises and propositions and chooses what suits his deplorable opinion; and sometimes, he goes back to use some parts of these to disprove others, because of his abject confusion.

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458 For some more examples see Sharḥ al-Mawāqif: Vol.8, Pg.73, Pg.82; Vol.6, Pg.88 and I skip translations because they are out of scope of our discussion.

459 Al-Mawāqif, Pg.285

460 incompetent people, without clear understanding of either kalām or áqīdah

461 powerless and without aid.

462 kalām al-qawm: here ‘community’ means scholars of kalām.

463 muqaddimah al-kubra and muqaddimah al-şughrā: major premiss and minor premiss; it could also mean mere introductions, but given the context it is about premises – using them here and there and arriving at wrong conclusions.

464 Ibid. I have used Al-Jurjānī’s commentary in the translation itself for clarity.
No comment would have been as apt as Ījī’s in this affair. In the above lines, he rejects those who pick up a line here or there and are all perplexed and confused. And without a firm grounding in principles, they try to apply this piece on others making blunders and ascribing them to ālimā while in reality, this was never the intention of the authors.

Any judicious person should be convinced by now; but some people may adamantly insist that Sharīf is stating his own position. Therefore, I will try to persuade them with yet another proof. Imām Fakhruddīn Rāzī in his Muḥaṣṣal Afkār al-Mutaqaddimīn wa’l Muta-akh’khirīn says:465

**Article:** The information given by Allāh tāālā is Truth
Because falsehood is a flaw and it is muḥāl for Allāh tāālā. And it is so because, if He could utter falsehood, then His falsehood would be pre-eternal; and if this were so, then truth would be muḥāl for Him.

However, the latter statement466 is itself muḥāl. Because, for everyone who knows something – he knows about that information to be true in itself.467 And this is known by necessity.468

**Don’t say:** Alright; that which you mention is proof that the information which is pre-eternal is truth; but this does not prove that these words are also true.469

**Because, then we shall say to the Mūtazilah:** This also is an entailing proof [against] you. Because according to you, elision and concealment [in kalām lafžī], which we don’t know, is possible; and this possibility makes these apparent words unreliable.470

Notice that this lā yuqāl / li annā naqūl is the style of mutakallīmūn. Ignoramuses who do not have an idea of correct āqīdah or methodology of kalām scholars, strut their ignorance and are causing people to go astray. Āllāmah Sharīf is using a similar dialectic – and only an idiot will claim that Imām Rāzī believed in hadhaf and idmār [elision and hiding] of kalām lafžī.

As a bonus, Imām Rāzī is not only proving falsehood muḥāl in this quote, but also proving that it is muḥāl in both kalām nafṣī and kalām lafžī.

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465 Muḥaṣṣal Afkār al-Mutaqaddimīn wa’l Muta-akh’khirīn, Imām Rāzī. Pg.185
466 ‘that truth is impossible’ is by way observation of muḥāl; he explains this in the next paragraph.
467 therefore šidq cannot be muḥāl.
468 common knowledge. ḍarūrah.
469 notice that this claim of possibility of falsehood in kalām lafzī is also a Mūtazilah belief.
470 Though Nasīruddīn Ţūsī in his commentary titled Talkhīş al-Muhaṣṣal contests that this is not the Mūtazilah position, he does not deny that kadhib is muḥāl.
D. Comments on this quote by other scholars

1. Al-Dawwānī commenting on this quote summarily rejects it and says:

I say: falsehood is a flaw and a flaw for Allāh tāālā is muĥāl. It is not included in the mumkināt and neither is it included in Divine Power. And this, just as His Divine Power does not include anything that implies that there is a flaw in Him – *exalted is He* – like ignorance [jahil] and powerlessness [ájz]; or negation of the attribute of Speech or any other such attribute of perfection.

2. In a gloss of the above:

[And I say:] so that you don’t heed Sharīf’s objection [upon which Al-Dawwānī answers]

3. Al-Siyālkūti in his supercommentary:

If you say: Falsehood is a flaw which is mustaĥīl for Allāh tāālā by *ijmā’a*; and there is no doubt that it is impossible to convert an impossible thing into a contingent thing.

I say: It is obvious that this comment is made with respect to the Mutazilah argument and they speak not, except about *kalām lafżī*. It was mentioned earlier that flaw in *kalām lafżī* is another form of *qubţ āqlī* – but we don’t say this.

Yes, it is proven by the information given by the Prophet *ṣallAllāhu álayhi wa sallam* that His Speech [is *kalām lafżī*] does not have falsehood absolutely. But the fact that it is muĥāl intrinsically [for *kalām lafżī*] based on the fact that it is a flaw cannot be used as an evidence [in this case].

What remains then, is the argument of the Mutazilah that something is obligatory [*wājib*] for Allāh tāālā, The Wise, during appropriate conditions and what befits wisdom; such that He does not have power over it and that it is obligatory for Him to do it. In addition to what they consider *wājib* for Allāh tāālā, they say that He has a choice in what He does. There is no difference [of opinion] amongst Mutazilah on this [point].

And using this [argument,] which they posit comprising their answer, their original premiss is being refuted; and that is what is being discussed here. Ponder.

Siyalkuti is clarifying the context in which Al-Jurjānī’s problematic statement is made. Certainly, this is not the position of Sharīf himself, but rather he is using one Mutazili argument to refute another.

\[\text{References:}\]

1. *Sharḥ Áqāýid al-Áđudiyyah*, Jalāluddin Dawānī, Pg.65
2. See the Diaber Manuscript no.1200 of Sharḥ Jalaluddīn álā Áđud; the commentary is anonymous or by the various names found there in: Íşām, Muhīyuddin ibn al-Khaţīb, Ahmed Ĥaydar, Masúūd, Muĥammad Amīn, Jamāluddin and Mahmūd Ĥasan. The MS is signed 1094 AH. Page 119.
3. This is Dawwānī commenting on Sharīf’s objection. Notice that they are talking about Sharīf’s ‘objection’ not his statement. Ponder.
4. jawāz al-muĥāl, muĥāl.
E. The Musāyarah/Musāmarah Problem:

Another quote is fished out of Al-Musāyarah of Ibn Humām and its commentary by Ibn Abi’sh Sharīf. Thus cite the Deobandis475:

Kamal ibn Hummam in Musayarah: “The author of al-Umdah then said ‘Allah is not attributed with the Power of injustice, vulgarity or lying since the impossible (muḥāl) is not included in His Power i.e. their affiliation to it is not right, and according to the Mu’tazilah He is able to do all these but does not do so’. It appears he [the author of Umdah] (inadvertently) confused what the Mu’tazilah say, since there is no doubt that the detraction from Allah’s Power as he mentions is the madhhab of the Mu’tazilah;

and as for its affirmation (i.e. Power) for what was mentioned but its impossibility (imtina’) in connection with them out of choice (ikhtiyar) is the madhhab of the Ash’aris. And it is not hidden that this view also declares transcendence (tanzih) since there is no doubt that the impossibility of them (lying, vulgarity and injustice) is from the topic of Tanzihat which cannot be attributed to His Holiness"

InshāAllāh, a detailed analysis of this quote will be made separately later, but what I want to say here is that this is an ambiguous and a jumbled quote. One should not use it to claim that this was Ibn Humām’s own belief. Because, in many places both Ibn Humām and the commentator, his own student, Ibn Abi’sh Sharīf categorically state that kadhib is muḥāl and clarify their own position.

In the text, the two imāms say;476

{so much so that, many of them} that is prominent Ashāris {are perplexed in the ruling that falsehood is muḥāl for Allah ta’ala because it is a flaw.}

Notice that the emphasis is on ‘because’. In other words, they do not dispute that it is muḥāl; only perplexed, whether the evidence of ‘flaw’ is sufficient to answer all objections. Elsewhere the commentator says discussing the Divine Attributes:477

And falsehood is muḥāl for Allāh tāālā

In the same book, again:478

{yes} according to this facet [it is necessary to have belief in Allāh taala and] obligatory
{to venerate Him and to consider it impermissible to attribute him with ugly things} exalted is He – from things like, falsehood and vulgerness, indecency.

In the same book, again:479

We answer: there is no difference of opinion among Ashāris or others that anything that is counted as a flaw for creation, then, the Creator is [also] transcendent from that.

475 This is the Deobandi translation.
476 Al-Musāyarah and Al-Musāmarah, Pg.176: The Third Pillar. Text in bold and brown color and in square brackets is by Ibn Humām; plain blue is Ibn Abi’sh Sharīf.
477 Ibid. Pg.92: The Second Pillar: Knowledge of the Attributes of Allah
478 Ibid. Pg. 159: The Third Pillar.
479 Ibid. Pg. 178
He is free from it and it is impossible – muĥāl – for Allāh tāālā. And falsehood is an attribute of flaw/fault for creation.480

As if, this is not sufficient, both authors write clarifying their own position in the conclusion of the book:481

{It is absolutely impossible482 for Him} Sanctified is He {from all attributes483 of flaw like ignorance and falsehood;} rather it is also absolutely impossible for Him to have any attribute that has neither perfection nor flaw, because every attribute of the Lord Almighty Allāh is that of Perfection.

The falsists still insist that Ibn Humam admitted difference of opinion. Even after his own Asháří student has categorically stated that it is muĥāl.

F. The Principle Of Good Faith

Suppose there is no linguistic basis to claim that it refers to the Mutázilah argument in the commentator’s statement “we say...” One should have good faith about early úlamā and interpret their ambiguous and unclear passages to conform to that which they have clearly expressed. Sharīf Al-Jurjānī himself says exonerating Imām Al-Asháři484 from a position attributed to him.

This is what they have understood from the statements of the Shaykh; which necessitate a number of problems, like not doing takfir of a person who denies that it is Divine Speech between the two covers of a muş-ńfaf485.

Even though it is a fact, that knowing this, is a requirement and among the necessities of religion that, it is actually the Speech of Allāh tāālā. [and not doing takfir for one who] objects or challenges the actual Speech of Allāh tāālā; [and not doing takfir of one] who denies that the recited and the memorized is in reality the Speech of Allāh tāālā.

And other such things which are not concealed from an astute person who is aware of rulings of the religion.486 Therefore, it is necessary for us to vindicate the Shaykh by ascribing to him, that his intention was the second meaning, that is, kalām nafsī according to him included both words and meaning, and together, the pre-eternal attribute of Allāh tāālā, written in the muş-ńfas, recited by tongues, memorized and safeguarded in bosoms: however, that which was written, recited and memorized are accidents.487

480 Therefore, it is muĥāl for Allāh tāālā.
481 Ibid. Pg.326 Conclusion: The Belief of Ahlu’s Sunnah.
482 muĥāl
483 in a minor difference in texts, samāt and şifāt are used.
484 Sharḥ al-Mawāqif, Vol.8 Pg.117
485 muş-ńfa: copy of the Qur’ān.
486 This is clear indication that such things which are commonly known by intelligent and religious people and the standard Áqidah of Ahl as-Sunnah
487 that is, ink, paper, voice etc.
G. The Style of Kalām Books:

Books of kalām are full of such dialectical arguments. People should not use these quotes to justify opposition to established āqīdah. We should not abandon their well-articulated position in favor of ambiguous quotes. In Tārifāt, Al-Jurjānī describing the term ‘Al-Madh‘hab al-Kalāmi’:

The methodology of kalām: is to bring evidence similar to the manner of kalām scholars; to state the entailment and demonstrate the exclusion of that conclusion; or by disproving the proposition; or by introduction of a conjunction [with other conjunctions] and derive the conclusion.

An example is the saying of Allāh tāālā: if there were [many] gods other than [one]
Allāh, there would be chaos in [the heavens and the earth.] Here, we see that:

a) There is no chaos,
b) Therefore [the conclusion:] there are not many gods.

Similarly, the verse: and when [the star] waned, he said: I do not like those that wane means:

a) The star wanes
b) And my Lord Almighty does not wane;
c) Therefore, the star is not my Lord.

Notice, in the second example, Sayyidunā Ibrāhīm álayhi’s salām did not originally consider the star as his Lord when he said: 'This is my Lord.'

Books of kalām are full of such jawāb ilzāmi, accusative proofs; and one those who are not acquainted with their method are bound to stumble. We have seen Ījī and Jurjānī warn about this pitfall earlier. Scholars who came after them took a strong exception to this method and thus, in the commentary of his own Umm al-Barāhīn, Al-Sanūsī says:

Let the beginner be warned and be careful in his endeavor, that he does not take the fundamental articles of religion from those books, which are full of philosophical arguments; in which the respective authors have taken a fancy to narrate the capricious quotes of philosophers. Some of such quotes are outright disbelief; they veil this filth [of kufr] in their āqīdah by burying it in numerous terms and arcane descriptions, which are mere names without any substance. Such are found, for example, in books of Fakhr al-Rāzī in [the science of] kalām, Tawāliy of Al-Baydāwī and those who followed them in their methodology.

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488 At-Tārifāt, Pg.220
489 Sūrah Al-Anbiyā‘a, Verse.22
490 Sūrah Al-Anā‘ām, Verse.76
491 Ibid.
492 Sharḥ al-Sughrā with Al-Dasūqī’s marginalia, Pg.107
493 hawashim
494 the philosophers, that is.
495 Al-Dasūqī in his supercommentary says: “...books, in which such statements of philosophers are mentioned.”
Those who fancy the arguments of philosophers will rarely succeed; or be blessed with the light of faith shining in their hearts and tongues.

How can one prosper while befriending those who are enemies of Allāh and His Messenger? 

How can one be successful by tearing up the veil of Divine Respect and throwing the sharīʿah behind him and saying things about our Lord Almighty Allāh – Exalted is He – and things about His Messengers [peace and blessings upon all of them] whatever pleases his own nafs, the ego of idiots and morons...

Imām Sanūsī clearly dismisses any such ideas – whether by mistake or by misunderstanding – that do not conform to established āqidah of Ahl as-Sunnah. Particularly those found in books of kalām, which cannot be used to justify a false and corrupt āqidah. Al-Dasuqi in his commentary indicates that such misunderstanding can occur for those who do not understand the style of these books or lack the proper context. Hunting for quotes in kalām books to justify a putrid āqidah is not the character of a Muslim.

H. Texts from the Ḥadīth and the Qurʾān that outwardly contradict established Sunni Āqīdah:

There are parts in the Ḥadīth of the Prophet ṣallAllāhu álayhi wa sallam and the Qurʾān which can cause one to go astray if not understood properly, or taken literally. The very mischief of anthropomorphists and other deviant groups is because of literal interpretations of the Qurʾān and Sunnah.

So what does one do when they find such a problematic quote? Do they base their āqidah on this or do they do ta’wil to find a resolution and explain the quote? And this is the Qurʾān and the Sunnah! Any denial could place one in a very difficult predicament. Yet, the ruling concerning such abstruse verses is that we must try to adapt them according to the well-established creed of Ahlu’s Sunnah. Imām Rāzī commenting on apparently problematic verses and hadith says:

...and if we cannot reconcile statements we must submit to Allāh’s knowledge about such things [and keep silent.] This is the general principle concerning all such abstruse verses. Guidance is with Allāh.

If this be the case with Qurʾān and Sunnah, then why should we take Al-Jurjānī’s quote literally and adamantly insist that this is a valid āqidah? So what, if he really said it? One does not become a kafir by rejecting a quote in a book of kalām, which openly contradicts the āqidah of Ahl as-Sunnah. The safest way for a Muslim is to follow the āqidah of the ijmā‘, and indeed among which is the opinion of Sharīf al-Jurjānī himself as it is clear from his own books.

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496 Al-Dasuqi commenting on Imām Sanūsī’s text above: [Fakhr ar-Rāzī and Al-Baydāwī...] that is, those who followed them like Al-Armawī, Ḥāmīmah Saād, Adududdin and Ibn Arafah. Burhānuddin Al-Laqqānī said in Ḥidāyatu'l Murīd that the discussions of the earlier ulama was restricted to Essence [dhāt], Attributes [şifāt], Prophethood [nubuwāt] and Revealed Evidence [samýiyyāt]. Various groups of heretics then began debating ulamā of Islam increasingly, and planted doubts and objections on what the earlier ulamā had said; they mixed up these objections with philosophical terms and concepts to conceal their heresies. When such things came up, the latter ulamā like Fakhruddīn Al-Rāzī (and those mentioned along with him earlier) were compelled to include these terms and objections, so as to repel these ideas and refute them. And thus [Sunnis] prevail over them by refuting their heresies using their own terms and the fallacies in their objections and assertions.

It is obvious that these ulamā should be excused for including these concepts in their books and there is no blame on them for doing so; and they are not to be admonished for this. However, the warning of scholars who came after them is for the faltering ones who do not properly understand these arguments.

497 Asās al-Taqdīs, Imām Rāzī. Pg.126 Chapter 32: Concerning the rational proofs contradicting literal meaning of evidence by revelation.

498 that is, if we cannot do ta’wil of such verses and hadith

499 Let the deviants not point out that I accept Jurjānī said so; we don’t accept that Jurjānī said this nor believed in this himself.
I. The Value of Evidence and the Ḥatibu’l Layl: 

How many more principles will the Falsists sacrifice to save their blundering mullahs? Truly, this is a shameful example of blind following. These two proofs provided in their claim, that it is an Ashārī belief are by Māturīdī authors. One may ask, ‘why is it surprising?’ The answer lies in going back to their reasoning process:

1. Deobandis claimed that falsehood is 

2. When challenged, they said, it is a sub-division of khulf.

3. And that some Ashārīs held that khulf is possible.

4. The Māturīdīs protested that khulf would necessitate falsehood.

5. Therefore, some Ashārīs held that falsehood is possible.

6. And to prove 5 above they present evidence from Māturīdī authors.

Whereas in reality, Ashārī scholars rejected this accusation and gave their evidence on how it does not necessitate falsehood. Using the evidence of Māturīdī scholars to implicate Ashārīs in a matter, which there is an accusation-defence, and claiming that it is an Ashārī position, is a travesty of examining evidence. Perhaps all these scholars and their blind followers should read basic books of reasoning. Indeed, we have presented evidence from many scholars in our paper to refute the claim that there is ‘a difference of opinion’.

Allāh táālā knows best.

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500 fetching wood in the night: doesn’t know what he has picked – firewood or serpents.
## Appendix D
## TRANSLITERATION TABLE

<table>
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<th>Arabic Letter</th>
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<th>Arabic Example</th>
<th>Transliteration</th>
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Appendix E

BIBLIOGRAPHY

A. Qurān al-Karīm

B. Tafsīr

1. Mafātīh al-Ghayb also known as Tafsīr al-Kabīr, Imām Fakhruddīn Muḥammad ibn Īmār ar-Rāzī (d. 606AH)
2. Anwār‘ut Tanzīl wa Asrār at-Tawīl, Abū Sa‘īd Abūl-Lughāt ibn Muḥammad al-Shirāzī Al-Bayḍāwī (d. 685 AH)
3. Tafsīr Avzī, Shāh Ābd al-Āzīz Dihlawī
4. Irshād al-Āqīl al-Salīm ilā Mazāyā al-Kitatb al-Karīm, Abū’s Sūūd al-Īmādī (d.951 AH)
5. Madārikū’t Tanzīl wa Ḥaqāqiyiq al-Ta’wil also known as Tafsīr an-Nasāfī, Imām Nasāfī (710 AH)
6. Rūḥ al-Bayūn, Ismā’il Ḥaqqī al-Bursāwī (d.1127 AH)

C. Ḥadīth and Commentaries

7. Ṣaḥīḥ Bukhārī, Abū Abdullāh Muḥammad ibn Ismā’il al-Bukhārī (194 – 256 AH)
8. Sahīḥ Muslim, Imām Abū al-Ḥusayn Muslim ibn al-Ĥajjāj al-Qushayrī (204 – 261 AH)
9. Jāmi‘ Tirmidhī, Imām Abū Yūsūf Muḥammad ibn Yūsūf al-Tirmidhī (d.279 AH)
10. Sunan Abū Dāwūd, Abū Dawsūd Sulaymān ibn al-Ĥashāth al-Sajistānī (202-275 AH)
12. Musnad Imām Aĥmed ibn Ħanbal, Imām Aĥmed ibn Ħanbal (d.241 AH)
13. Ikmāl al-Múlim, Abū Fađl Qāđī İyāđ ibn Mūsā al-Yaĥsubī al-Mālikī (d.544 AH)
15. Mirqāt al-Mafātīh Sharḥ Mishkāt al-Maşābīĥ, Allāmah Allī ibn Šalṭān al-Qārī (d.1014 AH)

D. Áqāýid and Kalām

16. Minākh ar-Rawḍ al-Az'ĥar Sharḥ Fiqh al-Akbar, Ālī al-Qārī (d. 1014 AH)
17. Al-Irshād, Imām al-Ĥaramayn Ābd al-Malik al-Juwaynī (419-478 AH)
18. Al-Inşāf, Qāđī Abū Bakr al-Baqillānī (d.403 AH)
19. Al-Mawāqif, Imām Ađududdīn Ābd ar-Raĥmānal al-Ījī (d.756 AH)
20. Sharḥ Al-Mawāqif, Sayyīd Sharīf Ālī al-Jurjānī (d.816 AH)
21. Sharḥ Al-Mawāqif, Sawayid Sharīf Ālī al-Jurjānī (d.816 AH)
22. Hāshiyah Sharḥ Al-Mawāqif, Abdu’l-Ĥakīm Siyālī (died after 1275 AH)
23. Hāshiyah Sharḥ Al-Mawāqif, Ḥasan Chalpī Muĥammad Shāh al-Fannārī
25. Sharḥ al-Muqaddimāt, Imām Muḥammad ibn Yūsuf al-Sanūsī (832-895AH)
26. Al-Mawāhib ar-Rabbāniyyah fī Sharḥ Muqaddimāt al-Sanūsīyah, Abū Is’ĥāq İbrāhīm al-Bannānī
27. Al-Milal wa’n Niĥal, Abū Mańṣūr Ābd al-Qāhir al-Baghdādī (d.429AH)
28. Al-Milal wa’n Niĥal, Muḥammad ibn Abū al-Karīm Al-Shahristsānī (479 – 538 AH)
29. Al-Musāyarah Sharḥ al-Musāyarah, Kamāluddīn Muḥammad ibn Abi’sh Sharīf (d.906 AH)
30. Al-Nibrās, Ābd al-Āzīz al-Farhārī
31. Al-Nukat al-Mufidah Sharḥ Khuţbatu’l Āqīdah, Ābdullāh Al-Qayrawānī (310-386 AH) / Muḥammad ibn Salāmah al-Anṣārī İbn al-Tūnisī (746)
34. Al-Qawl al-Sadid fi Khulaf al-Wayid, Ali al-Qari (d.1014 AH)
35. Al-Tabsir fi'Din wa Tamiz al-Firqati'n Nijiyati' an al-Firaq al-Halikin, Imam Abul Muzaflar al-Isfarayini (d.471 AH)
36. Ajdah al-Wusata, Imam Muhammed ibn Yusuf al-Sanusi (832-895AH)
37. Sharh Al-Wusata, Imam Muhammed ibn Yusuf al-Sanusi (832-895AH)
38. Umdatu Ahl at-Tawfiq wa't-Tasadid Sharh Ajdah, Imam Ali Qari (d.1014 AH)
40. Hashiyah Ilaysh alya Sharh al-Kabr, Imam Muhammad Ilaysh al-Maliki (d.1299 AH)
41. Qasidah Badiy Alami, Ali al-Ushai (d.569 AH)
42. Jaw al-Malii Sharh Badiy al-Malii, Imam Ali Qari (d.1014 AH)
43. Damam an Bagh e Subhcan as-Subhuk, Imam Ahmed Rida al-Barelwi (1272-1340AH/1856-1920 CE)
44. Al-Farq Bayn al-Firaq, Imam Muhammad ibn Yusef al-Sanusi (832-895AH)
45. Idratahul Jannah, Imam Muhammad Ilaysh al-Maliki (d.1299 AH)
48. Sharh Jawharah al-Tawhid, Imam Muhammad ibn Yusef al-Sanusi (832-895AH)
49. Tuqafatu'l Murid, Imam Ahmed Ridai al-Barelwi (1272-1340AH/1856-1920 CE)
51. Usul al-Din, Imam Abu'l-Hasan aI-Ishari (d.330 AH)
54. Subhan an Kadhibi d'Adun, Imam Ahmed Ridai al-Barelwi (d.685 AH)
55. Subhan an Kadhibi d'Adun, Imam Ahmed Ridai al-Barelwi (d.685 AH)
59. Usul al-Din, Imam Abu'l-Hasan al-Ishari (d.330 AH)
60. Asas al-Taqdis, Imam Abu'l-Hasan al-Ishari (d.330 AH)
61. Talkhish al-Muhasal, Nasir Tusi
62. Muhasal Afkar al-Mutaakhkhrin wa'l-Mutaakhlkin, Imam Razi
63. Ijtiyadat Firaq al-Muslin wa'l-Mushrikin, Imam Razi
64. Usul al-Din, Imam Abu'l-Hasan al-Ishari (d.330 AH)
E. Fiqh and Usūl al-Fiqh
74. Al-Durr al-Thamīn Sharḥ Murshid al-Muýīn, Muĥammad ibn Āḥmed known as Mayārah (d. 1072 AH)
75. Murshid al-Muýīn ála’d Darā’ī min Ūlūmi’d Dīn, Īmām Abū Muĥammad Ābīd al-Wāfīd ibn Āăshir al-Fāsī (d.1040 AH)
76. Musāllām al-Thubāt, Muĥūbbullāh al-Bihārī (d.1119 AH)
77. Fawātiĥ ar-Raĥmūt Sharḥ Musāllām al-Thubāt, Ābd al-Ălī Muĥammad ibn Niţamuddān Sihālī (d.1225 AH)
78. Radd al-Muňţār, Īmām Ībn Āābidīn Shāmī (1198-1252 AH)
79. Al-Wajīz fi Usūl al-Fiqh, Dr. Wahbah Al-Zuňaylī

F. Lexicons
80. Tāj al-Ărūs, Īmām Muţtadā al-Zabīdī (1145-1205 AH/ 1732-1790 CE)
81. At-Tārīfāt, Sharīf Ālī Al-Jurjānī (d.816 AH)

G. Poetry
82. Ħadāyiq e Bakshish, Alaĥazrat Īmām Aĥmed Riďā al-Baraylawī (1272-1340AH/1856-1920 CE)

H. Taşawwuf
83. Iĥyā’a Ūlūm al-Dīn, Īmām Muĥammad Ghazālī (d.505 AH)
84. It’ĥaf al-Sādah al-Muttaqīn, Īmām Muţtadā al-Zabīdī (1145-1205 AH/ 1732-1790 CE)
85. Miftāĥ al-Falāh wa Mişbāh al-Arwāh fi Dhikrillāhi’l Karīm al-Fattāh, Īmām Ībn Āţāyillāh as-Sakandarī (d.709 AH)
86. Qūt al-Qulūb, Abu Ţālib al-Makī (d.386 AH)
87. Al-Asnā fi Sharḥi Asmā’a Allāh al-îtusnā, Īmām Muĥammad ibn Yusuf al-Sanūsī (832-895AH)

I. Others
88. Al-Iýlām bi Ḫudūd al-Islām, Qāđī lyād (d.544 AH)
89. Al-Iýlām li Qawāţiý al-Islām, Īmām Ībn Ĥajar al-Haytamī (909-974 AH)
90. Lawāmiý al-Bayyināt Sharḥ Asmā’a Allāh wa’s Şifāt, Īmām Fakhruddīn Rāzī (d.606 AH)
91. Asbrāţ as-Sāăh, Muĥammad ibn Ābd ar-Rasul al-Barzanjī (1040 – 1177 AH)
92. Barāhīn e Qaţāţāh, Khalīl Āĥmed Sahāranpūrī
93. Ek-Rozah, Ismaýīl Dihlawī
94. Fayslah Haft-Mas’alah, Īţajī Imdādüllāh Muhājīr Makkī
95. Juhd al-Muqil, Maĥmūd al-Ĥasan Devbandī
96. Kanz al-Fawāyid, Cf Šub’hān as-Subbāh.
97. www. wikipedia.org
Appendix F

ANOTHER DECEPTION

Posted Today, 12:49 PM

Assalamu alaykum,

In *al-Mawqif fi 'ilm al-Kalam* by al-J, he discusses the reasons why both the Mu'tazilites and Ash'arites believe in the impossibility of falsehood for Allah. He concludes, since the debate with the Mu'tazilites is only about the uttered-speech, the first two arguments (below) are inapplicable and it is the third, the Prophet’s own confirmation of it, that we must rely on. The book, without al-Junani’s commentary, is available here.

"Lying for Him is impossible by agreement (of the Ash’aris and the Mu’tazilites). For the Mu’tazilites this is for two reasons. First, it is ugly and He does not do something ugly. This is based on their principle of affirming the judgement of the intellect (in establishing good and bad). Second, it is not something beneficial to the creation, and Allah must do what is optimum [aslah]. We respond this is not necessary.

"As for us, lying is impossible for three reasons:

"First, it is a defect [naqq] and defects are impossible for Allah. Furthermore it would mean we are sometimes more perfect than Him. Know that to me there is no difference between a rational defect in Divine Acts [as the uttered-speech is a Divine Act as opposed to the self-speech] and rational ugliness since defects in acts is the very same thing as rationally ugly. This is only a difference in terminology [so this argument is rejected as a Mu’tazilite one when it comes to the uttered-speech].

"Second, if He is attributed with falsehood, His falsehood would be pre- eternal since a temporal entity does not subsist in His Essence. So it necessitates the impossibility of truth for Him because that which the pre-eternity of which is established its non-existence is impossible. This concomitant is absurd because we know it is possible for one who knows something to narrate it truthfully. This only proves the self-speech is true but not the uttered-speech.

"Third, and we rely on this, the report of the Prophet, and that is known by certainty to be from the religion. If it is said the truth of the Prophet is only proven by Allah confirming him so it is impossible for Him to lie since circularity will result. We say, his confirmation is by miracle [and not necessarily Allah’s speech]."

The last point refutes the argument that this is circular as the Prophet’s own validation is through his miracles so his confirmation of the words of revelation, i.e. the uttered-speech, affirm their truthfulness according to al-J.

Thus, al-J denies the “rational impossibility” of falsehood in the uttered-speech, but affirms its contingent impossibility.

This post has been edited by summusmuslim: Today, 12:56 PM
Appendix G

EXONERATION OF SHAYKH BUTI

Faithless people, claiming that Shaykh Buti also believed in their heresy, were circulating a statement. When this was brought to his notice, he disavowed such an attribution vehemently and in such words:

Question: A statement has been ascribed to your kind self that you have said that falsehood is not intrinsically impossible for Allāh tāālā and is included in His Divine Power. However, He has made it necessary upon Himself to not utter a lie. This statement has been translated in English and is available on a website. We wish to ascertain the authenticity of this attribution to your kind self.

Reply by: Dr. Mūhammad Sayīd Ramadān Al-Būṭī

Nobody can even think of asking such a question; and I believe no one has ever brought such a contemptible and base question to my notice. [and may no one ask me in the future].

None is ignorant of the fact that falsehood is a despicable attribute; And none who believes in Allāh tāālā should be ignorant of [the principle] that the Attributes of Allāh tāālā are those of perfection and that He is transcendent from every attribute of flaw. His Divine Power shall not be attributed with a vain thing. This, apart from the fact that His Power is concerned only with contingent things [mumkinat] and not impossible things [mustahilat].

May Allāh tāālā reward Shaykh Buti for clearing this confusion; and give him health and strength to continue serving this ummah.
AFTERWORD

When I began writing this, I did not expect the article to be this long. Initially, I thought of writing a few pages with kalām terms and quotes from ālāmā on the issue, for the benefit of some brothers who had asked – but the scope kept expanding. Alḥamdulillāh, for making this easy for us.

I started writing on the 18th of March 2010 [2nd of Rabiý al-Thānî 1431AH] and finished a draft by mid May. Thereafter, I kept revising and adding more sections and appendices until finally, the first version of the document was released Alḥamdulillāh, on the 5th of June 2010 [22nd Jumādā al-Ākhirah, 1431 AH].

Many typographical errors and grammatical mistakes have been corrected in this second version. Even though the actual process of revision took only about 15-20 hours, it spanned over a few weeks until it was finally completed on the 8th of October, 2010 [29th Shawwāl, 1431 AH] wa lillāhi'l ĥamd.

Thanks are due to brothers who consented to review the document and enriched it with valuable suggestions and feedback. May Allāh táālā reward them for their help.

O Allāh, guide us and keep us on the straight path. We seek your refuge from an ugly end and an evil state – in both our beliefs and deeds. We ask Thee, O Allāh to grant us a beautiful end and a beautiful hereafter.

Only Allāh táālā gives guidance.