


This article was downloaded by: [Universitat Politècnica de València]

On: 27 October 2014, At: 22:43

Publisher: Routledge

Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK



Strategic Analysis

Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:

<http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rsan20>

Sects Within Sect: The Case of Deobandi-Barelvi Encounter in Pakistan

Ashok K. Behuria ^a

^a IDSA ,

Published online: 27 Feb 2008.

To cite this article: Ashok K. Behuria (2008) Sects Within Sect: The Case of Deobandi-Barelvi Encounter in Pakistan, *Strategic Analysis*, 32:1, 57-80, DOI: [10.1080/09700160801886330](https://doi.org/10.1080/09700160801886330)

To link to this article: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09700160801886330>

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the "Content") contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at <http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions>

Sects Within Sect: The Case of Deobandi–Barelvi Encounter in Pakistan

Ashok K. Behuria

Abstract

The Sunni Muslims of South Asia are divided into two major sub-sects, i.e. Deobandi and Barelvi, named after their places of origin in India in the 19th century. Because of abiding differences between them, these two sub-sects have built up walls of hatred and mistrust between them over time. The faultline between them has erupted violently in Pakistan since the late 1970s. While there are some pioneering works available on their separate worldviews, no study has yet been attempted to critically analyse the nature of their interaction at the political level. This article discusses the pattern of interaction between the sub-sects since the colonial days, during the movement for Partition, and later in Pakistani politics.

Pakistan is an Islamic state. As per the last census in 1998, Muslims constitute 96.28 per cent of its population.¹ Such an overwhelming majority would, on the face of it, lead to an abiding sense of cohesion among the people, ensuring ‘*asabiya*’ (social solidarity) that the well-known Muslim sociologist Ibn Khaldun² (1132–1406) emphasised as the hallmark of a state. But the fact remains that Muslims of Pakistan, as Muslims elsewhere, are divided along sectarian lines. By some estimates, as per broad sectarian divisions, there are 77 per cent Sunnis and 20 per cent Shias in Pakistan.³ This gives Sunnis an impressive lead in Pakistan and would imply a majoritarian Sunni plank for the Islamic state of Pakistan. However, the Sunni sect again subdivides into sub-sects (which are regarded as independent sects by some analysts) reducing the ability of the Sunnis to evolve a consensus on the nature of Islamic state that each of them would seek to impose on the State of Pakistan. Some estimates suggest that there are 50 per cent *Barelvis*, 20 per cent *Deobandis* and 4 per cent *Ahl-e-Hadith* within the Sunni fold.⁴ These intra-sectarian differences within the Sunni fold effectively pluralise

the dominant Islamic discourse in Pakistan and reduce the impact of Islam on the statecraft.

In the aftermath of the Afghan jihad, an even more divisive strain of 'militantism'⁵ has entered the sectarian world of religion and politics in Pakistan. 'Militantism' or the temptation to use violence to weaken the competing ideology is a virus that has gripped society. While the dominant form of interaction among different schools of thought of Islam was through '*munazara*' (debate) and '*radd*' (disavowal through argumentation) in the subcontinent, this dangerous trait of violence has threatened to stifle the spirit of enquiry and independent approaches to Islam. At the political level, this has the capacity to assume disastrous proportions and may spell havoc for the Pakistan State unless the state recognises the trend early and repositions itself vis-a-vis the sectarian monster that it has itself inadvertently created like Frankenstein. The suicide attack on a congregation⁶ celebrating *Milad-un-Nabi* (birthday of the Prophet) at Nishtar Park on April 11, 2006, demonstrated the extent of damage that such radicalisation can cause to the state and society of Pakistan.

This article explores the encounter between the Deobandis and the Barelvis in Pakistan and traces the evolution of the militancy within their folds. It goes on to analyse the impact of such radical confrontation on the state and society of Pakistan and the Muslim societies in the neighbouring states. The article seeks to argue that even if the leaders of the two groups might have come together at the political level, the seeds of distrust continue to divide them at the ground level. Thus the intra-sectarian faultline is likely to widen further and add to the internal security problems of the Pakistan State in the days to come.

The Two Sunni Schools: Deobandi and Barelvi

It is useful to study the evolution of these two separate schools of thought within the Sunni sect and trace the commonalities as well as differences between them. The two schools—Deobandi and Barelvi, named after their places of their origin—do not signify the rise of any fresh, unique and innovative strands within Islam. They were in fact names given to already-existing trends in Islam at the turn of 18th century in India. Both these schools were influenced by the reformist school of thinking that emerged out of the concern for the future of the *Dehlavi ulema* (scholars in Islam from Delhi) as well as Islam in India in the face of declining power of the

Mughals. The foremost among them was Shah Waliullah (1702–1763) of Delhi, who, through his Madrassa-i-Rahimiyya, sought to revive Islamic learning and reform Islam by purging it of its eclectic influences (*bid'a* or innovations). A contemporary of Abdul Wahab (1703–1792) of Arabia, Waliullah shared the former's concern for extraneous accretions (*bid'a*) into Islam but, unlike him, he was uncritical of the mystical order of the *sufis*.

In fact, he had claimed that he was instructed by the Prophet to take upon himself the task of uniting the different *fiqhs* (schools of jurisprudence by leading Islamic jurists), i.e. Hanafi, Maliki, Shafei and Hanbali. He emphasised the need of all Muslims to access the knowledge contained in the Quran and held that it was the responsibility of the learned to interpret the Quran without the assistance of the different schools of jurisprudence. He had to face tough criticism for his efforts at translating the Quran into Persian.

He also argued that the road to *ijtihad* (independent interpretation of Islam) was not closed, and one could interpret the Quran in light of *hadith* (traditions relating to the words and deeds of the Prophet Muhammad) rather than solely bank on the opinion of the Islamic jurists (*fiqhs*). However, at the same time, he urged Muslims of India to follow Hanafi School because a divine revelation had instructed him so. It needs brief mention here that Waliullah believed strongly in a powerful Islamic state and deplored the decline and disintegration of the Mughal rule, which he attributed to the lackadaisical attitude of the later rulers towards Islam. He, in fact, went to the extent of inviting the then Afghan ruler Ahmad Shah Abdali to invade Delhi and re-establish the rule of Islam in India.⁷

Waliullah's tradition was continued by his three children, his grandchildren,⁸ and his or their disciples. The inherent contradictions in Waliullah's philosophy in due course of time matured into four separate schools of thought in Islam in India – the Deobandi, the Ahl-e-Hadith, the Tablighi and the Barelvi. Each of these schools drew upon the Waliullah tradition and borrowed from its strands according to its needs. In the subsequent days, all these schools have sought to re-adapt themselves to the changing times and demonstrated an inclination to swing between one extreme and another.

There was another parallel stream of Islamic learning, if not reform, flowing at the same time from the Siharvi family based in Sihala (Uttar Pradesh or UP, India), which later shifted to Lucknow upon the murder

of Maulana Qutubudin Sahid Sihalvi during the reign of Aurangzeb in the late 17th century AD. Qutubudin Sahid's son, Maulvi Nizamuddin Muhammad Sihalvi, was the founder of the famous Firangi Mahal madrassa in Lucknow.⁹ He is also credited with the development of the Nizamia Education System, modelled after the 11th century state-sponsored madrassa curriculum in Baghdad. This curriculum—known in the Indian subcontinent as *Dars-i-Nizami*—is being followed by almost all madrassas of different sectarian persuasions with revisions over time. The reformist/revivalist stream flowing from the Waliullah legacy had to run into this stream of Islamic learning one day or the other, as is seen later.

Dar-ul-Ulum, Deoband

The decline of the Mughal Empire since early 18th century and the subsequent rise of British power in India were regarded by Islamic scholars of the time as indications of the final loss of power of the Muslims. In fact, the defeat of the 1857 uprising by both Muslims and Hindus to resurrect Mughal rule left the *ulema* bewildered and dejected. They attributed the eventual decline of Muslim rule to a moral crisis visiting the Muslims of the subcontinent. It was thus felt that there was an urgent need to reform and revive the Islamic faith, and the only way out in front of the religious scholars was to teach a version of Islam that they thought was unsullied and pure. The reassertion of Muslim orthodoxy assumed different shapes for different schools. If it was intensely reactive, vis-a-vis the western culture on the one hand, it was also imitative as far as adopting the instrumentalities of the western culture was concerned, on the other. There were modernists also who shared the concerns of their fellow Muslim clerics but sought power and influence through secular means of administration introduced by the colonialists.¹⁰ Their approach to Islam was academic and scholastic, and they tried their best to reinterpret Islam according to the need of the times. There was, indeed, a modernist, pragmatic response from Sir Syed Ahmad Khan (1817–1898), who went on to establish the Aligarh University, but the *ulema* dismissed such a prescription as un-Islamic and even called Sir Syed a *kafir* (infidel or non-believer).

In 1866, the setting up of the Islamic madrassa at Deoband, a small town in the present-day Uttar Pradesh, India, signalled the confluence of the two streams of reformism (Shah Waliullah tradition) and Islamic learning (the Firangi Mahal Tradition). Maulana Qasim Nanautwi (1832–1879) and Maulana Rasheed Ahmad Gangohi (1829–1908) were the founders of

the madrassa. Both were disciples of Imdadullah Muhajir Makki (1817–1899), who was a great Muslim saint of the Chishti Order in 19th century India and had the reputation of leading the ulema during the 1857 War of Independence. The failure of the 1857 rising forced the ulema to come to the conclusion that, rather than taking up the sword against the British, it was more important to take steps to protect the Islamic faith. Out of this concern, the madrassa came up at Deoband—Dar-ul-Ulum Deoband¹¹—in May 1866. As a pall-bearer of the Waliullah tradition, the Deobandi madrassa laid emphasis on *Sha'ria* (Islamic law based on *Quran*, *Sunnah* and *Hadith*) as well as *Tariqa* ('path', born out of religious experience or *Tassawwuf*). In as much as it accommodated Sufism, it sought to purify Islamic mysticism and rescue it from all influences from other local faiths and cultures.

*The Barelvis*¹²

Imam Ahmed Raza Khan (1856–1921) of Bareilly (also in UP) countered the approach adopted by the Deobandis. He repudiated the stance of the Deobandi ulema that visiting of shrines or graves of religious saints was *bi'da* and held that the practices by the *pirs* (holy men) and *sufi* (a mystical order) saints were well in line with Islamic principles. A venerable *alim* himself, he stood by the sufi tradition of intercession between man and God and found nothing objectionable in the play of music (*qawali*) for invoking religious experience. He also emphasised the infallibility of Prophet Muhammad unlike the Deobandis. Deobandis would regard Prophet Muhammad as *Insaan-i-Kamil* (or a perfect human being), but followers of Raza Khan would regard Muhammad as a superhuman entity, always *hazir* (present) and even if he is not in flesh and blood, he is all-pervasive as *noor* (light). Ahmad Raza Khan's approach was closer to the tolerant, subcontinental approach to Islam and was received well among the lay and the uninitiated common folk. The entire Barelvi tradition was built up on the scholarly works of Ahmad Raza Khan. The first madrassa of the Barelvis came up in 1905, which was known as *Jamait-i-Manzir-i-Islam*.

Each of the two schools sought to spread its version of pure Islam through a proliferation of madrassas, which taught, through the works of their advocates, two separate worldviews. There were many commonalities between them, yet they differed from each other in practice. The two siblings of the Waliullah tradition have fought a battle of one-upmanship

ever since, and in Pakistan today, these two streams are increasingly seeking recourse to violence to prevail over each other.

Approach to Politics During the Colonial Period

It would be useful to see how the above-mentioned theological or philosophical traditions/principles translated into political practices during the colonial period (see Table 1). The Deobandis captured the political space early, by opposing the colonial penetration in West Asia, regarded as the cradle of Islam. *Anjuman-i-Khuddam-i-Kaaba*, which spearheaded the movement against British manipulation of political power in the region, was founded in 1913. With the signs of the British power disregarding the Ottoman Caliphate during the war, the Muslims of India expressed their anxiety over the issue and very soon an alliance between the ulema and the Indian National Congress materialised to launch the famous Khilafat Movement. The response of the All India Muslim League (AIML)—the political group founded in 1906 that sought to safeguard the interests of the Muslim community—was rather lukewarm to the Khilafat movement during this time.

In 1919, the first-ever ulema-led political group took shape in the form of *Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Hind* (JUH). The JUH displayed a reflexive anti-colonial bias, which made its tie-up with the Congress Party easier, which was, till then, being viewed by the Muslim elite in India as a Hindu-dominated political movement. In fact, when the Deobandi ulema were tying up with the Congress, the Muslims of Bareilly persuasion advocated that such an alliance with Hindus was unnecessary, unprofitable and un-Islamic. As the Deoband establishment chose to side with the Congress, in spite of the steady build-up of the separatist movement in favour of Pakistan, there was a steady migration of pro-separation ulema out of JUH into the movement for Pakistan subsequently. Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, when the Muslim League hardened its stance in favour of separate electorates and a separate state for the Muslims of British India, the JUH was increasingly viewed by a substantial section of the Muslim elite, especially in the Muslim minority provinces, as a political grouping acting against the interests of the community. The elections of 1937, in which the League lost out to the Congress party, came as a stark reminder to the AIML leadership that the League lacked mass support. It was then that the League pooled the support of the forces opposed to the Deobandis, who had aligned themselves with the Indian National Congress.

Table 1 Deobandi–Barelvi Approaches During Colonial Period

	Deobandi	Barelvi
Concerns	Common concerns about decline of Muslim rule, need to revive Islam	
Madrassas	The madrasa founded in May 1866 by Maulana Qasim Nanautwi (1832–1879) and Maulana Rasheed Ahmad Gangohi (1829–1908)	Founded by Imam Ahmed Raza Khan (1856–1921) of Bareilly, first madrasa came up in 1905
Shirk	Favoured some sufi orders No to innovations Against <i>shirk parasti</i> Visit of graves, participation of <i>Urs</i> Against the idea of intercession by dead or alive saints	Favoured <i>Bida'at</i> (innovations) Visits to graves and <i>Urs</i> not un-Islamic In favour of intercession by <i>pirs</i> and saints
Colonialism	Virulently anti-colonial	Neutral
Khilafat	In the interest of Islam, there was a need to join hands with Congress	Any alliance with Hindus is counter-productive and against Islam
Political Participation	<i>Necessary</i> Deobandis formed Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Hind (1919)	Barelvis formed Jamiaat-i-Aliyah al-Markaziah (All India Sunni Conference) in 1925
Pakistan Movement	<i>Counter-productive for Islam</i> Kept away from Pakistan movement <i>A breakaway group headed by S.A. Usmani supports Pakistan</i>	<i>Enthusiastic about Pakistan</i> Took a blind plunge

The first rival ulema body that sought to counter the influence of the Deobandis at the political level was formed by the Barelvis in Kanpur in the year 1921. This was named *Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Kanpur*, which advocated contact with the AIML. One of the most vocal dissidents among the Deobandi scholars, Maulana Ali Ahmad Thanwi (1863–1943), widely known

as *Hakim al-Ummat* (sage of the Muslim community), was the first to resign from the rectorship of Dar-ul-Ulum Deoband and came out openly in support of the AIML. The next to defect was Maulana Shabbir Ahmad Usmani (1885–1949). He engaged the ulema over the issue of whether it was in the interest of the Muslims to join the AIML or not. In the aftermath of passing of the Pakistan Resolution in 1940, Usmani organised a four-day conference on October 26, 1945, in Calcutta, and echoed Jinnah's position that the 100 million Muslims of South Asia were a separate nation. This conference led to the birth of a pro-Pakistan outfit by the ulema, which was known as the *All India Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Islam* (AIJUI) or All India Assembly of Islamic Clergy,¹³ with Usmani as its elected president. It was also around this time that the chief Mufti of Deoband, Maulana Muhammad Shafi (1897–1976), ruled that the demand of the AIML for the separate State of Pakistan for the Muslims was the only Islamic course open at that point of time. It was natural for him to migrate to Pakistan later in 1949. The *naib* (deputy) Mufti Ahmad Ali (who later added *Lahori* to his name, upon his migration and settlement in Lahore after Partition) also supported the 1940 Lahore resolution.

All this was happening when the leading Deobandi scholar Maulana Hussain Ahmad Madani (1874–1957) was advocating cooperation with Congress. In fact, Madani had coined the term *Muttahida Quamiyat* (composite nationalism) based on territorial nationalism rather than religious nationalism to support his stance. In a desperate bid to demonstrate unity in Deobandi ranks, a JUH delegation led by Maulana Madani approached Maulana Usmani immediately after the Calcutta conference on December 1, 1945. But Maulana Usmani and Maulana Zafar Ahmad Thanwi, who played a major role in the campaign for Pakistan in Sylhet, refused to yield and joined the election campaign of the League with increased enthusiasm and devotion.

While Deobandis were divided over the issue of a separate state for the Muslims, the Barelvīs were wedded to the cause of Pakistan right from the start. The Barelvī ulema gathered in Muradabad during March 16–19, 1925, and formed *Jamiaat-i-Aliyah al-Markaziah* or All India Sunni Conference (AISC). It opened its membership only to Sunni orthodox Muslims and decided to work towards uniting all Sunnis in India. Pir Jamaat Ali Shah was its first president and Maulana Naimuddin Muradabadi was elected as its first *Nizam-i-Ala* (the chief leader). AISC started holding annual meetings in different parts of India and started running down the Deobandi JUH.

The presidentship went to Maulana Hamid Riza Khan and came back to Pir Jamaat Ali Shah again in 1935. In its Badayun annual meet, the AISC expressed its concern at the way Ibn Saud (1880–1953) of Saudi Arabia was treating the sacred places of the Muslims. The *pir* declared, on the day the Congress ministries resigned (which was celebrated as ‘Day of Deliverance’ as per Jinnah’s appeal on December 22, 1939), from the AISC platform, ‘the flag of Muslim League is the flag of Islam’ and ‘all Muslims must join the League’.¹⁴

In fact, the different branches of AISC worked enthusiastically towards the making of Pakistan. The zeal for Pakistan was visible in the AISC weekly publication from Amritsar, *Al-Fiqh*. From 1942, the weekly started adding Pakistan after Amritsar to connote that the state had almost come into being. On October 19, 1945, the *pir* of Manki Sharif, Aminul Hasnat, convened a three-day meeting of *pirs* and *sajjada nashins* and organised the Jamiat-ul-Asfiah to support the cause of the League. In an early demonstration of its emphasis on an Islamic State of Pakistan, the *pir* of Manki Sharif had extracted an assurance from Jinnah as early as in November 1945 that the Constituent Assembly of the new State of Pakistan would ‘enact laws not inconsistent with the Sharia’.¹⁵ The dominance of the Barelvi ulema in the Pakistan movement can be gauged from the fact that out of the 35 ulema members of Masaikh Committee appointed by the League to utilise the support of *pirs* for the Pakistan movement, as many as 30 were of Barelvi persuasion.¹⁶ The Barelvis were prepared to rope in Muslims of other persuasions, with the exception perhaps of the Deobandis, into the movement. The Barelvi leaders such as Maulana Abdul Hamid Badayuni held that Pakistan was a matter of life and death for the Muslims and went to the extent of suggesting a merger of AISC with the AIML.¹⁷

One major reason for Deobandi disapproval of the idea of Pakistan was its expanding support base among the Shias, the Ahmadis or Mirzais and the Barelvis. Deobandis could not take such a heterodox movement as an Islamic movement and were rather alarmed by its populist overtones, which through the slogan of an Islamic state at the grassroots level by the Barelvi *pirs* and *sajjada nashins* (guardians of the shrines), overwhelmed their overly puritanical Islamic concerns. The Barelvis had earlier demonstrated their aversion to Deobandi approach to politics by refusing to join them in the Khilafat movement, for they had held that any alliance with the Hindus would not yield any positive dividend in the long run. The AIML’s strategy of employing local-level Barelvi saints and *sajjada nashins* also exhibited the

latter's susceptibility to the Pakistan movement.¹⁸ It is an irony of history that a majority of the central leadership of the Barelvi AISC chose to stay back in India after Partition and the creation of Pakistan in 1947.

Enter Pakistan: Deobandi–Barelvi Encounter in Politics

Immediately after Pakistan came into being, the two schools shed their aversion to worldly issues and tried to make their presence felt in the political scenario of the country (for a cursory view, refer to Table 2). The Deobandi AIJUI led by Maulana Usmani reorganised itself as Markaji JUI (MJUI) in 1947 with its head office at Karachi and the Barelvi AISC renamed itself as *Markazi Jamaat-i-ul-Ulema-i-Pakistan* (MJUP) in March 1948. However, the dissident Deobandi ulema, who supported the cause of Pakistan, played a more influential role than the Barelvi MJUP in the politics of Pakistan after 1947, even after the death of the most vocal Deobandi leader, Maulana Usmani, in 1949. Immediately after Partition, the Muslim League selected Maulana Usmani as one of the members of the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan (CAP), while there was no representation from MJUP. The Barelvi Sunni ulema were not quite comfortable with the close relationship between AIML and JUI, in spite of the fact that the Barelvis had almost offered to merge themselves with the AIML once upon a time. In fact, the sense of displeasure had expressed itself in the top leadership of the MJUP for the official patronage of Deobandis quite early in 1947–48. The Deobandi ulema claimed their role in influencing the framing of the 'Objective Resolution' of Pakistan, which was presented in March 1949. The Barelvis, on their part, sought membership for its leader Maulana Abdul Hamid Badayuni in the CAP, but the League leadership was not too keen on this offer.

Since the modernists—if not secularists—among the Muslim elites dominated the politics of the immediate post-Partition period, the Deobandis and Barelvis along with other groups like *Jamaat-i-Islami*, *Jamaat-i-Ahl-e-Hadith*, *Tahaffuz-i-Huquq-i-Shia Pakistan* and many others came together and started their campaign for an Islamic state. In a show of solidarity, which was not unusual in the early days of Partition, ulema of all groups gathered in Karachi on January 21, 1951, and evolved a consensus on 22 fundamental principles on which the Islamic state of Pakistan would be established. The initiative for this coming together was taken by the Deobandi ulema, and the recommendations were sent to the Nishtar committee for incorporation in the upcoming Constitution. These 22 fundamental principles were to form the basis for JUI demand for Islamisation for quite a long time.

Table 2 Deobandi–Barelvi Approaches: Post-Colonial Politics in Pakistan

Issues	Deobandi	Barelvi
Kashmir Constituent Assembly of Pakistan	Urged the government to use force Found representation	Nominated one representative, turned down
Ahmadiya Issue	Came together in their campaign for an Islamic state (1951), initiative taken by Deobandis Started the movement against Qadianis	Reluctant entrants Enthusiasm at the margins
Dissolution of Constituent Assembly of Pakistan (1954)	Opposed the move	Supported the move
Ayub's Rule	Fell out of official favour	Cosied up to Ayub Supported 1962 Constitution
Fatima Jinnah's Candidature 1965 War	Ready to support with conditions Ayub let the winning army down	Opposed to the idea of a woman president Supported Ayub
East Pakistan Issue of Regionalism Rise of Bhutto	Supported the idea of dialogue Supported talks Alliance with regional parties Did not see any contradiction between Islam and socialism	Supported armed intervention Saw it as divisive and opposed to Islam Held it anti-Islamic
Anti-Qadiani Movement of 1974	Participated in the movement enthusiastically Forced Bhutto to declare them non-Muslims	
Anti-Bhutto Alliance	Joined hands	

(Continued on next page)

Table 2 Deobandi–Barelvi Approaches: Post-Colonial Politics in Pakistan (*Continued*)

Issues	Deobandi	Barelvi
Nizam-e-Mustafa	Joined hands	
Zia-ul-Haq Rule	<i>Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Islam</i> Supported and then retracted Split when Fazlur joins MRD	Largely undecided
Afghan Jihad	Supported jihad. Joined the US–Pak–Saudi efforts Wahabisation and sectarian traits emerged	Participated but did not enjoy official patronage Jealously guarded their anti-Wahabi tenor
Madrassa	Saudi funds poured in Growth in geometric proportion	Barelvis seek to defend their turf. Rise in number of madrassas
Taliban	Received governmental attention and patronage Offensive militantisation	At the receiving end Defensive militantisation
Post-Taliban	Mainstream political groups from both the sub-sects joined hands as a political force, Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal; however, militant groups from both the groups continue to engage in violence	

It is also important to mention here that the Deobandis were the first to start the anti-Qadiani movement in the wake of the oft-cited speech by Sir Zafarullah Khan on May 18, 1952, at Jahangir Park in Karachi, where he emphasised on the finality of the Prophet and called the founder of the Ahmadiya movement, as a person commissioned by God for *tajdid-i-din* (revival of true religion). The Deobandis were particularly incensed about his assertion that ‘that Ahmadiyyat was a plant implanted by God Himself, that this plant had taken root to provide a guarantee for the preservation of Islam in fulfillment of the promise contained in the Qur’an, that if this plant were removed, Islam would no longer be a live religion but would be like a dried up tree having no demonstrable superiority over other religions’.¹⁹

Barelvis were reluctant entrants into the anti-Qadiani movement, but once they joined the movement, they left their mark. It should also be

mentioned here that in spite of the popular demonstrations on the streets by Barelvis, their leader Maulana Abul Hasnat Qadri was opposed to direct action against the Qadianis. The Barelvi MJUP all this while demanded an official ecclesiastical role for the ulema, and demanded that the Constitution ought to have a provision for ulema membership in the different organs of administration and judiciary. Barelvi ulema were not quite comfortable with the Deobandi influence in the process of the drafting of the Constitution and even hailed Governor General Ghulam Muhammad for dissolving the Assembly on October 24, 1954. As soon as the new Constituent Assembly was formed, the Barelvis made yet another unsuccessful attempt in 1955–1956 to make their presence felt until they, like the ulema of other schools, were swept away by the military rule by Ayub Khan.

Both the MJUI and MJUP suffered divisions because of first Partition and then the regional divide between the two parts of Pakistan, and the West Pakistan (WP) branches of JUI and JUP were formed in the mid-1950s. The JUP considered Ayub Khan's rule an opportunity for itself to grow and seek official patronage, and, thus, its leadership welcomed Ayub Khan's 1962 Constitution, whereas other Islamic parties opposed it. Ayub was particularly uncomfortable with the Deobandi JUI leadership and started cultivating the Barelvi JUP. Shahibzada Fazial Hassan—the *Sajjada nashin* (descendant of a sufi saint) of Alo Nahar Sharif—and leader of WPJUP after the death of Maulana Qadri—was particularly amenable to Ayub's conciliatory approach towards the Barelvi group. In the presidential elections of 1965, the Barelvi WPJUP opposed Fatima Jinnah's candidature on the ground that it was not Islamic to have a woman as a president of an Islamic country and supported Ayub Khan. On the contrary, the WPJUI led by Mufti Mahmud (1919–1980) and Ghulam Ghous Hazarvi was inclined to offer conditional support to Ms. Jinnah—the Combined Opposition Parties (COP) candidate. However, she was not prepared to accept the conditions to secure JUI's support.

Despite the official support it received during the rule of Ayub Khan, the Barelvi WPJUP was weakened by divisions. There were many groups within the party who opposed JUP's support to Ayub Khan, but still the central leaders were pro-Ayub and basked under official patronage. During the post-Ayub Khan period, it was the turn of the MJUI to side with the party most likely to come to power, the PPP, led by the charismatic Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. MJUI led by Mufti Mahmud supported Bhutto's idea of Islamic socialism. The Barelvi JUP along with Jamaat-i-Islami of Maulana Maududi

opposed the very idea of socialism and held it anti-Islamic. The JUI later fell out with Bhutto and the latter's policy of meddling with the provincial governments led by JUI and its alliance partner National Awami Party (NAP)—the left-wing Pakhtun nationalist party led by Badshah Khan's son Khan Abdul Wali Khan (1917–2006)—drove a wedge into its relationship with PPP. The anti-Qadiani movement in 1974 and the *Nizam-e-Mustafa* movement (Movement for the establishment of Mohammad's law) launched by the religious parties in the wake of the elections in 1977 saw the JUI and JUP coming closer. During this period, it was observed that the JUI led by Mufti Mahmud (1919–1980) consolidated its position in the North-Western Frontier Province (NWFP) and Balochistan, whereas JUP under the leadership of Maulana Shah Ahmad Noorani (1926–2003) sought to bring the Barelvi Ahl-e-Sunnat groups together under one umbrella in rural Punjab and Sindh.

Afghan Jihad and Militantisation²⁰ of Sectarian Divide

The JUI, JUP and other religious groups welcomed the military coup and the subsequent rule of General Zia-ul-Haq. They expected Zia to impose an Islamic rule in Pakistan. But it was the Jamaat-i-Islami led by Maulana Maududi that emerged as the party Zia-ul-Haq was comfortable with. The JUP disillusionment with Zia came early when it became clear that he had no intention of holding elections. It was the first among religious groups to disassociate itself from the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA)—which was formed with the avowed aim of ousting Bhutto from power. The PNA went on to join the National Government during the early days of Zia's rule, without the JUP. The JUI also discovered the same some time later and withdrew its support. Both JUP and JUI were condemned to political wilderness with the rising fortunes of Jamaat-i-Islami during the days of the Pakistan-backed Afghan jihad (1979–1989). However, this was the period when JUI, more than JUP, consolidated its hold in NWFP and northern Balochistan through a network of madrassas, under indirect official patronage. The Deobandi madrassas, which were being run under the leadership of Maulana Fazlur Rahman, Maulana Sami-ul-Haq and Sufi Muhammad, provided the personnel for jihad. Maulana Sami later came to be known as the 'Father of the Taliban'.

In fact, during the Afghan jihad years, the Zia-ul-Haq regime encouraged the Deobandi madrasa system and, very soon, there was a

proliferation of madrassas all over Pakistan. The jihad in Afghanistan altered the country's political landscape entirely. With the flow of funds from outside, madrassas grew in geometrical progression. By some estimates, the growth has been phenomenal since then.²¹ The official statistics regarding the number of Madrassas have been revised from time to time, and more and more madrassas have been forced to register themselves with the government. The Pakistani Minister for Religious Affairs, Mr. Ejaz-ul-Haq (Late Zia-ul-Haq's son), had recently informed Washington during his trip to the United States that there were 11,882 madrassas being run under the topmost Madrassa oversight board, *Ittehad-e-Tanzimat-e-Madarise-Dinya* (ITMD), and, of them, more than 11,000 had been registered.²²

With the flow of funds into Deobandi and Wahabi organisations and the adoption of militancy as a legitimate strategy by the government of Pakistan since the Afghan jihad, there was an increasing trend towards militancy within the sectarian groups in Pakistan. The emergence of Deobandi sectarian groups like Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan and their subsequent nexus with militant jihadi outfits such as Harkat-ul-Mujahideen and Lashkar-e-Tayiba during this period (and later with Jaish-e-Muhammad, a splinter group of Harkat) signalled a major transformation of the political realm in Pakistan. These militant outfits have since sought to change the sectarian landscape by force. The surge in inter-sectarian and intra-sectarian violence in Pakistan in the aftermath of the Afghan jihad proves this point.

During this period, another important development took place—the internal fragmentation of the JUI and JUP, the two mainstream political parties representing Deobandi and Barelvi views, respectively. The fragmentation has been ascribed to the electoral politics on non-party basis introduced by Zia-ul-Haq in 1985. It is also known that Fazlur Rahman's decision to join the anti-Zia pro-democracy movement in the late 1980s had created differences between him and other leaders within the JUI. During the 1985 elections, several groups from within JUI and JUP splintered away unofficially and contested the elections. In the early 1990s, the divisions became sharper.

The JUI got divided into different factions named after their leaders, i.e. Maulana Sami-ul-Haq (Akora Khattak, NWFP), Maulana Abdullah Darkhwasti (Rahim Yaar Khan, Punjab), Maulana Ajmal Qadri (Lahore, Punjab) and Maulana Fazlur Rahman (Dera Ismail Khan, NWFP). The

division was more political than ideological. These factions of JUI appeared moderate in comparison with militant sectarian groups such as Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Sipah-i-Sahaba, which were also founded during this period. But it did not stop here. The political support base of JUI was further divided into Tablighi Jamaat led by Maulana Abdul Wahab, and Tahaffuz-i-Khatam-i-Nabuwwat under Maulana Khan Muhammad of Kundian Sharif. There were other Deobandi factions such as Tahaffuz-i-Ahal-i-Sunnat under Syed Abdul Majeed Nadeem and Harkat-ul-Ansar led by Maulana Saadat Ullah Khan. Harkat-ul-Ansar became infamous later for its involvement in terrorist attacks in Jammu and Kashmir and Afghanistan. Another pan-Deobandi group was Sufi Muhammad's Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (Movement for the Enforcement of Islamic Law), which gained influence in Malakand and Swat.

The JUP also got divided into several groups. Sunni Tehrik was founded in the mid-1990s by Maulana Saleem Qadri of Karachi. Its followers wear dark brown turbans. Dawat-i-Islami was led by Maulana Ilyas Qadri, who had been president of the Anjuman Tulaba-i-Islam, Punjab, the youth wing of JUP. The Dawat-i-Islami built a huge campus at Kahna, in the suburb of Lahore. Its followers wear green turbans. Tahir-ul-Qadri, known for his institution, Minhaj-ul-Quran, which emphasises on preaching of Islam, heads two factions of the JUP, i.e. Jamaat Ahl-e-Sunnat and the Tehrik-i-Tahaffuz-i-Namoos-i-Risalat. The fragmentation of the Barelvi groups into regional and local groups was perhaps due to the weakening of the pulls of cohesive politics among the Barelvis at the national level. They were also divided on their approaches to politics and their views on how to defend their sectarian interests. Some of them advocated pacifist measures, whereas others like Sunni Tehrik advocated the use of force and violence in self-defence.

Aftermath of Afghan Jihad

The success of the Afghan jihad boosted the confidence of the Deobandi groups. Deobandi Maulanas—Fazlur Rahman, Maulana Sami-ul-Haq and Maulana Sufi Muhammad—gained a lot of prominence at the local level for their able participation in the Afghan jihad. In the context of state-sponsored militancy in the 1980s, Deobandi groups had taken to armed politics and asserted their presence in the internal politics of Pakistan. This had perhaps led to disenchantment among the Barelvi groups, and many

of the leaders took to militancy while groups such as Sunni Tehrik were set up to defend Barelvis against any possible attack by Deobandis and others.

After Zia's death in August 1988, Pakistan reverted to multi-party democracy. As Benazir Bhutto's Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) gained strong popular support, Zia's military successors fashioned out a pro-Islamic alliance called Islamic Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI or Islamic Democratic Alliance). Fazlur Rahman's softness towards Benazir Bhutto and his disinclination to join the army-backed alliance created further rift within the JUI. Among the several JUI factions, JUI-Fazlur (JUI-F) emerged as the major Deobandi political party and the principal successor to the old JUI. Rival JUI leader Abdullah Darkhwasti issued a *fatwa* declaring that a woman ruler was *haram* (heresy) in Islam. The Barelvi JUP joined IJI and hoped to benefit from its links with the army. However, the PPP led by Benazir came to power and JUI-F enjoyed her government's patronage. Benazir's removal and subsequent success of IJI in 1990 elections pushed JUI-F to the opposition again. During this period (1990–1993), the differences between the Deobandis and Barelvis were glossed over as the compulsions of competitive electoral politics-engendered political alliances among the Deobandi and Barelvi groups at the political level.

In the elections of 1993, there were three different Islamic alliances: Pakistan Islamic Front (PIF) led by Jamiat-i-Islami (JI), the Islami Jamhoori Mahaz (IJM) led by JUI-F and the *Muttahida Deeni Mahaz* (MDM), including the Sipah-i-Sahaba. Together, these fronts could secure just 6.7 per cent of the total votes.²³ Benazir's return to power in 1993 and the PPP's subsequent alliance with JUI-F led to the marginalisation of most of the other religious political groups. This was the period when out of all Deobandi factions, JUI-F played a major role in Benazir's efforts to bring Taliban into the centrestage in Afghanistan.

Deobandi extremist groups operating in Punjab and Sindh also began to be drawn into sectarian attacks on Shias during the early 1990s. The mainstream religious parties did seek to bridge the sectarian differences by forming a coalition dominated by the religious parties of all persuasions on March 24, 1995. This was named Milli Yakjehati Council (MYC), a coalition of more than 15 religious parties. The council, however, could not resolve internal differences amongst different factions of JUI. In the subsequent elections in 1997, after Benazir's second term was cut short by presidential intervention, JI's leader Qazi Hussain made an effort to bring several

religious parties together and convert MYC into an electoral alliance. He failed in his effort and JI finally boycotted the 1997 elections. The only party that survived through all this political permutation and combination was the JUI-F. Nawaz Sharif's party (PML-Nawaz) swept the 1997 polls as JUI-F could win two seats in the National Assembly. During Nawaz Sharif's second term, the faultline between Deobandi and Barelvis became wider with militants targeting leaders of both the groups on a regular basis.

Ever since the days of the Afghan jihad, the Deobandi–Barelvi competition at the political field has been transferred to the competition at the grassroots level. The Deobandis took maximum advantage of the jihad funds pouring in from outside and sought to expand their area of influence, while the Barelvis struggled to keep pace with them. It was around this time that the close nexus between the Pakistan State agencies and the Deobandi groups emerged. It was also interesting to find a larger Deobandi consensus emerging among other sister movements such as Ahl-e-Hadith and Tablighi Jamaat.²⁴

Intra-Sectarian Faultline Erupts: The Deobandi Militancy and Barelvi Response

If Afghan jihad radicalised approaches to Islam and militantised them, the withdrawal of Soviet troops left them with no other excuse for united action. During the jihad days, the Deobandis and Barelvis came together in Afghanistan and Pakistan to take on the enemy. But in the absence of a common enemy in the post-1989 period, these two groups started fighting between themselves. While, on the one hand, the nature of democratic politics between 1988 and 1999 de-emphasised the role of religion in politics, on the other, the government actively backed the Taliban in Afghanistan and the armed militant groups unleashed into Jammu and Kashmir. Politicians like Nawaz Sharif proved smarter than religious leaders and co-opted the Islamist agenda by coming out with the Sharia bill in 1998. Ironically, political marginalisation of the religious elements coincided with the rise of Islamic radicalism in Afghanistan actively patronised by the Pakistani State. The radical approach adopted by the Taliban had to have its impact in Pakistani society.

With the rise of the Taliban and its Deobandi outlook, the Wahabi incursion as a result of the co-option of Deobandi madrassas by the Saudi charitable organisations such as Al Hamrain and Al Rasheed trusts, as

well as the active support of the Pakistani State, the sectarian elements in Pakistan received a huge fillip, and the rising incidence of sectarian incidents since the 1990s proves this point.²⁵

The basic aim of the Barelvis in this context was initially to guard their turf and protect themselves against what they saw as a state-sponsored effort to wean away their following and weaken their influence. The Barelvi organisations thus responded to this Deobandi radicalisation by their efforts to weave different factions of Barelvi groups together and forge unity among them. In fact, unlike factions of Deobandi JUI, the Barelvi JUP had been a less assertive political outfit, and it was a loose and amorphous organisation, unable to bring disparate groups together as an effective political force in Pakistan. But, in recent years, there have been efforts to pool their strengths and establish themselves as a major political force.

Several Barelvi organisations have sought to take up the interest of the Barelvis in recent years. Some of them were Jamaat Ahl-e-Sunnat led by Syed Riaz Hussain Shah, Pakistani Awami Tehrik (PAT) led by Allama Tahir-ul-Qadri, Dawat-i-Islami led by Maulana Illyas Qadri and Allami Tanzim Ahl-e-Sunnat led by Maulana Afzal Qadri. In fact, in response to the Deobandi militancy targeting Barelvi mosques and leaders, the late Salim Qadri, a former member of Barelvi Dawat-i-Islami, had founded the militant Sunni Tehrik in 1990. Among several demands that the Tehrik placed on the state, the most important one was that the state should ensure adequate Barelvi representation in government services and armed forces as well, which the Tehrik viewed as grossly tilted towards the Deobandis.

The sway of the jihadi Deobandi ulema has radicalised Pakistan society during the past two decades. The militantisation of one sect has led to militantisation of others. The most disturbing factor for Pakistan in all this was the intra-Sunni divide that has surfaced in the last few years. This showed that the roots of sectarian conflict had gone deeper than it appeared at the surface level. The murder of a Deobandi cleric, Maulana Yusuf Ludhianvi on May 18, 2000, and the murder of Sunni Tehrik Chief Maulana Saleem Qadri on May 18, 2001, exactly a year later, showed the way the intra-sectarian divide has opened up in the post-Afghan jihad years. The fact that in spite of the Musharraf regime's best efforts, the Deobandis could successfully attack the Milad un Nabi congregation and wipe out the top leadership of the Tehrik on April 11, 2006, at Nishtar Park, further proves the point that the Deobandi–Barelvi intra-sectarian divide is

likely to erupt more ominously in the days to come. It is also true that intra-sectarian violence has assumed a dynamics of its own and pan-sectarian political alliances like Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal (MMA or United Council of Action), which brought together the mainstream Deobandi and Barelvi groups, may not be able to preclude the possibility of continuing bloody encounters between the two groups in future.

Conclusion

The basic differences between the two Sunni sub-sects, Deobandi and Barelvi, have remained unreconciled as the separate theological and philosophical traditions have congealed over time through their enthusiastic propagation by separate madrassa education systems. As the lines of division have hardened over time, their separate responses to the external stimuli have thrown up interesting patterns. At times, the two Sunni schools have come together to take on a common enemy while jealously guarding the sacred frontiers of their separate worldviews and their theosophical principles.

The two schools of thought came together in the anti-Qadiani movement in the 1950s and then in 1970s. But they tried their best to outbid each other in the anti-Qadiani movement for *Khatm-e-Nabuwat* as well as the movement for *Nizam-e-Mustafa*, which was effectively co-opted by Zia-ul-Haq, to their disadvantage. They were (and still are) quite vociferous about the Islamisation of the Constitution and law in Pakistan. But, these commonalities apart, they competed with each other for following and influence, each claiming to be more Islamic than the other.

Till the advent of the Afghan jihad, the history of their interaction showed that while the differences could be visceral, they would rather choose the weapons of '*munazara*' (debate) and competitive propagation of their line of thinking through scholarly articulations in their publications to take on each other. However, in the post-Taliban period, the most effective strategy has been to decimate the opponent through targeted violent attacks.

Although proliferation of madrassas is not a full indicator of the growing militancy in Pakistan, it is true that they have contributed to the sustenance of a conservative environment that can host violence. In fact, the experience of Afghan jihad and the purported success of the strategy of

employing religiously inspired *mujahideen* against the Soviet Union has convinced the orthodox constituency in Pakistan that the traditional methods of keeping and preaching faith through forceful argumentation would need to be supplemented by new means of coercion. The easy availability of small arms in the country has made the matters worse.

The Nishtar Park tragedy, as well as the case of encounter between the two clerics in the Bara Tehsil of the Khyber agency in NWFP, is suggestive of their reconcilability of the two worldviews. In fact, the Nishtar Park incident is being analysed as an extrapolation of the struggle for power between the Deobandi Mufti Munir Shakir and the Barelvi Afghan Pir Saifur Rehman in Bara, which went on for almost two years before the administration asked both the clerics to leave Bara. While Pir Saif left immediately, Munir was forced to leave Bara. Munir landed up in the Tirah valley and was reported to be sowing his brand of sectarianism there. His disciple Mangal Bagh, who heads the militant outfit, Lashkar-i-Islam, has kept the Pakistani security forces on high alert since April 2006.

At the moment, different Sunni Barelvi organisations—there are as many as 45 of them in Pakistan today²⁶—are trying to come together ever since the Bara encounter between the followers of Mufti Munir and Pir Saif claimed nearly 13 lives, mostly Barelvis. The April 11, Nishtar Park tragedy has awakened the Barelvi leadership who are now seriously thinking of coming out with a Grand Sunni Party (GSP) led by Pir Pagaro. Given Pir Pagaro's mercurial character, such an alliance may not be politically influential but the fact that the Barelvi community is now aware of its weaknesses and working towards overcoming them is a sign of changes taking place. Such a political formulation may consolidate Barelvi constituency vis-a-vis the Deobandis and others and could also radicalise their politics.

A leading commentator and close observer of the sectarian politics in Pakistan, Khaled Ahmed argued in the beginning of 2000 that if 1996 marked the shift to militant Deobandism with the rushing of Pakistani recruits to defend the Taliban in Afghanistan, then from 2000, Pakistan 'promised to revert to the non-Deobandi track'. He argued that the Pakistani society had already reacted to 'the puritanism and extremism of Deobandism by inclining to the popular Islam of the Barelvis'²⁷ and 'charismatic organiser-mystics' like Illyas Qadri, Shah Raiz Hussain and Tahir-ul-Qadri, who had started tapping the expatriate Pakistani community unsullied by

jihad for fiscal support in nourishing Barelvi constituencies in Pakistan. The Barelvis, according to Khaled Ahmed, had also adopted a very accommodative posture vis-a-vis the Shias with the hope of bringing them on board in their struggle against the Deobandis.

In the coming days, the sectarian situation in Pakistan is expected to worsen. The aim of the Deobandi–Barelvi sectarian organisations has been to acquire mosques, wipe out rival faith or belief systems by force, and employ all possible means to protect their separate constituencies. It is expected that such an unremitting bloody struggle for power and influence at the local levels between a highly organised network of Deobandi militants and a loose but increasingly self-conscious community of Barelvis is not going to abate easily. This is likely to further worsen the internal security problems of the Pakistani State. At another level, such militancy at the sub-sectarian level has the potential to influence *intra*-sectarian divides among Muslims in neighbouring states and societies.

Notes

- ¹ As per the statistics provided in the *1998 Census of Pakistan*. See http://www.statpak.gov.pk/depts/pco/statistics/other_tables/pop_by_religion.pdf (Accessed November 11, 2007).
- ² Ibn Khaldun was born in present-day Tunisia. He is well known for his work, *Muqaddimah* (translated into Latin as *Prolegomenon*), which is regarded as the first-ever work on the philosophy of history. He is also considered as the first philosopher in the medieval period who dealt with a wide variety of subjects like historiography, mathematics, economics, sociology, theology and cultural studies.
- ³ As per the estimates of *CIA World Factbook, 2005*, at <http://www.cia.gov> (Accessed October 1, 2007).
- ⁴ As per the estimates of [globalsecurity.org](http://www.globalsecurity.org) based in Alexandria, Virginia, at <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/intro/islam-barelvi.htm> (Accessed October 1, 2007).
- ⁵ I have deliberately introduced this jargon to differentiate it from its variant ‘militarisation’ and would suggest that there is an ideological drive/orientation guiding militancy, which could be an important point of difference between the two.
- ⁶ See *Dawn* (Karachi), April 12, 2007.
- ⁷ In his letter to the Abdali, he wrote, ‘... All control of power is with the Hindus because they are the only people who are industrious and adaptable. Riches and prosperity are theirs, while Muslims have nothing but poverty and misery. At this juncture you are the only person, who has the initiative, the foresight, the power and capability to defeat the enemy and free the Muslims from the clutches

of the infidels. God forbid if their domination continues, Muslims will even forget Islam and become undistinguishable from the non-Muslims'. Translation from his original letter in Sayed Riaz Ahmad, *Maulana Maududi and Islamic State*, People's Publishing House, Lahore, 1976, p. 15.

- ⁸ Prominent among them were his son Shah Abdul Aziz (1746–1823), Shah Waliullah Rafi-uddin (1749–1818), Shah Abdul Qadir (1751–1816) and Abdul Ghani, whose son was the famous *alim* Shah Ismail Shaheed.
- ⁹ For details, see Francis Robinson, *The Ulema of Firangi Mahal and Islamic Culture in South Asia*, Permanent Black, Delhi, 2001.
- ¹⁰ The argument here is influenced by the position taken by Mumtaz Ahamad in his article 'Islamic Fundamentalism in South Asia: The Jamaat-i-Islami and Tablighi Jamaat of South Asia,' in Martin E. Marty and R. Scot Appleby (eds.), *Fundamentalism Observed*, The Fundamentalism Project, I, paperback edition, University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 1994, pp. 457–529.
- ¹¹ For details regarding the Deoband madrasa and Deobandi world view, see Barbara D. Metcalf, *Revival in British India: Deoband, 1860–1900*, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 2002.
- ¹² For details about Barelvi interpretation of Islam, see Usha Sanyal, *Devotional Islam and Politics in British India. Ahmad Riza Khan Barelvi and His Movement, 1870–1920*, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1996.
- ¹³ For a detailed discussion of the formation of the JUI and its participation in Pakistani politics, see Sayyid A.S. Pirzada, *The Politics of the Jamiat-Ulema-i-Islam Pakistan 1971–1977*, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 2000.
- ¹⁴ Quoted in Mujeeb Ahmad, *Jam'iyat 'Ulama-i-Pakistan 1948–1979*, National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, Islamabad, 1993, p. xxi.
- ¹⁵ See Khalid Bin Sayeed, *Pakistan: The Formative Years: 1857–1948*, Oxford University Press, London and New York, 1968, p. 19.
- ¹⁶ Ian Talbot, *Provincial Politics and the Pakistan Movement: The Growth of Muslim League in North–West and North–East India (1937–1947)*, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1988, pp. 23–24.
- ¹⁷ This is not to suggest, however, that there was absolutely no opposition to the idea of Pakistan from the Barelvi ranks. There were some Barelvi Sunni leaders like Maulana Qari Muhammad Tayyib, Pir Muhammad Sirajul Huda Qadiri, Maulana Hashmat Ali Khan and Shah Aulad-i-Rasul Muhammad Mian Marahrawi (1892–1052), who formed their own branch of Jamaat-i-Ahle Sunnat in 1935, and many others who adopted a line close to the central leadership of the Deobandis and argued that if support for the Congress was *kufir* then support for League led by apostates, hypocrites and Shias like Jinnah was *haram*.
- ¹⁸ For a detailed discussion on the way the popular support for Pakistan was generated, see Ian Talbot, *Freedom's Cry: The Popular Dimension in the Pakistan Movement and Partition Experience in Northwest India*, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1996,

and David Gilmartin, *Empire and Islam: Punjab and the Making of Pakistan*, Oxford University Press, London, 1988.

- ¹⁹ Report of the Court of Enquiry constituted under Punjab Act II of 1954 to enquire into the Punjab Disturbances of 1953, Government Printing Press, Lahore, Punjab, 1954, p. 75.
- ²⁰ I have used this word, for want of a better alternative, to connote the onset of militancy during this period when the society was radicalised at both the ideological and operational levels. There were many groups in Pakistan who thought they could impose their brand of Islam through militant means.
- ²¹ As per the report of the International Crisis Group, titled 'Pakistan: Madrasas, Extremism and the Military' of July 29, 2002 (Islamabad, Brussels): "In the first years of Zia's Islamisation (1979–82), only 151 new seminaries were established. During the next six years, as the Afghan jihad gained momentum, 1,000 more opened. According to the last (1995) official update, 2,010 new madrasas had been registered since 1979, raising the total number registered to 3,906."
- ²² *India Abroad News Service*, July 25, 2006.
- ²³ Data taken from Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) website, <http://www.hrcpelectoralwatch.org/partyprofiles.cfm> (Accessed November 11, 2007).
- ²⁴ Khaled Ahmad, 'The Grand Deobandi Consensus,' *The Friday Times*, Lahore, February 4–10, 2000, p. 4.
- ²⁵ See for a detailed discussion, 'The State of Sectarianism in Pakistan,' *Asia Report No. 95*, Report of the International Crisis Group, Islamabad, Brussels, April 18, 2005.
- ²⁶ For details on Barelvi and Deobandi organisations, see Muhammad Amir Rana, *Gateway to Terrorism*, New Millennium Publication, London, 2003.
- ²⁷ Khaled Ahmed, 'Re-assertion of the Barelvis in Pakistan,' *The Friday Times*, Lahore, September 8, 2000, p. 3.

Ashok K. Behuria is a Research Fellow at IDSA.